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Abstract
The  so-called  ‘amphiboly’  section  of  Kant’s  Critique  of  Pure  Reason is  a
section  that  has  remained relatively  understudied  in  commentaries  and
literature  on  the  Critique.  In  this  brief  appendix  to  the  Transcendental
Analytic,  Kant  puts  forward  a  charge  against  his  German  Rationalist
heritage  –  the  philosophical  tradition  of  Leibniz,  Wolf,  Baumgarten  –
claiming for  this  heritage the error  of  an ‘amphiboly of  the concepts  of
reflection’.  When  the  precise  nature  of  this  charge  is  appreciated,  it  is
possible to see that both the recognition of the error and the identifcation
of its correction play a crucial role in the Critical philosophy itself. In this
study, it is my aim to bring to light certain signifcant details of Kant’s case
in the appendix and the crucial ways in which these play a subsequent role
in the Critique itself.
The  study  begins  with  an  examination  of  the  case  in  the  appendix,
focussing  on  what  I  take  to  be  a  crucial  line  of  reasoning found in  its
introductory passages. Thereafter, the study divides broadly into two parts.
In the frst part,  I examine the line of reasoning insofar as it  concerns a
claimed error in the German Rationalist tradition. I show that the error is to
be  found  in  an  implicit  commitment  in  the  frst  stage  of  the  German
Rationalist  method for philosophical cognition, the stage of bringing the
representations  of  philosophy  to  distinctness,  and  show  the  line  of
reasoning  in  the  appendix  to  constitute  Kant’s  Critical  response  to  this
commitment. In the later part of the study, I turn to the signifcance of the
line of reasoning for the early parts  of  the  Critique,  in particular  for the
proofs of the Transcendental Aesthetic’s Metaphysical Exposition, showing
these proofs to be the culmination of Kant’s corrected Critical method for
bringing the representations of philosophy to distinctness. 
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Impact statement
The research presented in this  thesis  is  likely to be of particular  interest to
scholars  within  the  history  of  philosophy  with  the  aim  of  furthering  the
interpretive understanding of one of the key fgures in philosophy since the
Eighteenth  Century,  Immanuel  Kant.  The  research  puts  forward  a  novel
interpretation of  both some relatively under-appreciated passages in Kant's
magnum opus, the  Critique of Pure Reason, as well as some of the more well-
worn passages,  each of which are signifcant for our understanding of Kant's
philosophy  as  well  as  for  our  understanding  of  the  ways  in  which
contemporary philosophical accounts have been influenced by this celebrated
and important text. 
This development in interpretive understanding is likely to be incremental, as
much philosophical development is, and will not be limited by region.
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Introduction
The so-called ‘amphiboly’ section of the Critique of Pure Reason is a section
that has remained relatively understudied in commentaries and literature
on the Critique. In this brief appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, Kant
puts forward a charge against his Leibnizian heritage – a tradition equally
influencing Wolf and Baumgarten – claiming for this heritage the error of
an ‘amphiboly of the concepts of reflection’. When the precise nature of this
charge is appreciated, it is possible to see that both the recognition of the
error and the identifcation of its correction play a crucial role in the Critical
philosophy itself. In this study, it is my aim to bring to light certain crucial
details of the case that Kant puts forward in the appendix and to trace out
the ways in which these play a signifcant subsequent role in the  Critique
itself – a role that has, as yet, gone unappreciated. 
Over the course of gaining an appreciation of the case put forward in the
appendix,  a  number of  diferent,  though interrelated,  lines will  come to
light. Each of these will form part of the overall picture here put forward, a
picture ultimately meant to establish the Critical signifcance of the case. In
this brief introduction, I will trace these lines and provide something of an
overview of the picture that the study means to establish, turning thereafter
to some of its qualifcations and caveats. 
In its most familiar formulation, the charge put forward in the appendix
concerns a certain confusion regarding the objects of our cognition. Indeed,
as  we  fnd  it  explicitly  formulated  in  the  appendix,  the  Leibnizian
philosophy is said to “[take] the appearances for things in themselves, thus
for intelligibilia, i.e., objects of the pure understanding” (A264/B320).  Or
again,  the  ‘transcendental  amphiboly’  that  it  commits  is  that  of  a
“[confusion of] the pure object of the understanding with the appearance.”
(A270/B326) Now, this formulation is not erroneous. Indeed, these are the
terms in which Kant himself formulates the case. It is, however, the tail-end
of a much more complex and systematic case that is  to be found in the
appendix – a tail-end that emerges as an implication of the case’s more
fundamental core. Once properly understood, the charge will be seen to
concern,  not  the  objects  of  our  cognition,  but  our  representations
considered  as  representations.  It  is  here  that  the  fundamental  error  with
which Kant is concerned in the appendix is to be found – the error upon
which the more familiar charge depends. 
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The key to the appendix and the core of its case is contained in its short,
lesser treated, introductory section. It is in this brief introduction that we
fnd a  complex,  and at  times  opaque,  line  of  reasoning.  In  this  line  of
reasoning, we are presented with the distinction between an erroneous and
a  correct  employment  of  a  certain,  less  familiar,  set  of  concepts,  the
concepts of reflection. In crucial contrast to the concepts put forward prior
to the appendix, the concepts of reflection are not concepts of objects, but
concepts of representations. They are, as Kant tells us, somewhat opaquely,
concepts  of  the  “relations  of  given  representations  among  themselves”
(A260/B316). And what this line of reasoning shows is that the possibility of
a  priori,  or  philosophical,  cognition  requires  precisely  that  the  correct
employment  of  these  concepts  is  distinguished  from  their  erroneous
employment and that they are so employed.
In order to understand this case that Kant puts forward in the appendix,
it  will  be  necessary  to  digress  to  an  examination  of  Kant’s  account  of
philosophical  method.  It  is  only once  we locate  the  employment  of  the
concepts  of  reflection within the procedure  for arriving at  philosophical
cognition, a procedure shared in important ways by Leibniz, Wolf and his
followers, and the Critical philosophy, that the importance and intricacy of
the role played by the concepts of reflection in such cognition can be seen.
Over the course of this examination, we will come to see that the case in the
appendix concerns a further crucial way in which the Critical philosophy
involves  a  correction  to  the  philosophical  method  of  its  heritage,  the
correction to its employment of the concepts of reflection – a correction that
has not, thus far, been recognised in extant discussion. Having in hand this
understanding  of  the  employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection  within
philosophical cognition, and indeed of their correct employment in such
cognition, we will then be able to see how the early parts of the Critique, in
particular  the  proofs  of  the  Aesthetic’s  Metaphysical  Exposition,  are,  in
signifcant ways, the culmination of their corrected employment. 
The study proceeds as follows. I begin in Part I with an examination of
the case in the appendix itself, focussing on what I take to be a crucial line
of reasoning found in its introduction. This examination is preceded by an
exposition of the account of the appendix as it is familiarly formulated in
the literature. In Parts II to IV, I then turn to a progressive comparison of
the correct method for philosophical cognition as it is put forward under
German Rationalism, under Kant’s ‘moderate’ pre-Critical account in the
Inquiry, and under the Critical philosophy. The discussion in Parts II to IV
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proceeds from the general to the more specifc, with Part IV identifying an
implicit complex commitment at a narrow, precise point in the methods,
which commitment involves the employment of the concepts of reflection.
In Part V, I turn to the signifcance of these fndings for the early parts of
the  Critique, in particular for the proofs of the Transcendental Aesthetic’s
Metaphysical Exposition. Part V, which also emerges as the longest part of
the  study,  begins  with  a  number  of  overlooked  details  in  Kant’s
explanation of the Metaphysical Exposition, which details are followed by
an intricate analysis of the proofs themselves. The part is appended with
some discussion of the continuity and discontinuity between the Critical
philosophy  and  its  German  Rationalist  predecessor  in  relation  to
philosophical method. Finally, in Parts VI and VII, I return to the case in the
appendix.  Part  VI  is  a  re-examination  of  the  case  and  its  familiar
formulation in light of the discoveries of Parts II to V, while Part VII is an
examination of three important accounts of the appendix that deviate both
from the familiar formulations and from my own in important ways. 
Before  commencing  shortly  on  this  course,  it  is  worth  noting  a  few
caveats and qualifcations with regard to the aim and subject mater of our
study.  First,  the  aim of  this  study  is  to  be  understood as  philosophical
rather  than  historical.  That  is,  our  underlying  aim  will  be  to  make
philosophical  sense of  the  case  in  the  appendix,  and  to  come  to  an
understanding of its philosophical role in Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical
accounts  of  philosophical  cognition.  The  study  is  not  intended  as  an
exhaustive historical account of the claims and traditions that it treats. In
consequence, our appeal to historical sources will extend only as far as is
needed to achieve this philosophical aim, and not as far as it would do if
our  aim  were  the  contrasting  one  of  providing  a  thorough  historical
account of the claims. This consideration plays out in the range of texts
found in the study in at  least  two ways.  First,  although precursors  and
passages relevant to the claims of the appendix can be found in a number
of texts and passages both in Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical writings, I will
focus on only on certain of these – viz. on those that turn out to be crucial to
our philosophical understanding of the case in question. Secondly, rather
than bearing any pretence to thoroughness with regard to the tradition to
which Kant is responding, our appeal here will be to a select and limited
range of these German Rationalist  authors and texts – viz.  to those that
clearly express or evince the philosophically relevant claims and positions.
In many instances, I will provide references to a number of such authors or
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passages, but again, these parts of the study are not to be understood as an
atempt to provide a thorough historical exposition of the claim or position.
The subject mater of this study is also narrow in a second way. In the
appendix,  Kant,  for  the  most  part,  directs  his  case  to  the  Leibnizian
philosophy. And this aspect of the case equally applies, as we will see, to
the tradition influenced by Leibniz, the philosophical tradition of Wolf and
Baumgarten.  There is,  however,  another  tradition towards  which Kant’s
case in the appendix is directed, a tradition that is charged with a converse
error: “Locke,” Kant tells us, “sensitivized the concepts of understanding”
(A271/B327)  and,  in  this  converse  way,  is,  alongside  Leibniz,  the  other
“great [man who] holds on only to one of [the two diferent sources of
representation]  which in his  opinion is  immediately  related to things in
themselves.”  (ibid.)  In  these  remarks,  Kant  is  typically  taken  to  raise  a
charge against a tradition that, in various ways, opposes that of Leibniz,
Wolf, and Baumgarten: The empiricist  tradition of Locke, Berkeley,  and
Hume (and, to varying degrees, of Lambert, Knuten, and Tetens). Now,
while I believe that the case that we will uncover in the introduction to the
appendix applies equally – as Kant indicates – and no less interestingly to
strands of this later tradition, our atention in this study will be restricted
to the former aspect of the case, viz. to its application to the tradition of
Leibniz, Wolf, and Baumgarten. The reasons for this are threefold. The frst
is the obvious and usual spectre of constraints of space. As we will see, an
understanding  of  Kant’s  charge  against  the  Leibnizian  philosophy  will
require a detailed and lengthy digression into the philosophical methods of
the tradition within which Kant was working. It would not be possible to
do this sort of justice to a further tradition within the space of this study.
Secondly,  the  frst  aspect  of  the  case,  as  mentioned,  is  the  charge  as  it
applies to the tradition within which Kant was working, and it is arguably
the more fundamental of the two aspects to the appendix’s case, both in
terms  of  chronological  priority  and  in  terms  of  its  implications  for  the
Critical philosophy. Finally, and relatedly, the culmination of the case in
the appendix is,  as  we will  see,  a  correction of  the tradition of  Leibniz,
Wolf, and Baumgarten. That is, the Critical correction of the error laid out
in the appendix, as it is found in the  Critique itself, is a correction to the
error as it is found within this tradition. Our point of interest will thus be
restricted to the case of the appendix as it is directed towards the tradition
influenced by Leibniz, regretably overlooking the contrasting tradition of
Lockean stripe.
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This  study is  narrow in a third way. Turning to the reception of the
Critique and Kant’s legacy, certain claims of the appendix were debated,
rejected, and defended in various ways.  These responses to the  Critique,
and equally to certain claims found in the appendix, might be divided very
broadly into two. First, there were those responses that, in various ways,
atacked the Critique on the basis of its failing to fulfl its aims – that is, on
the  basis  in  failing  to  provide  a  coherent  fundamental  account  of  our
cognition  that  corrected  the  preceding  tradition  of  German  rationalism.
With  regard  to  the  claims  of  the  appendix,  we  might  here  mention
Maimon’s  atempt  to  give  a  more  signifcant  role  to  the  concepts  of
reflection. Secondly, there are those that atacked the Critique in defence of
the preceding tradition of German Rationalism. Again, in relation to the
claims of the appendix, it is well-known, for example, that Eberhard and
Kant undertook an extensive debate over the distinctness of sensibility and
the understanding. 
Now,  although  these  subsequent  debates  and  developments  of  the
material of the appendix are of unquestionable interest in their own right,
this study will be restricted to the claims of the appendix as a response to the
prior tradition and will not extend to this ‘after-life’ of the appendix chapter
as an examination of its reception in turn. Again, our frst reason for this
restriction  is  the  constraint  of  length.  Secondly,  and  more  importantly,
many of these discussions would render us too far afeld from our place of
interest. The crucial details of the case in the appendix that we will bring to
light  are  details  that  apply  to  the  pre-Critical  tradition  of  German
Rationalism,  as  Kant understood it,  and our interest  here  will  be in the
appendix as puting forward a crucial, yet unrecognised, response to this
tradition. One potential exception to this restriction can, of course, be found
in the second of the responses to the Critique – viz. in those who responded
on behalf of German Rationalism. Nonetheless, as will become clear over
the course of the study, the features of the German Rationalist account with
which  Kant  is  primarily  concerned  in  the  appendix  can  be  found  in  a
number of  the  German Rationalist  fgures prior  to Kant,  and,  given the
philosophical  nature  of  our  aim,  an  examination  of  the  subsequent
Eberhard-Kant  controversy  or  similar  would  be  supplementary  and  an
occasion for a diferent discussion.  
Finally, as a third point of narrowing, this study is – for beter or worse –
largely not intended to be evaluative.  That is,  our aim here will,  for the
most  part,  be  to  put  forward  an  account  of  a  specifc  aspect  of  Kant’s
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response  to  his  preceding  tradition,  and  not  to  provide  any  further  or
explicit evaluation either of the strength of Kant’s position nor that of his
predecessors, whether from the perspective of the accounts prevalent at the
time  or  in  our  own  contemporary  terms.  (This  caveat  is,  however,
admitedly qualifed. A certain implicit evaluative element will be evident at
certain points insofar as our aim is to render Kant’s case as intelligible and
clear as possible.) As we will see, merely puting forward an interpretive
account of Kant’s response in the appendix will carry us to the length of
this study, and so the further task of explicitly adjudicating between the
views, and their comparison or incorporation into contemporary accounts,
is one for a later undertaking. 
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Part I
The case in the appendix
The  point  of  interest  of  this  study  is  a  case  put  forward  by  Kant  that
concerns  the  employment  of  a  less  familiar  set  of  concepts,  viz.  the
employment of the concepts of reflection. This case is to be found in the
brief appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, the section entitled ‘On the
amphiboly of the concepts of reflection’. As we will come to see, this case,
found in this brief and oft-overlooked section of the Critique,1 turns out to
be crucial to the Critical philosophy and to our understanding of it. In this
part, I turn to an examination of the appendix and the case that Kant there
puts forward.
Part I proceeds as follows. In Section I, I begin with some preliminary
discussion  of  the  appendix  in  order  that  we  might  orient  ourselves
somewhat in its relation to the rest of the  Critique. Section II turns to the
formulation of  the  case  in  the  appendix  as  it  is  familiarly  found in  the
literature. In Section III, I give a brief preliminary exposition of the novel
subject  mater of  the appendix,  the  concepts  of  reflection.  Thereafter,  in
Sections  IV and V,  I  turn  to  a  crucial,  but  inadequately treated,  line  of
reasoning that Kant puts forward concerning these concepts: In Section IV,
I examine this line of reasoning more closely, while Section V addresses a
number of questions and puzzles that arise when we consider the precise
meaning  of  Kant’s  case  concerning  these  concepts,  along  with  some
preliminary and speculative answers to these. 
1 Throughout  this  study,  ‘Critique’  will  refer  to  the  frst  of  Kant’s  three  critiques,  the
Critique of Pure Reason, with all A/B citations referring to the passage numbering of the
1781(A)  and the 1787(B) editions of the text respectively. When referring to any of Kant’s
other texts, I will use an abbreviated title of the text, indicated where necessary, with all
two-value (volume:page) citations referring to the location of the passage in the Academy
edition of Kant’s works.
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I. Preliminary orientation
The  appendix  is  to  be  characterised  in  a  number  of  ways.  Foremost,
however, it is an examination of the employment of a newly introduced set
of  concepts,  the concepts  of  reflection.  These concepts  are,  in  important
ways, to be distinguished from the representations treated in the preceding
Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic and from the concepts treated in the
subsequent Dialectic. Most notably, in addressing the concepts of reflection,
Kant  turns  his  atention  from  concepts  of  objects  to  concepts  of
representations. More specifcally, the concepts of reflection subsume, Kant
tells us, the relations of representations “among themselves” (A260/B316).
In so doing, the appendix comes to be populated with a distinct subject
mater. Kant is no longer concerned with concepts that might ultimately
subsume objects, but with concepts that are in some way of the subject. The
concern of the appendix is with the correct employment of a certain set of
such subjective concepts. 
Secondly,  the  appendix  explicitly  treats,  for  the  frst  time  within  the
Critique,  the  activity  of  transcendental  reflection.  It  is  here  that  such
reflection receives explicit characterisation, and it is here that we fnd the
line  of  reasoning  that  shows  it  to  be  necessary  for  a  priori  cognition.
Transcendental reflection, we are told in the introduction, is “consciousness
of the relation of given representations to our various sources of cognition”
(A260/B316)  or  again,  later,  “the  action  through  which  I  make  the
comparison  of  representations  in  general  with  the  cognitive  power  in
which they are situated” (A261/B317). As we will come to see, the appendix
shows such reflection to be “a duty from which no one can escape if he
would judge anything about things a priori.” (A263/B319)
Neither  of  these  characterisations,  however,  constitute  the  appendix
with which we are most familiar. The appendix – the ‘Amphiboly Chapter’
– is surely most closely associated, thirdly, with a charge that is raised in it
against the Leibnizian philosophy. Here Kant charges this philosophy with
commiting an ‘amphiboly of the concepts of reflection’. Such an amphiboly
involves  “a  confusion  of  the  pure  object  of  the  understanding with  the
appearance” (A270/B326), and in the appendix Kant claims to show how
Leibniz’s “allegedly synthetic principles […] are grounded solely on [such]
a transcendental amphiboly” (A270-1/B325-6).
Such  are  the  primary  ways  in  which  the  appendix  might  be
characterised. As we progress, these various strands of the appendix will
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come to light. Before beginning a closer examination of the appendix itself,
however,  I  turn to a discussion of  the appendix as  it  is  most  familiarly
treated in the literature. 
II. The familiar formulation
The case in the appendix, though understudied, is by no means unstudied,
and  has  received  a  familiar  formulation  in  various  discussions  in  the
literature.  A  few  of  these  discussions  are  found  within  an  overall
commentary on the Critique, though by-and-large the appendix has tended
to receive litle or no treatment among these general commentaries2 on the
Critique. Other mention is often found within discussions that involve the
appendix  somewhat  tangentially.3 More  recently,  a  number  of  more
detailed treatments4 of  the section have appeared, motivated by various
interpretive objectives. Aside from a few noteworthy exceptions5, three of
which I will deal with in Part VII, these discussions all characterise the case
in the appendix in a broadly similar way. In what follows, I will outline the
case in the appendix as it is typically presented in this literature. 
In  its  familiar  formulation,  the  Amphiboly  Chapter  is,  in  the  frst
instance, concerned with puting forward a charge against the philosophy
of Leibniz.6 This charge atributes to the Leibnizian philosophy a general
2 A fuller  treatment of the appendix can be found in Bird (2006),  Hartnack (1967),  and
Kemp Smith (2003). A briefer mention of the section is found in Gardner (1999) and Paton
(1936).  No mention  of  the  appendix  is  found in  Bennet (1966),  Guyer  (2006),  Guyer
(1987), Strawson (1966), or Wood (2005).
3 See  Allais  (2013),  Janiak  (2010),  Jauernig  (2008),  Kleist  (2012),  McBay  Merrit (2009),
Nuzzo (2008), Perrejin (1997), Sutherland (2004), Sutherland (2006), Warren (2013).
4 See de Boer (2010), Langton (1998), Longuenesse (1998), McBay Merrit (2015), Nunziante
and Vanzo (2009), Parkinson (1981), Zinkin (2008).
5 The primary of these are de Boer (2010), Longuenesse (1998), McBay Merrit (2015), and
Waxman (2013).
6 Although Kant’s entire discussion in the appendix is expressly directed towards Leibniz’s
philosophy, the following are worth noting:
(i) There has been a fair bit of discussion in the literature both as to the exact content of
the  claims  atributed  by  Kant  to  Leibniz  and  as  to  whether  the  claims  are  in  fact
atributable to Leibniz. 
(ii) In many cases, it is plausible that the claim in question is also, or sometimes in fact
rather, atributable to the Leibnizian tradition (the so-called ‘Leibniz-Wolf’ tradition). This
tradition, which included the philosophies of Wolf, Baumgarten, Meier, and Knuten,
among others, was informed by and coincided with Leibniz’s philosophy in many ways
(in  its  adoption  of  the  principle  of  sufcient  reason,  for  example),  but  received  its
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error,  which  error  is  claimed  to  manifest  in  four  of  its  fundamental
ontological principles. Now, the general error is emphasised or formulated
in  various  ways  in  these  discussions,  many  of  which  formulations  are
found  explicitly  in  the  appendix  itself.  These  diferent  emphases  or
formulations of  the  error  can usefully  be  divided,  non-exclusively,7 into
four:
Under the frst of these formulations,8 the Amphiboly Chapter charges
the  Leibnizian  philosophy  with  a  confusion.  The  general  error  of  the
Leibnizian  philosophy,  according  to  these  accounts,  is  to  confuse
phenomena (or the appearances) with noumena (or things in themselves or
pure  objects  of  the  understanding).  Leibniz  takes  what  are,  under  the
Critical account, phenomena to be noumena. As Langton paradigmatically
puts it, Leibniz “’took’ the phenomena for things in themselves, according
to Kant.” (1998, p. 71) And this formulation is indeed found explicitly in the
Amphiboly Chapter in an oft-cited passage at A270/B326: The error of the
Leibnizian philosophy, Kant there tells us, is “a confusion of the pure object
of the understanding with the appearance”. 
Under  this  frst  formulation  then,  the  error  with  which  Leibniz  is
charged is a confusion of two sorts of object. As can be seen, the objects in
question  are  diferentiated  in  various  ways,  both  by  Kant  and  in  the
literature.  At  times,  Kant  puts  the  confusion  as  one  concerning  the
appearances  and things  in  themselves  (A264/B320).  At  other  times,  it  is
paradigmatic formulations in the metaphysical treatises of Wolf and Baumgarten These
treatises,  despite  containing  a  number  of  identical  claims,  difered  from  Leibniz’s
philosophy in their systematicity, method, and rigour. 
(iii)  In  what  follows,  our  concern  will  be  with  one  particular  feature  of  Leibniz’s
philosophy (which feature is ultimately identifed in Part IV). This feature is atributable
both to Leibniz as well as to the Leibnizian tradition, though it is manifest most clearly in
the case of the later. Thus, in what follows, I will discuss the appendix as involving a
case that applies to the  Leibnizian tradition, mentioning Leibniz’s philosophy itself only
when needed. To refer to this tradition from Part II onward, I will use the term ‘German
Rationalism’.
(I will thus also set aside any debates that concern claims atributed to Leibniz other than
those concerning the particular feature in question.)
7 By dividing up the accounts in this fourfold way, I neither mean to claim that the various
formulations of the error are incompatible with one another nor that any given discussion
formulates  the  error  in only  one of  the  ways.  The diferent  formulations  are,  as they
stand, compatible, and many discussions formulate the error in one or two of these ways,
while some do touch on all of them. My aim here rather is to divide up the literature
along some natural lines, lines which will also be seen to have relevance in terms of the
responses  we  might  give  to  them  (these  responses  will  be  put  forward  in  our  re-
examination of the familiar formulation in Part VI).
8 See Langton (1998) p. 71, McBay Merrit (2009) p. 999, Nunziante and Vanzo (2009) p. 133.
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formulated as a confusion of the objects of the senses with things in general
(A272/B328).  Still  elsewhere,  it  is  contrasted in terms of phenomena and
noumena (A269/B325). Similarly, some discussions in the literature put the
error forward as “mistaking [the] objects in space and time for things in
themselves,  namely,  for  monads”  (Nunziante  and Vanzo,  2009,  p.  133),
while others emphasise it as Leibniz’s taking “the appearances for things as
they are in themselves” (Langton, 1998, p. 72). Despite these diferences in
specifcs,  these  accounts  involve  a  common  construal  of  the  error  as
essentially a confusion of two sorts of object. 
A second way9 in which the error is typically formulated is similarly in
terms  of  a  confusion.  Under  this  second  formulation,  the  Leibnizian
philosophy  errs  insofar  as  it  confuses  objects with  concepts.  More
specifcally, the Leibnizian philosophy is said to compare the concepts of
objects, for the various distinctions between them, but to mistakenly take
this to constitute a comparison of the objects of the concepts. As Bird puts
it, “Kant argues that the source of the trouble lies in the atempt to infer
truths about objects from truths about concepts” (Bird, 1962, p. 71). Again,
we fnd this  formulation  of  the  error  suggested in  certain places  in  the
Amphiboly  Chapter  itself.  At  A269/B325,  for  example,  Kant  contrasts
concepts  “compared  logically”  with  “get[ting]  to  the  objects  with  these
concepts” (A269/B325).  This second formulation of the error  can also be
found stated in terms of the logical and the real: Leibniz mistook merely
logical distinctions between concepts for real distinctions between objects. 
Thirdly,  in many discussions,10 the error is put forward in terms of a
failure  to  recognise  the  distinctness  and  signifcance  of  the  faculty  of
sensibility.  The Leibnizian philosophy, under this formulation, treats the
diference between conceptual and sensible representation as one of degree
and not of kind. It thus fails to recognise that sensibility makes a distinct
and  ineliminable  contribution  to  our  cognition.  As  Parkinson  puts  it,
9 This formulation can be found in Allais (2013) p. 336, Bird (1962) p. 71, Hartnack (1967)
pp.  92,  94-95,  Marques  (2008)  p.  218,  Kerslake  (2004)  p.  489,  Kleist  (2012)  p.  53,
Longuenesse (2005) p. 225, and Warren (2013) p. 31f.
10 See Hartnack (1967) p.  91,  Kleist  (2012)  pp.  52-53,  Makkreel  (1994) p.  165,  Parkinson
(1981) p. 304, Stock (1990) p. 112f., Wilson (1990) p. 73.
Wilson’s discussion is worth singling out as a more complex and detailed version of this
formulation.  Wilson  characterises  the  fundamental  error  atributed  to  the  Leibnizian
tradition as treating conceptual and sensible representation as merely difering in degree,
but goes on to distinguish the further step in which this manifests in the metaphysical
claims of the tradition (1990, p. 73). Stock, too, recognises the fundamentality of Kant’s
epistemological or subjective claims, which then imply the metaphysical disagreement
(1990, p. 115).
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“Leibniz did not see in the understanding and the sensibility two diferent
sources  of  representation”  (1981,  p.  304),  but  “failed  to  note  […]  the
conditions of sensible intuition also carry with them their own diferences”
(ibid.).
A  further,  and  perhaps  most  prevalent,  way11 in  which  the  error  is
emphasised is as the commiting of a fallacy – the fallacy of amphiboly.
This formulation is,  of course, straightforwardly extracted both from the
title  of  the Amphiboly Chapter  –  ‘On the amphiboly of  the concepts  of
reflection’  –  and  from  Kant’s  explicit  remarks  in  one  of  the  most-cited
passages from the chapter: “Without [transcendental] reflection […] there
arise allegedly synthetic principles,  which […] are grounded solely on a
transcendental  amphiboly” (A270/B326).  The formulation of  the  error  as
one of the fallacy of amphiboly is common to nearly all discussions, though
in most cases,  the error  is  simply noted as  involving a fallacy and then
discussed in terms of one of its other formulations. Few accounts examine
the error as a case of the fallacy in any detail.  Those that do diverge in
terms  of  their  details.  Some  discussions  note  the  error  as  a  fallacious
employment of the concepts of reflection – a formulation found explicitly in
the title.  Others note it as a fallacy of ambiguity involved in the confusion
of objects. De Boer, for example, explicitly characterises the ambiguity as
one involved in the concept ‘thing’, which the Leibnizian philosophy fails
to disambiguate between ‘thing of the understanding’ and ‘things such as
they appear to the senses’ (2010, p. 65).12 
The fnal, most developed formulation13 of the error brings together a
number of the elements above and is one which makes the best work of the
title and subject mater of the chapter.  A paradigmatic  statement of this
formulation of  the error can be found in Parkinson’s  1981 discussion in
‘Kant as Critic of Leibniz’. Under this formulation, the error is characterised
as  traceable  to  an  error  involving  the  concepts  of  reflection,  the  newly
introduced concepts of the Amphiboly Chapter. The broad account of this
problematic employment is given as follows.
11 See, among others, de Boer (2010) p. 64, McBay Merrit (2009) pp. 996 and 999, Marques
(2008) p. 219, Parkinson (1981) p. 303, Kleist (2012) p. 52, Zinkin (2008) p. 846.
12 Again, one account here worth singling out is
that of Kleist (2012, p. 52). Kleist interestingly recognises the fallacy of amphiboly in a
historically correct way, as one involving syntactic, rather than lexical, ambiguity. While
the account that will be presented in this study can, I think, be made to ft well with this
understanding of the fallacy, I will not, for reasons of length, take it up in any detail.
13 See de Boer (2010) p. 64 and Parkinson (1981).
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The  concepts  of  reflection,  these  accounts  note,  have  a  normal  and
unproblematic  employment.  Standardly,  the  concepts  of  reflection  are
employed in every case of judgement, prior to the judgement’s being used
objectively, and this employment yields the logical form of the judgement.
As Parkinson puts it:  “Kant’s view is that before we make any objective
judgement,  we  must  compare  concepts.  Suppose,  e.g.,  that  we  make  a
universal judgement about certain objects: we must frst compare concepts
to fnd in them an identity of many representations under one concept.”
(1981, p. 303, emphasis omited) Thus, in their standard employment, the
concepts  of  reflection  are  used  to  compare  the  concepts  found  in  a
judgement with one another, prior to the judgement’s being applied to any
objects. This comparison of the concepts with one another yields the logical
form  that  the  judgement  takes  as  universal,  particular,  afrmative,
negative, and so on. The oft-cited passage in which Kant points out this
standard  employment  is  found  towards  the  start  of  the  Amphiboly
Chapter:  “Prior to all objective judgements”,  he states,  “we compare the
concepts,  with  regard  to  identity  (of  many  representations  under  one
concept) for the sake of universal judgements, or their diference, for the
generation  of  particular  ones,  with regard to  agreement,  for  afrmative
judgements, or opposition, for negative ones, etc.” (A262/B318)
These discussions then turn to the Leibnizian philosophy. The concepts
of reflection are employed by the Leibnizian philosophy;i however, its use
of  them,  it  notes,  is  somewhat  diferent.  The  Leibnizian  philosophy
proceeds by comparing concepts  by means of  the concepts of reflection,
thereby establishing the logical relations of the concepts to one another, but
at  once  takes  these  comparisons  to  establish  the  relations  between  the
objects of  the concepts  themselves.  That is,  the concepts  of reflection are
employed  not  solely  for  the  sake  of  establishing  the  logical  relations
between the concepts of objects, but are also given, what we might term, an
‘ontological’ signifcance. As de Boer puts it: “Kant’s criticism of rationalist
metaphysics aims to demonstrate that the synthetic a priori  principles it
generates rest on a particular fallacy. This fallacy arises, according to Kant,
if the concepts of reflection are employed for ontological purposes.” (2010,
p. 64)14
The employment of the concepts of reflection in comparing our concepts
allows  us  to  draw  conclusions  about  the  logical  relations  between  the
14 It is worth noting that de Boer’s account is not an instance of this formulation. I examine
her more nuanced account in Part VII.
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concepts. However, it does not allow the further step – it does not allow us
to draw the same conclusions about the objects of the concepts. Leibniz’s
philosophy  errs  in  its  giving  the  concepts  of  reflection  this  further
ontological employment. 
Kant’s  reasons  for  this  claim  are,  according  to  these  discussions,  as
follows. The worry, according to Kant, is that the objects in question, the
objects whose relations the Leibnizian philosophy takes itself to establish in
employing the concepts of reflection, are objects that are given or presented
to  us  by  sensibility.  And  crucially,  it  is  further  noted,  such  objects  bear
relations to each other that are not adequately captured by comparing the
concepts of the objects in the understanding. Sensibility, as is emphasised,
“brings with [it  its] own distinctions” (A270/B326). So, in  comparing the
concepts of the objects and taking these comparisons to be sufcient for the
comparison of the objects themselves, the Leibnizian philosophy overlooks
this point. The relations captured in comparing the concepts of objects is
not sufcient for the relations between the objects of the concepts.  Thus,
concludes Kant, according to these accounts, the ontological employment
of the concepts of reflection is illegitimate and cannot yield the purported
conclusions about the objects of the concepts. 
Such  are  the  various  ways  in  which  the  error  put  forward  in  the
Amphiboly Chapter is formulated in most discussions of the chapter. As
noted, these accounts also typically examine the error as it is borne out in
four  central  ontological  principles  of  the  Leibnizian  philosophy:  The
principle of the identity of indiscernibles, the impossibility of opposition
between realities, the doctrine of the existence of monads, and the principle
of  the  dependence  of  outer  relations  (space  and  time)  on  the  inner
determinations  of  monads.15 Again,  diferent  formulations  of  the
manifestation of the error are found, depending on the way in which the
general error itself is formulated. The frst, second, and ffth formulations
above  tend  to  be  associated  with  certain  correlative  discussions  of  the
principles, and I will focus on these. 
Under the frst formulation, the general error of confusing phenomena
with noumena is borne out in the adoption, by the Leibnizian philosophy,
of  ontological  principles  that  hold  of  noumena,  but  not  of  phenomena,
15 These four principles do vary in terms of their details across the literature and they are
certainly not always designated by the labels that I have chosen here. Nevertheless, they
are uniformly identifed with the four ontological principles put forward at A263-8/B319-
24 (and again as discussed at A270-6/B326-32).
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which are, under the Critical account, the objects in question. As Nunziante
and Vanzo put it:
The  four  arguments  against  Leibniz  follow  the  same  argumentative
patern. If objects of knowledge were noumena, or things in themselves,
and if we knew them with the pure understanding, Leibniz’s doctrines
[i.e.  principles]  would  be  true.  Instead,  objects  of  knowledge  are
appearances  in  space  and  time,  and  we  know  them  by  means  of
sensibility. Sensible appearances  follow diferent laws from objects of the
pure understanding. Hence, Leibniz’s conclusions are wrong.
(2009, p. 138, emphasis my own)
Under  the  second  formulation,  the  error  is  borne  out  in  these  four
principles  insofar  as  the  Leibnizian  philosophy  takes  logical  principles,
principles that hold of concepts and applies them to the (real) objects of our
cognition. The Leibnizian philosophy thus takes merely logical principles
for ontological principles. As Longuenesse puts it, in the case of the second
mentioned principle: “Because no logical conflict, or contradiction, can be
thought  between  two  positive  determinations  or  realities  thought  by
concepts  alone,  no  conflict  could  be  thought  between  two  positive
determinations or realities in things.” (2005, p. 225)
Finally, the manifestation of the error under the ffth formulation is a
more  developed  form  of  the  above:  Under  the  ffth  formulation,  the
manifestation of the error in the principles is cast in terms of the concepts of
reflection. The principles of the logical employment of these concepts are
interpreted ontologically. This is frequently illustrated by appeal to the frst
pair of concepts of reflection: When we employ the frst pair of concepts of
reflection (identity and diference) in an unproblematic way, we take two
concepts to be (numerically) identical when they contain all the same marks
or predicates. If they difer in any predicate, a diference in the concepts is
yielded. Correspondingly, this employment is interpreted ontologically in
the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. If  two objects have all the
same inner or intrinsic determinations, then they are one and (numerically)
the same object, while a diference in any intrinsic determination between
objects yields a (numerical) diference between the objects. 
A fnal feature of the case of the Amphiboly Chapter noted prevalently
in these discussions is the solution to the error that Kant puts forward in it:
The  solution  to  the  error,  claims  Kant,  is  transcendental  refection.  Such
reflection, these accounts point out, involves an awareness of the faculty of
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the objects of our cognition. Thus, if the Leibnizian philosophy were frst to
engage in transcendental reflection, and thus to recognise that the faculty of
the objects in question is not solely that of the understanding, but that in
fact these objects are given to us in sensibility, it would realise in advance
that  any  comparison  of  the  concepts  of  these  objects  cannot
straightforwardly yield any conclusions about the objects themselves, and
that the legitimate employment of the concepts of reflection is their logical
employment  for  the  sake  of  judgement  and  not  their  ontological  one.
Transcendental reflection would thus allow the Leibnizian philosophy to
avoid this potential erroneous employment of the concepts and the ensuing
problematic ontological principles found in it.
Such,  in  broad  outline,  are  the  main  features  of  the  account  of  the
appendix  –  the  ‘Amphiboly  Chapter’  –  as  formulated  in  most  familiar
discussions in the literature. Discussions then tend to focus on the account
in one of two ways:  Some concern themselves with the merits of Kant’s
specifc  discussions  concerning the  four  rejected  ontological  principles.16
Many extant discussions in the literature focus on such discussions in order
to evaluate the arguments and claims that Kant puts forward.
A second common focus concerns the correctness of the views atributed
by Kant to Leibniz.17 These discussions focus on the various assumptions
and principles atributed to Leibniz in a historical way. Such discussions
aim to establish,  on the basis of  Leibnizian texts,  whether or not  Kant’s
atributions to Leibniz are in fact accurate. For example, in the course of the
argument  outlined  above,  Kant  atributes  to  Leibniz  the  claim  that  the
understanding and sensibility are in fact  only diferent in the degree of
clarity with which they are able to represent the objects of our cognition,
but  that  they  are  not  diferent  in  kind.  This  claim  regarding  Leibniz’s
commitments is one of a number that have been questioned with regard to
their accuracy in representing the actual views that Leibniz held.
These familiar formulations of  the case in the appendix are,  in many
respects,  correct,  both in their focus and details.  In the following study,
however,  a  somewhat  diferent  picture  of  the  case in  the  appendix will
emerge. This picture will show the appendix to involve a far more complex
and systematic case than is captured in the formulations above – a case that
will  be  seen  to  have  far-reaching  consequences  within  the  Critical
16 See Janiak (2010) pp. 91-92, Jauernig (2008), Langton (1998) Chapter 4, Nunziante and
Vanzo (2009), Nuzzo (2008) p.41, Sutherland (2004) p. 166.
17 See Jauernig (2008) p. 45f., Nunziante and Vanzo (2009) p. 139f., Parkinson (1981) p.
304f., Zinkin (2008) p. 846f.
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philosophy.  More  specifcally,  this  picture  will  show  the  case  in  the
appendix to inform the Critical account from the very start of the Critique –
from the very elements put forward in the Transcendental Aesthetic. 
In the following three sections, I set aside the familiar formulation of the
appendix,  in favour of  an examination of  the text  as  it  stands – and in
particular of an examination of a line of reasoning that appears near the
very start of the appendix. The merit  and adequacy of this method will,
with luck, become apparent by the end of the study, when we will be able
to return to the familiar formulation with a subtler understanding of the
complex case in the appendix. In order to begin gathering the details we
need, let us then return to the case in the appendix, to study it in closer
detail than has thus far been presented.
III. The concepts of reflection
Before we look at the case itself that Kant puts forward in the appendix, it
will be helpful to introduce in some more detail, the distinct subject mater
with which Kant is concerned in the appendix, viz. the so-called ‘concepts
of reflection’. 
As noted above, the concepts of reflection are most usually associated
with their role  in  yielding the logical  form of  a judgement.  This  role  is
mentioned in the appendix, as we saw, at A262/B318. Kant does not give
much further explication of this role in this passage, and what I wish to do
here  is  to  begin  a  step  back,  and to  examine  the  concepts  of  reflection
afresh,  in  light  of  Kant’s  various  explicit  remarks  about  them  in  the
appendix. We will return to this more familiar role of the concepts at the
end of the section.
Having  examined  various  concepts  in  the  preceding  Aesthetic  and
Analytic,  in  the  appendix,  Kant  turns  his  atention  to  concepts  not  yet
treated  in  the  Critique,  the  concepts  of  reflection.  As  mentioned,  these
concepts are importantly diferent to those found elsewhere in the Critique.
As with all concepts,  the concepts of reflection are mediating general or
universal  representations  that  subsume a  number  of  diferent  things  by
means of a common mark or marks found in the concept (A320/B377). In
contrast to the categories of the Analytic,  and the ideas of the Dialectic,
however, the concepts of reflection do not purport to subsume the objects
of  our  cognition.  As  Kant  emphasises  at  A269/B325,  the  concepts  of
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reflection  are  “distinguished  from  categories  by  the  fact  that  what  is
exhibited  through  them  is  not  the  object  in  accordance  with  what
constitutes  its  concept  […],  but  rather  only  the  comparison  of
representations, in all their manifoldness, which precedes the concepts of
things.” Thus, the concepts of reflection are not concepts that mediate our
relation  as  cognising  subjects  to  the  objects  of  our  cognition,  as,  for
example,  the  concept  ‘table’  or  ‘substance’  mediate  my  relation  to  the
furniture before me. They are instead higher-order concepts – concepts of
concepts and other representations. Thus, in the appendix, Kant’s atention
turns from the objects of  cognition and the concepts  found applicable a
priori  to  these,  to  the  subject of  cognition.  Kant  is  here  concerned with
distinguishing various things about the subject, viz. with distinguishing its
representations in various ways. 
Now, there are a number of  concepts  treated in the  Critique  that  are
characterisable in this way. An example that comes immediately to mind
are the various concepts of the faculties or capacities of the subject – the
understanding,  sensibility,  reason,  and  so  on.  These  concepts  are  not
concepts of the objects of our cognition, but are concepts of the  cognising
subject of  any such objects  – in  particular,  the  capacities  of  that  subject.
Similarly, the concepts of the various sorts of representations – ‘intuition’,
‘concept’, ‘idea’, and the like – are not concepts under which the objects of
our cognition fall, but concepts under which some feature or element of the
subject  falls.  The  concepts  of  the  appendix  –  those  ‘of  reflection’  –  are
similarly  to  be  grouped  among  such  concepts  of  the  subject.  They  are,
however, a less familiar and somewhat more opaque set of these. 
Broadly-speaking  then,  the  concepts  of  reflection  subsume  the
representations of the subject. More specifcally, however, they are concepts
of the  relations of our representations to one another, or, ‘among themselves’
(A260/B316).  It  is  worth  here  noting  that  it  is  the  relations among  our
representations that fall under these concepts, and not the representations
themselves.  The  concepts  of  reflection  are  not  monadic  concepts  under
which some representation considered in isolation might fall, and thus are
not further concepts to be found alongside ‘intuition’, ‘concept’, ‘idea’, etc.
The concepts are diadic concepts under which the relation between two or
more  representations  falls.  Put  another  way,  they  are  concepts  of  the
connections  between  our  representations  rather  than  concepts  of  the
representations themselves.
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Now, in all of the above cases of subjective concepts, and perhaps most
particularly in the case of the concepts of reflection, there are the questions
of how precisely the concepts are to be understood and how that which
falls under the concept is to be understood. How, for example, are we to
understand  the  distinctions  between  the  varieties  of  representation
(intuition, concept, idea)? Do they mark distinctions among the content of
the representations or among the faculties by means of which we have the
various representations? Or more broadly, how are we to understand the
possibility of subsuming various elements and features of the subject as
such?  And  indeed  with  regard  to  our  concepts  of  interest,  those  of
reflection, what precisely are they concepts of? How are we to understand
the  distinction  between concepts  of  representations  and concepts  of  the
relations among our representations? Such questions must inevitably arise
in this change of subject mater from concepts of the object to concepts of
the subject  and, over the course of our study,  these questions and their
answers will be addressed. For the moment, however, it is our aim simply
to put forward in more detail that which is found in the appendix.
Turning to the taxonomy of the concepts of reflection themselves,  we
fnd  four  pairs  of  concepts:  Identity  and  diference,  agreement  and
opposition, inner and outer,  and determinable and determination (or,  as
they are elsewhere termed, mater and form). These are the ways in which
representations can be related “among themselves” (A260/B316) or, as Kant
formulates it later, the relations in which “concepts in a state of mind can
belong to each other” (A261/B317). Each of these concepts, then, subsumes
a diferent relation that our representations can bear to one another. It is the
employment  of  these  four  pairs  of  concepts  that  constitutes  the  distinct
subject mater of the appendix.
Kant’s explicit remarks in the appendix also bring to light a third feature
of these concepts. It is in the act of the comparison of representations with
one another that the concepts of reflection are employed. We compare and
contrast representations with one another, and, where they bear a certain
relation  (for  example,  if  they  difer  in  some  respect),  we  subsume  the
relations under the relevant concepts of reflection (for example, subsume
the  mentioned  relation  between  the  two  concepts  under  the  concept
‘diference’.) As Kant variously puts it: These are the concepts under which
our  representations  are  “connected  or  compared”  (A260/B316).  We
“compare […] concepts with regard to identity […] or their diference, […]
with regard to agreement, […] or opposition” (A262/B317-8, emphasis my
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own). And this indeed seems to be the corollary to the concepts subsuming
the relations between our representations. Any subsumption of a relation by
a concept seemingly must involve a comparison of the two relata. 
Such are Kant’s explicit remarks on the concepts of reflection, as they are
found in the introductory section to the appendix. As noted, this section
also mentions their role in yielding the logical form of a judgement, and it
is  with this employment that  the concepts of  reflection are most closely
associated.  At  A262/B318,  Kant  tells  us  that,  prior  to  “all  objective
judgements”, the four pairs of concepts are employed in order to yield the
form of a judgement, respectively in four ways. The discussion here passes
fairly quickly over this employment, however, and with litle explication,
and it  is  necessary to turn elsewhere for clarifcation on this role  of the
concepts. Considering both Kant’s discussion in the appendix, as well as
remarks  found  variously  in  the  Jäsche  Logic,  the  employment  of  the
concepts  of  reflection  in  the  logical  form  of  a  judgement  might  be
illustrated as follows. Due to the increasing opacity of Kant’s remarks,  I
will, for present purposes, focus only on the frst two pairs of concepts. 
If we consider a judgement such as ‘All men are mortal’ or ‘No men are
feathered’,  in  both of  these  cases,  the  concept  taking subject  position  is
wholly included in or excluded from the concept taking predicate position
(wholly included in the case of the former and wholly excluded in the case
of  the  later).  When we connect  two such concepts  in  a  judgement,  the
judgement, in virtue of the concepts bearing this relation, is universal in
form.  Now,  this  relation  between  two  concepts  (of  one’s  being  wholly
included or excluded in another) is recognised by means of comparing the
concepts  in terms of  the frst  pair  of  concepts  of  reflection.  Insofar as  a
concept in a judgement is  wholly included in or excluded from the other
concept  in  a  judgement,  the  two  concepts  have  been  compared  “with
regard  to  identity”  (A262/B318).  Now,  what  distinguishes  the  two
judgements in our example is  that,  in the former,  the subject  concept is
wholly  included  in the  predicate  concept,  while  in  the  later,  the  subject
concept  is  wholly  excluded  from the  predicate  concept.  Again,  any
judgement connecting two concepts bearing one of these relations, is said
to be afrmative or negative in form, in virtue of the concepts bearing the
relation. In recognising this relation between the concepts, the second pair
of the concepts of reflection plays a role. The concepts are compared “with
regard to agreement” (ibid.) in the case of the former and “[with regard to]
opposition” (ibid.) in the case of the later.
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In contrast to the above examples are the judgements ‘Some men are
wise’ and ‘Some men are not wise’. In the case of these later judgements,
the concept taking subject position is not  wholly included in or excluded
from  the  concept  taking  predicate  position.  In  this  case  of  the  relation
between  the  concepts,  the  judgement  is  singular  in  form,  and  it  is  the
second of the frst pair of the concepts of reflection that plays a role when
such concepts are compared. The concepts are compared “[with regard to]
their diference” (ibid.).18
Such are some of the primary ways in which the new subject mater of
the appendix,  the concepts of reflection, can be characterised. Before we
arrive at a clearer understanding of these concepts, however, it is necessary
to turn again to the introductory section of the appendix, in which we fnd
an important,  yet  under-appreciated,  line  of  reasoning concerning these
concepts.
IV. The line of reasoning in the introductory passages
As  we  have  seen,  the  appendix  is  concerned  with  a  particular  set  of
concepts  of  the  subject,  the  concepts  of  reflection,  which  concepts  are
employed in the comparison of representations for their relations among
themselves. Now, in the appendix’s brief introduction, we fnd a line of
reasoning that  concerns  the  employment  of  these  concepts.  This  line  of
reasoning turns out to be crucial in understanding the concepts of reflection
themselves and the case that Kant puts forward with regard to them. In this
section, I turn to these introductory passages in order to examine the line of
reasoning that is to be found there. I will begin by reproducing the relevant
passages. Thereafter, I will turn to an exposition of the line of reasoning
that is to be found in it. My aim here is to give an exposition of these crucial
passages  in  terms  that  remain  as  close  as  possible  to  Kant’s  own.  In
18 The third and fourth pairs of concepts of reflection are more opaquely treated in Kant’s
discussions.  Seemingly,  the  third pair  is  used in the  comparison of  concepts  that  are
subordinated to one another  as subject  and predicate and as ground and consequent,
yielding judgements with categorical and hypothetical forms respectively. And fnally,
the fourth pair of concepts have their role in the modality of a judgement, with the frst of
the pair yielding judgements that are problematic and the later yielding judgements that
are assertoric.
Discussion of the fourth pair of concepts can be found later in the appendix at A266-
7/B322-3, and of the third and fourth logical forms of judgement in the Jäsche Logic [1800]
at 24:102.
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subsequent sections, I will turn to the various questions and concerns that
emerge from this exposition.
The relevant passage is to be found shortly before the main section of
the appendix. At A261/B317, Kant tells us,
The  action  through  which  I  make  the  comparison  (Vergleichung)  of
representations  (Vorstellungen)  in  general  with  the  cognitive  power
(Erkenntniskraft)  in  which  they  are  situated,  and  through  which  I
distinguish whether they are to be compared (verglichen) to one another
as belonging (gehörend) to the pure understanding or to pure intuition
(sinnlichen  Anschauung),  I  call  transcendental  reflection.  The relation
(Verhältnis), however, in which concepts (Begrife) in a state of mind can
belong (gehören) to each other are those of identity and diference, of
agreement and opposition, of the inner and the outer, and fnally of the
determinable  and  the  determination  (mater  and  form).  The  correct
determination (Bestimmung) of this relation depends on the cognitive
power  in  which  they  subjectively  belong  (gehören)  to  each  other,
whether  in  sensibility  (Sinnlichkeit)  or  in  understanding.  For  the
diference (Unterschied) in the later makes a great diference in the way
in which one ought to think of the former. 
Prior to all objective judgements we compare the concepts, with regard
to identity (of many representations under one concept) for the sake of
universal judgements, or their diference, for the generation of particular
ones,  with  regard  to  agreement,  for  afrmative  judgements,  or
opposition, for negative ones, etc. On this ground it would seem that we
ought  to  call  these  concepts  concepts  of  comparison
(Vergleichungsbegrife) (conceptus comparationis). But since, if is not the
logical  form  but  the  content  of  concepts  (Inhalt  der  Begrife)  that  is
concerned,  i.e.,  whether  the  things  themselves  (Dinge  selbst)  are
identical  or  diferent,  in  agreement  or  in  opposition,  etc.,  the  things
(Dinge) can have a twofold relation (zwiefaches Verhältnis) to our power
of cognition, namely to sensibility and to understanding, yet it is this
place  (Stelle)  in  which  they belong that  concerns  how they  ought  to
belong to each other, then it is transcendental reflection, i.e., the relation
(Verhältnis) of given (gegebener) representations (Vorstellungen) to one
or the other  kind of cognition,  that  can alone determine (bestimmen)
their  relation (Verhältnis)  among themselves,  and whether  the  things
(Dinge)  are identical  or  diferent,  in  agreement or  in  opposition,  etc.,
cannot  immediately  be  made  out  (ausgemacht  werden)  from  the
concepts themselves through mere comparison (comparatio),  but rather
only through the distinction (Unterscheidung) of the kind of cognition
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(Erkenntnisart)  to  which  they  belong,  by  means  of  transcendental
reflection (refexio). […]
To  be  sure,  one  could  therefore  say  that  logical  reflection  (logische
Reflexion)  is  a  mere  comparison  (blore  Komparation),  for  in  its  case
there is  complete abstraction (gänzlich abstrahiert)  from the cognitive
power to which the given representations  belong, and they are thus to
be  treated  the  same  as  far  as  their  seat  in  the  mind  is  concerned;i
transcendental  reflection,  however,  (which  goes  (geht)  to  the  objects
themselves)  contains  (enthält)  the  ground  of  the  possibility  of  the
objective comparison (objektiven Komparation) of the representations to
each  other,  and is  therefore  very  diferent   from the  other,  since  the
cognitive power to which the representations belong is not precisely the
same. This transcendental  reflection is  a duty from which no one can
escape  if  he  would  judge  (urteilen)  anything  about  things  (Dinge)  a
priori. 
(A261-3/B317-20, emphasis omited)
In this line of reasoning Kant distinguishes between two ways in which
we might carry out the comparison of our representations. First, we might
carry out such comparison straightforwardly. That is, we might begin with
the  representations  in  question  and  compare  them  without  taking  into
account anything about the faculty or power of the subject to which they
are due. As Kant puts it, “in [the case of such comparison] there is complete
abstraction from the cognitive power to which the given representations
belong” (A262-3/B318-9).  In such comparison –  or  ‘mere  comparison’  as
Kant terms it – all representations are treated as having arisen by means of
the same faculty or power. In contrast to this, however, we might carry out
our  comparison  such  that  it  does  not  involve  an  abstraction  from  the
faculty to which the representations in question are due. In this later case,
we  compare  our  representations  in  order  to  determine  the  relations
between them  while taking into account the faculty or power to which the
representations in question are due. That is, our comparison involves both
establishing the relations of the relevant representations to one another as
well as  the relation of the various representations to the relevant faculty.
Now this later, viz. to become aware of the relation of a representation to
the faculty to which it is due, is the activity of transcendental reflection.
Indeed,  as  Kant  construes  it  earlier  in  the  introduction,  transcendental
reflection  is  the  “action  through  which  I  make  the  comparison  of
representations  in  general  with  the  cognitive  power  in  which  they  are
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situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared
to  one  another  as  belonging  to  the  pure  understanding  or  to  pure
intuition.”  (A261/B317)  Thus,  the  line  of  reasoning  distinguishes
comparison  that  omits transcendental  reflection  from  comparison  that
includes or is preceded by transcendental reflection.
What the line of reasoning is ultimately concerned to show is that, if we
are to secure a priori cognition, the later form of comparison is needed.
That  is,  if  a  priori  cognition is  to  be  possible,  comparison that  involves
transcendental reflection is necessary. As the passage explicitly concludes,
“[such] transcendental reflection is a duty from which no one can escape if
he would judge anything about things a priori.” (A263/B319)
Now,  the  line  of  reasoning  that  shows  this  conclusion  involves  two
steps. First, Kant tells us, "the correct determination of [the relations of our
representations  among  themselves]  depends  on  the  cognitive  power  in
which they subjectively belong to each other, whether in sensibility or in
understanding. For the diference in the later makes a great diference in
the way in which one ought to think of the former.” (A261/B317) That is, in
comparing some given representations for the relations between them, the
relations that we are to take to hold between them will vary depending on
the  faculty  to  which  we  take  them  to  be  due.  If  we  suppose  the
representations to belong to one faculty, their relations must be taken to be
thus and so. If we take them to belong to some other faculty, their relations
must be taken to be otherwise. Further, as Kant emphatically reminds us, in
the case of discursive subjects, which are the subjects we are, two distinct
and mutually dependent faculties of representations are needed in order
for us to stand in relation to the objects of our cognition, sensibility and
understanding. The "cognitive power to which the representations belong
is not precisely the same." (A263/B319) Thus, in this frst step, we fnd a
dependence claim: The correct determination of the relations among our
representations will depend on our taking into account to which of these
two faculties the representations in question are due and determining them
accordingly. 
The second step of the line of reasoning (beginning A262/B318) places
the  considerations  above  within  the  context  of  cognition.  Kant
distinguishes a further form of comparison: The ‘objective’ comparison of
our representations is such that in determining the relations between our
representations, the relations among the objects of our cognition are thereby
also  captured.  That  is,  in  the  case  of  objective  comparison,  we  are
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concerned, not merely with whether our representations bear this relation
or that relation, but with the ‘content’ or objects of those representations –
with “whether the things themselves are identical or diferent, in agreement or
opposition, etc.” (A262/B318, emphasis my own) Now Kant’s crucial claim
here  is  that  only  the  comparison  of  representations  that  includes
transcendental reflection allows for objective comparison. As he tells us, “it
is transcendental reflection, i.e., the relation of given representations to one
or  the  other  kind  of  cognition,  that  can  alone  determine  their  relation
among  themselves  [i.e.  the  relation  of  the  given  representations  among
themselves], and whether the things [i.e. the objects of the representations]
are  identical  or  diferent,  in  agreement  or  in  opposition,  etc.,  cannot
immediately  be  made  out  from  the  concepts  themselves  through  mere
comparison  […]  but  rather  only  through  the  distinction  of  the  kind  of
cognition to which they belong, by means of a transcendental reflection”
(A262/B318). Thus, Kant’s claim here seems to be that objective comparison –
that  is,  comparison  such  that  not  only  the  relations  among  our
representations are determined, but the relations among the objects of the
representations  are  also  thereby  determined  –  requires  the  correct
determination  of  the  relations  of  our  representations  among  themselves.  Such
correct  determination,  as  we  have  seen,  itself  rests  on  transcendental
reflection  and  thus  the  possibility  of  the  objective  comparison  of  our
representations rests on transcendental refection. Indeed, as Kant emphasises
in concluding the passage: “[T]ranscendental reflection […] (which goes to
the  objects  themselves)  contains  the  ground  of  the  possibility  of  the
objective comparison of the representations to each other” (A263/B319).
We might formalise this as follows:
(1) For any given representations, a diference in the faculty to which they
are atributable implies a diference in the relations we are to take to hold
between them (a diference in the way in which the concepts of reflection
are to be employed).
(2) In our case, our representations are atributable to either one of two
distinct  and mutually dependent cognitive faculties,  the understanding
and sensibility. 
(3) Thus, the correct determination of the relations of our representations
among themselves (the correct employment of the concepts of reflection)
requires  the  taking  into  account  of  the  faculty  to  which  the
representations belong (transcendental reflection).
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(4) The objective comparison of representations, i.e. comparison such that
not only the relations among our representations are determined, but the
relations  among  the  objects  of  those  representations  are  also  thereby
determined, requires the correct determination of the relations among our
representations (the correct employment of the concepts of reflection).
(5)  Thus,  transcendental  reflection  is  necessary  for  the  possibility  of
objective comparison.
(6)  Objective  comparison  is  necessary  for  the  possibility  of  a  priori
cognition. 
(7)  Thus,  transcendental  reflection  is  necessary  for  the  possibility  of  a
priori cognition.
Such is the primary line of reasoning as I take it to be found in these
introductory passages to the appendix. Now, the passage also contains a
subsidiary line of argument, and this is the line that tells against Leibniz’s
philosophy and implies the charge for which the section is known. If the
line of reasoning thus far is correct, then a contrast is to be drawn between
any  form  of  comparison  that  omits  transcendental  reflection  and
comparison that includes transcendental reflection. Given that the later is
required  for  objective  comparison,  engaging  in  the  former  rules  out  the
possibility  of  objective  comparison.  In  its  subsidiary  line  of  argument,  the
passage  identifes  logical  reflection  as  a  case  of  comparison  that  omits
transcendental  reflection.  In  the  case  of  logical  reflection,  we  compare
whatever  given  concepts  are  in  question  for  these  relations  of  identity,
diference, etc.,  but in terms of their “logical form” (A262/B318). That is,
logical reflection treats “[all given representations] the same as far as their
seat in the mind is concerned” (A263/B319), viz. as representations of the
understanding.  Thus,  as  Kant  concludes,  “one  could  therefore  say  that
logical  reflection  is  a  mere  comparison,  for  in  its  case  there  is  complete
abstraction from the cognitive power to which the given representations
belong” (A262-3/B318, emphasis my own). The crucial consequence of this
is then that logical comparison, too, rules out the possibility of objective
comparison.
We might thus summarise the subsidiary line of reasoning as follows:
(1)  ‘Mere  comparison’  is  the  comparison  of  representations  for  their
relations with one another among themselves without taking into account
the faculty to which the representations belong (without transcendental
reflection).
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(2)  Transcendental  reflection  is  necessary  for  the  possibility  of  the
objective comparison of representations. 
(3) Thus, the objective comparison of representations is impossible under
mere comparison.
(4) In logical reflection, representations are compared with one another
for  their  relations  among  themselves  as  concepts  (that  is,  as
representations of the understanding).
(5)  Thus,  in  logical  reflection,  representations  are  compared  without
taking  into  account  the  faculty  to  which  the  representations  belong
(without transcendental reflection).
(5) Thus, logical reflection is a case of mere comparison.
(6) Thus, the objective comparison of representations is impossible under
logical reflection. 
Such are the primary and subsidiary lines of reasoning that we fnd in
the  introduction  to  the  appendix.  In  the  later  ‘Remark’,  this  line  of
reasoning is  then shown explicitly  to  tell  against  the  philosophy of  the
Leibnizian  tradition:  Leibniz,  we  are  told  at  A270/B326,  “compared  all
things with each other solely through concepts, and found, naturally, no other
distinctions than those through which the understanding distinguishes its
pure concepts from each other.” Thus, this tradition is atributed with (i)
comparing  all  representations  for  their  relations  as  concepts  (i.e.  with
carrying out logical reflection) and, (ii) taking this to be adequate for the
objective  comparison  of  the  representations.  However,  as  the  line  of
reasoning above has shown, the later assumption is illegitimate. Despite its
intentions,  the  Leibnizian  philosophy  cannot  succeed  in  such  objective
comparison:  Objective  comparison,  and  so  too  a  priori  cognition,  is
impossible under logical reflection.
V. Puzzles arising
In the above, I have given an exposition of the line of reasoning that comes
to light in the introduction to the appendix, in terms that remain relatively
close  to  Kant’s  own.  Now  although  we  might  identify  and extract  this
argument  relatively straightforwardly,  a  number  of  important  questions
and  puzzles  arise  when  we  begin  to  consider  its  precise  meaning  and
35
Kant’s grounds for the various claims found in it. In this section, I will turn
to a closer examination of this line of argument. I begin with some points of
emphasis and some remarks in support of the foregoing exposition of the
argument. Thereafter, I will turn to a number of questions and puzzles that
present  themselves  when we examine it  more  closely,  along with some
initial speculative answers to these. 
A frst crucial  point to note with regard to this argument are its  two
distinct  steps.  The  discussion  at  the  start  of  the  passage  –  the  frst
paragraph  cited  above  –  concerns  solely  the  relations  among  our
representations. Kant has not yet made any reference to the objects of our
cognition and the discussion is solely at the level of representations per se.
That  there  is  a  distinct  step  in  the  line  of  reasoning,  in  which  Kant  is
concerned  with  a  point  that  has  to  do  with  the  relations  among  our
representations, is evident in a number of places – most prominently in the
very opening lines of the introduction: “Reflection,” Kant tells us, “does not
have to do with objects themselves, in order to acquire concepts directly
from  them,  but  is  rather  the  state  of  mind  in  which  we  frst  prepare
ourselves to fnd out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at
concepts. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to
our various sources of cognition, through which alone their relation among
themselves can be correctly determined.” (A260/B316,  emphasis  my own)
Now although there is presumably much to be said as to the distinction
that is made in the frst line – between the concern with objects for the sake
of acquiring concepts and the concern with the subjective conditions for
arriving at concepts – it is clear that Kant means to emphasise his central
concern here as not being that of objects. As is stated in the second line, the
concern is with the relations between our representations among themselves.
This  is  the  point  at  which  we  fnd  the  employment  of  the  concepts  of
reflection  –  the  concepts  of  reflection  subsume  the  relations  of  our
representations among themselves – and  this is the fundamental point of
concern of the appendix – an appendix entitled ‘On the amphiboly of the
concepts of refection’.
This frst step is often conflated with the second step – a step that does
introduce consideration of the objects of  our cognition. Although Kant’s
fundamental concern in the appendix is at the level of representations as
such, this concern is relevant to the pages of the  Critique insofar as it has
implications for the possibility of a priori cognition. The second step of the
argument makes explicit  the role of  the determination of these relations
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within  a  priori  cognition.  Here,  we  do  fnd  mention  of  the  objects  of
cognition. However, it is crucial that we recognise that the two steps are
distinct. The concepts of reflection do not subsume objects. Despite Kant’s
explicit  formulation, the potential point of error put forward here is  not
straightforwardly a conflation of two sorts of object. It is instead a potential
error found at the level of our representations as such, which error then has
implications for a priori cognition and thus implications for the objects of
our cognition. Thus,  even in this early stage of our discussion, we have
some signs that there is  more detail  to the case in the appendix than is
included in its more familiar formulations.
A second point of clarifcation concerns premise (6) of the argument. In
the  passage,  Kant  distinguishes  objective  comparison  and  identifes
transcendental  reflection  as  necessary  for  the  possibility  of  such
comparison. By the end of the passage, however, Kant has moved from the
claim that transcendental reflection is necessary for objective comparison to
the claim that transcendental reflection is necessary for a priori cognition.
Now although we have yet to establish the relation between the two, I take
it  to  be  minimally  clear  –  even  at  this  stage  –  that  while  objective
comparison must play a role in a priori cognition, a priori cognition does
not  amount to objective comparison (for a priori cognition cannot amount
simply to a comparison of our representations as representations). If this is
correct,  then Kant’s inference here from premise (5) to premise (7) is  an
implicit one. He does not explicitly state that objective comparison and a
priori cognition are distinct, nor does he tell us the relation between them
such that the necessity of transcendental reflection for the former entails the
necessity of transcendental reflection for the later. He simply moves from
the  one premise  to  the  fnal  conclusion  (7).  Thus,  my exposition of  the
argument makes explicit a premise that must be implicit in it if we are to
deny that a priori cognition amounts simply to objective comparison. This
claim will be examined and established in various ways in what follows;i
for the moment, this caveat is to be noted with regard to how closely the
argument follows Kant’s own formulation. 
Granting these clarifcations, the line of reasoning is in many ways not
yet perspicuous. A number of questions arise when we examine it more
closely and atempt to understand what precisely is going on in it. In what
follows, I  will  address a number of crucial questions and considerations
that  present  themselves  when  we  examine  the  line  of  reasoning  more
closely. 
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As we  have  seen,  although  Kant’s  ultimate  concern  is  with  a  priori
cognition,  the  fundamental  point  of  worry  in  the  appendix  is  with  the
correct  employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection,  or  equivalently,  the
correct  determination  of  the  relations  between  our  representations  as
representations. It is because transcendental reflection is necessary for their
correct  employment,  and  because  their  employment  plays  a  (yet-to-be-
specifed) necessary role in a priori cognition, that transcendental reflection
is necessary for a priori cognition. Two sets of questions naturally emerge
from this. 
The frst of these concerns the employment of the concepts of reflection
themselves, or, the comparison of representations for their relations among
themselves.  Nowhere  in  the  introduction  to  the  appendix,  nor  in  fact
anywhere later in the appendix, does Kant explicitly indicate or explain the
nature of such comparison. As noted, the discussion concerns the level of
representations as representations. But how is this to be understood? What
precisely  is  it  to  compare  representations  for  their  ‘relations  among
themselves’? And how are these relations that fall under the concepts of
reflection to be understood? What is the nature of the representations so
compared? This is a frst set of questions that needs to be addressed if we
are to understand the argument that Kant is puting forward here in the
appendix. 
A second set of questions concerns the role of the determination of these
relations within a priori cognition. How is it that these relations are such
that in determining them we might thereby determine the relations among
the  objects of  our  cognition?  That  is,  how  are  we  to  understand  this
possibility  of  objective  comparison?  And indeed,  is  Kant  here  straining
under  a  claim that  is  in  tension  with  the  Critical  account?  The  Critical
account  means  to  atack  the  unprincipled  or  assumed  transition  from
representations to objects. Can Kant’s account of objective comparison be
made to avoid this? And then further, what is the role of such comparison
in a priori cognition, such that securing objective comparison is a necessary
condition for the former? The answers to these will give us an answer to
the  question  of  the  role  that  determining these  relations  plays  within a
priori  cognition.  Put  another  way,  it  will  give  us  an  answer  to  the
fundamental  question,  what role  do the employment of  the  concepts  of
reflection play in a priori cognition? 
Having set these questions out in a broad sense,  I  turn now to some
speculative  answers  to  these.  Having litle  guidance  from the  appendix
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itself  as  to  the  details  of  the  answers  to  these  questions,  there  are
nonetheless some things that we might say in advance of uncovering the
further details of Kant’s case. I will address each set of questions in turn.
Along the way further  puzzles  and questions  will  arise,  some of  which
might  be  dispelled  here  while  others  must  be  dispelled  once  we  have
covered further crucial ground in understanding Kant’s case.
Our frst set of questions concerns the claims of the determination of the
relations between our representations as representations. As we saw, the
frst step in the line of reasoning concerned the conditions for the correct
determination of these relations – or, equivalently, the correct employment
of the concepts of reflection. Before we ask after the determination of their
relations,  we  might  consider  the  appeal  to  representations  as
representations.  How  are  we  to  understand  this  mention  by  Kant  of
representations as representations? In taking a frst stab at the focal point of
Kant’s  argument  here,  the  following  considerations  seem  to  present
themselves: 
Recall  that  in  the  line  of  reasoning  of  the  introduction,  objective
comparison  involved  a  distinction  between  the  relations  of  our
representations ‘among themselves’ and the relations that hold between the
objects of those representations. (That is, objective comparison is such that,
in  capturing  the  relations  of  our  representations  to  one  another,  the
relations  between  the  objects  of  the  representations  are  also  thereby
captured.)  Thus,  a  distinction  is  drawn  here  by  Kant  between  the
determinations of the objects or things represented and the determinations
of the representations themselves. I take it that in considering representations
‘as  representations’,  or  more  specifcally  the  relations  between
representations as  representations,  we are considering determinations of
the representations themselves, as distinct from any determinations of the
objects  thereby  represented.  Thus,  a  discussion  of  the  relations  of  our
representations  as  representations,  or  ‘among  themselves’,  minimally
involves the recognition of features or determinations of representations as
distinct  from  the  features  or  determinations  of  the  objects  (of  those
representations). That is, minimally, within cognition, we must distinguish
between  features  or  determinations  of  objects  (the  objects  of  the
representations) and features or determinations of representations. 
In fact, it seems we might at this point  make a threefold distinction. If
we consider representation in isolation from any objects themselves, two
sorts  of  determination  are  already  to  be  distinguished.  Given  that
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representations represent their objects,  they will involve,  as part of their
represented content, the determinations of those objects. Thus, if we consider
representations  in  isolation,  we  can  distinguish  determinations  of  the
representation considered as a representation and determinations that are
part  of  the  representation  insofar  as  they  are  part  of  the  represented
content. The determinations involved across these two cases will difer and
they  will  be  determinations  of  diferent  things.  The  former  will  be
determinations of the representation itself;i the later determinations of the
represented  object.  Thus,  a  threefold  distinction  emerges:  We  can
distinguish between (i)  determinations of representations themselves,  (ii)
represented determinations of the object, and (iii) determinations of objects
themselves.  In  considering  the  relations  of  representations  among
themselves,  I  take  it  that  Kant  is  considering  determinations  that  are
distinct both from the determinations of objects and from determinations
that are part of a representation insofar as they are part of the represented
content/are determinations of the object represented. 
We might illustrate this point. I will begin with a toy example, and then
proceed  to  an  example  that  is  perhaps  closer  to  the  focus  of  Kant’s
discussion here.  First,  suppose we consider  a  painting of  a young Kant
walking  over  a  third  bridge  in  Königsberg.  The  river  is  running  idly
beneath the bridge and Kant is looking up reflectively at the not-yet-starry
sky.  Here  we might  make a  threefold  distinction:  The slow flow of  the
water depicted on the canvas is distinct from the slow flow of the water
that  runs  beneath  the  bridge  under  (actual)  Kant’s  feet.  The  former
determination (the slow flow) is a representation of the later. Similarly, the
thickness and angle of the brush stroke of paint on the canvas that play a
role in depicting the water’s flow are again distinct from the determinations
of the water thereby represented. They bear relations to the various brush
strokes on other canvases that  they could never bear to the represented
flow of the water, nor to the flow of the water itself beneath Kant’s feet. 
To take a less far-removed example, suppose we consider entertaining
the  thought  of  Kant’s  crossing  the  bridge  in  Königsberg.  Here  too,  we
might make a threefold distinction. In the thought of the river scene, the
water runs beneath the river at its slow pace. This is part of the thought
insofar as  it  is  part  of the content represented by the thought,  and it  is
distinct from the flow of the river itself than runs underneath the bridge.
Again too, there is a third set of determinations that are distinct from both
of these. Given the other beliefs we might have at the point of entertaining
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the thought, this thought of Kant’s crossing the bridge will be amenable to
certain inferences and not others. This particular feature, of amenability to
inferences x and y, but not z, is neither a feature of represented flow of the
river  (the  same  represented  content  might  be  found  in  the  thought  of
someone else with diferent beliefs) nor a feature of the flow of the river
itself (such a flow would perhaps be amenable to all possible legitimate
inferences). Thus, again we fnd a threefold distinction that is to be made in
the case of representation. 
Further,  it  seems  that  we  must distinguish  the  determinations  of  the
representation itself from these two other sorts of determinations. If we do
not,  representation  and  object  collapse. We  do  away  with  the
representation-object relation. In order to see that this is so, suppose the
threefold distinction above to be replaced with a twofold distinction: the
distinction  between  the  determinations  of  the  object  itself  and  the
determinations represented of the object that are part of the content of the
representation. In order to distinguish the former determinations from the
later, there must be some further thing about the later that make them
determinations that are part of the representation and not simply those of
the  object.  That  is,  the  representation  itself  must  in  some  way  be
distinguished and involve determinations that are not  determinations of
the  object.  Given  that  a  representation  represents  its  object  and  thus
includes the determinations of its object as part of its content, in order to
distinguish  the  two,  a  level  of  diferentiation  over  and  above  the
diferentiation found in the object is necessary. This level of diferentiation
are  those  determinations  that  pertain  to  the  representation  itself  as  a
representation and which are not at all to be taken as part of the content of
the representation, that is, not as determinations of the represented object,
but as determinations of the representation itself. Indeed this seems to be a
minimal  condition  both  on  Kant’s  account  of  representation  as  it  is
implicitly found in the appendix and, as I have suggested, on any account
of representation.
This distinction is,  as noted at the start,  involved in Kant’s appeal to
mere and objective comparison. Without a distinction between the relations
of  representations  ‘among  themselves’  as  determinations  of  the
representations themselves and relations that hold between the  objects of
those representations,  there would be no intelligible  distinction between
mere comparison and objective comparison at all. (Whether and how the
later can yield the former is a further question, to which we will return.)
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That is, supposing no such distinction, any purported comparison would
either amount solely to a determination of the relations between objects or
a determination of the relations between our representations. As is evident,
in both cases, we do not arrive at any intelligible distinction between mere
and objective comparison. There is no sense to ‘representation’ in the frst
case, and no sense to ‘object’ in the second.
The distinctions above, which distinguish determinations or features of
representations  themselves,  lead  naturally  to  the  next  point  of
consideration in coming to understand the concepts of reflection. We have
distinguished  representations  themselves  as  having  certain  features  or
determinations,  but what is the nature of these representations? What is it
that we are considering when we consider representations themselves, and
consequently when we consider their relations among themselves?
To  begin,  there  are  two  understandings  of  ‘representation’  that  it  is
important to dispel. There is a threat of reifcation on two fronts. Let us
recall some of Kant’s claims. The concepts of reflection are employed in the
comparison of representations. We compare and contrast representations
with one another, and, when that they bear certain relations (for example,
when they difer  in  some respect),  we subsume the  relations  under the
relevant concepts of reflection. This comparison of representations for their
relations  leads  us  naturally  to  think  of  representations  in  terms  of
something  akin  to  Cartesian  ideas,  Humean  impressions,  or  empiricist
sense  data.  If  we  are  to  determine  the  relations  between  some
representations,  it  is  most  natural  to  suppose  that  their  features  or
determinations must be in  some way ontologically given –  ontologically
determinate – in order even to begin comparison. Yet, it cannot be that this
comparison is a comparison of representations of the Cartesian or Humean
or  sense  data  variety,  or  indeed  of  entities  of  any sort  that  involve  an
ontological commitment. The reasons for this are twofold. First, it would
seem  that  the  order  of  argument  does  not  here  allow  any  implicit
ontological  commitments.  The  appendix  is  situated  between  the
Transcendental  Logic  and  the  Transcendental  Dialectic.  Each  of  these
sections  treats  certain  a  priori  concepts,  with the  aim of  showing these
necessarily to apply to the objects of our cognition in the former case and
necessarily  not  to  apply  to  the  objects  of  our  cognition  in  the  later.
Nonetheless,  the order of argument,  in each of  these sections,  is  from a
characterisation of the subject to any relevant claims about the objects of
cognition.  The  project  of  the  Critique is  –  at  least  intended  as  –  an
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investigation  that  is  prior  to  any ontologically  commiting metaphysical
claims. Moreover, secondly, the Critical philosophy does not, at any point,
allow for any such an ontological commitment. Cartesian ideas, Humean
impressions,  and the like are transcendentally real  objects,  albeit  mental
ones, and we cannot have cognition of such objects, albeit it mental ones.
Thus, in whatever other ways such representations might be understood,
Kant’s claims here are not  claims about the comparison of  ontologically
determinate and independent mental entities.
On  a  second  and  related  front,  the  representations  here  cannot  be
understood to be the representations of a soul, nor any other  subject that
involves an ontological commitment as to its nature. Our reasons in this
case  are  the  same.  First,  in  terms of  the  argumentative  structure  of  the
Critique, Kant cannot begin with such an ontological commitment. Critical
philosophy is the prior investigation into the nature of the faculties of the
subject in order to determine whether and how, for example, cognition of
the soul is possible in the frst place. Thus, whatever the sense of ‘subject’
and ‘faculties of the subject’ here in question, it cannot be that of the subject
as  a  soul  or  substance.  Again,  secondly,  as  is  familiar,  Kant  ultimately
denies the possibility of theoretical cognition of the soul as subject. Thus,
even once the Critique is concluded, we cannot understand ‘representation’
as ‘representation of a soul’. 
If these representations are not those of a subject to whose nature we are
commited ontologically, nor even representations to whose nature we are
commited  ontologically,  how  then  are  these  representations  to  be
understood? The answer here is  that the representations in question are
those of the subject of cognition or  epistemic subject.  This,  I  suggest,  is  a
minimal way in which this is to be understood. Such an epistemic subject
is, in the frst instance, distinct from an ontological subject insofar as claims
about it involve no ontological commitment. (Indeed, the implication here
is that even if there was a commitment to a soul that had representations,
its being an epistemic subject is conceptually distinct from this.) Secondly,
such a  subject  is  seemingly distinct  from a merely representing subject,
such  as  a  video  camera  or  painting.  An  epistemic  subject  involves  the
possibility  of  correct  or  incorrect  representation  –  of  representations
standing the subject in relation to the object of cognition or of them failing
to  do  so  –  while  the  later  seemingly  involves  no  such  possibility.  The
representations of a merely representing subject simply represent the object
– as a video camera records the scene before it – or there simply fails to be
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such  a  subject.  Thus,  the  determinations  distinguished  above  are
determinations  of  the  representations  of  an  epistemic  subject,  and  our
distinguishing of them allows for the prising apart of the representations of
such a subject and the object of cognition. 
That the representations in question are representations of an epistemic
subject might equally be gleaned by considering the project of the Critique.
The Critique as such is concerned with the conditions for philosophical or a
priori cognition. The appendix is similarly concerned with these conditions:
Transcendental reflection is a condition for the correct employment of the
concepts of reflection and the later is a condition for a priori cognition. If
we recall,  we claimed that the concepts  of  reflection signalled a turning
from concepts that ultimately subsume objects to concepts that are, in some
way, of the subject. Thus, it seems that ‘subject’ here must, minimally, be
understood in this way.
Thus  far,  we  have  given  some  speculative  and,  as  yet,  inconclusive
answers  to  the  question  of  how these  relations  as  subsumed under  the
concepts  of  reflection  are  to  be  understood  as  determinations  of
representations and to the question of the nature of these representations.
We have not yet, however, distinguished how Kant is to be understood in
focussing on the  relations as determinations of representations. A further
puzzle arises when we examine this claimed comparison of representations
for their relations. Recall, representations are compared, by means of the
concepts  of  reflection,  for  their  relations  among  themselves.  Now
standardly,  in cases of relations,  relata precede their relations.  The relation
depends (in some furtherly specifable way) on the relata. A paradigm and
pedestrian case of  comparison for  relations might  be  the  comparison of
people for their relative height. In such comparison, the people (here the
relata) clearly precede the relations (their relative heights). Transposing this
to  the  case  at  hand,  the  comparison  of  representations  would  involve
beginning  with representations that are determinate in at least some way,
such that their relations could then depend on, and be ‘read of’ from, this
determinacy. 
And yet, in the Kantian case, this seems reversed, for it seems that the
individuation of the representations themselves depends on these relations.
The determination of the relations makes a diference to the representations
so  represented  –  to  the  relata: Consider,  for  example,  the  relations  of
‘agreement’  and  ‘opposition’.  Now  while  this  is  yet  to  receive  a  more
perspicuous treatment in what follows, I take it that if some representation
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x is  related  to  some  representation  y as  ‘agreeing’  with  y,  then
representation  x is  part  of representation  y. Thus,  we  cannot  have  a
characterisation of representations x and y, that is, a characterisation of the
relata,  that  precedes  and  is  independent  of  mention  of  the  relation
‘agreement’.  Indeed,  the  correct  determination  of  this  relation  serves  to
determine  the  relata  themselves.  Thus,  it  would  seem  that  the
determination of these relations in some way precedes the representations
thereby determined. If this is indeed so, then it is a mystery as to what we
are to begin with when we carry out this procedure of comparison in terms
of the concepts of reflection. Seemingly, we are to begin with indeterminate
‘representation in general’ and proceed, by means of such comparison, to
make such representation determinate. Needless to say, whether this line of
thought is on the right track or not, the way we are to understand Kant’s
claims about the ‘relations’ between our representations as it features in the
line of argument here requires much further clarity. 
A  related  set  of  questions  concerns,  not  the  relations  between
representations, but the activity of comparison by means of which we are to
determine these relations. Is such comparison a conscious, willed activity?
Or is it an activity that takes place in some other way – perhaps one that is
due  to  the  nature  of  our  cognitive  capacities  and  which  takes  place
unconsciously and without our ‘carrying it out’? A frst point worth noting
with  regard  to  such  comparison  as  the  activity  of  determining  these
relations under the concepts of reflection concerns how ‘determine’ is here
to be understood. Kant’s use of this word naturally yields an ambiguity in
English  that  it  is  crucial  to  remove.  One  might  ‘determine’  something
insofar as one stipulates or decides on it. A restaurant owner determines
which dishes are to appear on this week’s menu. An auctioneer determines
which  paintings  are  to  be  put  for  auction  at  which  times.  However,
‘determine’ in the case of the comparison of our representations is not to be
understood as determining the relations in this sense. The relations are not
stipulated or decided upon in comparing our representations. As is clear
from Kant’s discussion, there is a standard of correctness for this activity
that  is  entirely  independent  of  the  choice  of  whoever  is  doing  the
determining.  The  relations  can  be  correctly  or  incorrectly  determined.
‘Determine’ here is to be understood in the sense of ‘establish’ or ‘ascertain’
or ‘apprehend’. In such comparison, we determine the relations between
our representations insofar as we ascertain or establish what these relations
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are – just as the restaurant owner determines, i.e. ascertains, the cost to him
to prepare each dish.
Having noted then that the relations are ascertained or apprehended in
the  activity  of  comparison,  how then is  this  activity  to  be  understood?
Prima facie, the following seems to be the case. According to the line of
argument,  transcendental  reflection  is  necessary  for  a  priori  cognition
because it is necessary for the correct determination of the relations among
our  representations  and  because  the  correct  determination  of  these
relations is necessary for a priori cognition. Thus, it would seem that such
determination is present in every case of a priori cognition. Thus, insofar as
philosophy  (as  a  conscious,  willed  activity)  involves  establishing  the
synthetic a priori judgements that constitute our a priori cognition, such
determination is involved in  a conscious,  willed activity.  Further,  Kant’s
discussion in the appendix leads us to think that such determination itself is
a conscious, reflective activity that forms part of philosophy’s overall route
to establishing such cognition: He explicitly draws out and distinguishes
the correct  way to carry out such comparison from an incorrect way to
carry it out.  And so it must be that we are able,  consciously and in the
course  of  examining  our  cognition,  to  distinguish  these  two  ways  of
carrying out such comparison and thus to carry out such comparison.
Having considered the  frst  set  of  questions  mentioned above,  I  turn
now to some speculative answers to the second. Recall, part of what needs
to be uncovered if we are to understand Kant’s case in the appendix is the
role of  determining these relations  –  the role  of  the  employment  of  the
concepts of reflection – in cognition. How is it that these relations are such
that  in  determining  them  we might  determine  the  relations  among  the
objects of  cognition?  That  is,  how  are  we  to  understand  objective
comparison? And then further, what is the role of such comparison in a
priori cognition?
Now it seems to me that this relevance might minimally be understood
as follows. In cognition, we stand in relation to an object of cognition by
means  of  some  representations.  Suppose  that,  in  a  certain  case  and  by
means of some yet-to-be-specifed manifold of representations, we stand in
relation to two diferent objects of cognition. It would seem that a minimal
condition on so standing is  that  the representations in the  manifold  are in
some  way  or  another  taken  to  be  diferent  from  one  another.  It  seems
impossible  to  stand  in  relation  to  two  diferent  objects  of  cognition  by
means of  some representations if  we suppose (per impossible on Kant’s
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account) that only a single representation is involved. Similarly, a minimal
condition  on  standing  in  relation  to  one  object  by  means  of  certain
representations is  that  the representations in question,  even if  otherwise
diferent, be taken to be in some way identical. Thus, it would seem that the
employment of the concepts of reflection plays a role in the objects to which
we might  stand in  relation by means  of  those  representations,  and any
variation in this employment is  similarly going to have an efect on the
objects  to which we might  stand in relation. We can thus see,  in a still
highly speculative and minimal way, why the correct employment of these
concepts might be a concern for the possibility of cognition.
In the above, we have seen a number of questions and puzzles that arise
when we consider the explicit line of reasoning put forward regarding the
concepts  of  reflection  in  the  appendix’s  introduction,  and  I  have  put
forward a number of speculative,  and yet under-determined, answers to
these. Regardless of these speculations, however, the concepts of reflection
and their employment in a priori cognition remain opaque. To uncover the
workings of the case in the appendix, we will need to venture beyond the
claims of the appendix to an examination of Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical
accounts of arriving at a priori cognition. It is here that we will fnd the
landscape necessary  to  understanding the  case  in  all  its  complexity  –  a
complexity that will lead us ultimately to the early parts of the  Critique.
Before starting on this course,  however,  it  is  worth reviewing in outline
what has been put forward above.
In the above, we began with an overview of the material of the appendix
chapter quite broadly, in its relation to the rest of the Critique. We saw that
the  appendix  introduces  and  treats  a  set  of  concepts,  the  concepts  of
reflection, that contrast in important ways to the other concepts treated in
the preceding and succeeding parts of the  Critique. We saw also that the
treatment of these concepts involves the frst mention within the Critique of
the  activity  of  transcendental  reflection.  We  turned  then  to  extant
discussions  of  the  literature  and  examined  the  account  given  of  the
appendix,  the  ‘Amphiboly  Chapter’,  in  these  discussions.  Familiar
formulations, we noted, focus on the charge that the section raises against
the Leibnizian philosophy, a charge which received various emphases in
these discussions but which was commonly taken to be underlain by an
erroneous ontological employment of the concepts of reflection. In the later
part of our discussion, we turned to the text of the appendix itself – more
specifcally,  to  its  introductory  sections  in  which  we  found  a  line  of
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reasoning  that  links  the  concepts  of  reflection  to  the  activity  of
transcendental reflection, claiming the later to be necessary for the correct
employment of the former, and this later to be necessary for the possibility
of  a  priori  cognition.  This  line  of  reasoning  was  extracted  relatively
straightforwardly,  but,  as  we  saw  in  our  fnal  section,  a  number  of
questions and puzzles arose as to the precise meaning of the case: What
precisely  do  the  concepts  of  reflection  subsume?  Why is  transcendental
reflection necessary for their correct employment, and what role does this
employment play in securing a priori cognition? These were some of the
questions that we raised, and to which, towards the end of our discussion,
we put forward some speculative answers. Nonetheless, it seems evident
that the case in the appendix – including the crucial line of reasoning found
in its introductory passages – has unanswered questions, unanswered both
by the familiar formulation and by our speculative answers. It is to this task
that we turn in the remainder of this study. And I hope, by the end, to
show  that  the  appendix  contains  a  systematic,  complex,  and  hitherto
overlooked  case  that  distinguishes  a  corrected,  Critical  employment  of
these  concepts  in  addition  to  their  erroneous  Leibnizian  employment,
which corrected employment is at work in securing a priori cognition from
the very frst pages of the Critique itself. Let us turn then to this task.
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Part II
Method in philosophy from the Inquiry 
to the Critique
As we have seen above, the appendix puts forward what Kant takes to be
an  error  in  the  German  Rationalist19 employment  of  the  concepts  of
reflection. What has also come to light is a line of reasoning that seemingly
underlies this charge, the line of reasoning that we fnd in the introductory
sections to the appendix. Now, in order to understand more precisely the
nature of the concepts of reflection and the role that Kant takes them to
play in philosophical cognition – both of the German Rationalist  variety
and within the Critical philosophy – it is necessary that we examine how,
under each of these accounts, we arrive at philosophical cognition. Once we
have  an  understanding  of  the  route  to  philosophical  cognition  under
German Rationalism, along with the way in which the Critical route to such
cognition is to be contrasted with it, we will be beter placed to understand
and to pinpoint the role of the concepts of reflection within such cognition –
and thus to understand the case and charge put forward by Kant in the
appendix. Here in Part II, I will begin with this task. 
In what follows, I will examine the method of German Rationalism and
Kant’s contrasting Critical method by focussing primarily on two texts: The
pre-Critical  Inquiry  concerning  the  distinctness  of  the  principles  of  natural
theology and morality  (1763)20 and the Doctrine of Method that forms the
second  major  division  of  the  Critique (A707-855/B735-883).21 Although
19 As noted  in  footnote  6  above,  although  Kant  explicitly  directs  his  arguments  in  the
appendix  to  the  philosophy  of  Leibniz,  many  of  the  central  claims  of  the  appendix,
including our argument of concern, apply equally, if not in fact more precisely, to the
philosophical  tradition of  Wolf and his followers.  From here on,  I  will  use  the  term
‘German Rationalism’ to refer to this tradition.
20 Hereafter, ‘Inquiry’.
21 Although these two texts cannot, without further argument, be taken to be paradigmatic
statements  of the method of  German Rationalism,  our interest  here is  not in German
Rationalist method for its own sake, but rather lies in Kant’s understanding of this method.
It  will  be  the  method  of  German  Rationalism,  as  Kant  understands  it,  to  which  the
arguments  of  the  appendix  are  directed  and,  thus,  in  order  to  understand  these
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Kant’s discussions of method in philosophy are to be found as early as  A
New Elucidation of  the  First  Principles of  Metaphysical  Cognition (1755)  and
indeed later  in  the  inaugural  dissertation,  On the  Form and Principles  of
Sensible and the Intelligible World (1770), it is in the Inquiry and the Doctrine
that Kant’s primary treatment of the methods are to be found, and it is in
these that we fnd his clearest statements of the signifcant changes made
under the Critical philosophy to the pre-Critical method – the changes that
will  come  to  be  crucial  in  understanding  the  case  put  forward  in  the
appendix. 
As is well-known, German Rationalism – or at least the variety that Kant
takes himself to be rejecting – is commited to the claim that the route to
metaphysical cognition is to be modelled on that of mathematics.22 That is,
the correct method to adopt in the case of metaphysics is the method that is
used in obtaining and furthering our mathematical cognition. Even prior to
the Critical philosophy and its method, Kant rejects the wholesale adoption
of the mathematical method in philosophy and instead proposes a more
moderate  philosophical  method  (put  forward  in  the  Inquiry).  In  what
follows, I will progress towards the Critical method by examining in turn
each of the following: (I) The mathematical method as it is construed by
Kant in the Inquiry, (II) Kant’s reasons for rejecting this method as correct in
philosophy, as these are put forward in the  Inquiry, (III) Kant’s preferred
‘moderate’  method of the  Inquiry,  (IV)  the mathematical  method as it  is
discussed in  the  Critique,  (V)  the  Critical  rejection of  this  as  the  correct
method in philosophy, and (VI) Kant’s proposed Critical method. Finally,
in Section VII, I will highlight an important feature of these methods that
will bring us closer to understanding the concepts of reflection and their
arguments,  we need a picture of German Rationalist  method as it was understood by
Kant.
22 This commitment is stated explicitly in Mendelssohn’s essay entered in the Berlin Royal
Academy of the Sciences 1763 competition alongside Kant’s  Inquiry,  Über die Evidenz in
den metaphysischen Wissenschaften’ (1764, p. 280), in Lambert’s  Treatise on the Criterion of
Truth (1761, §22), in Wolf’s so-called ‘German Logic’ (1712, p.20-21) and the Preliminary
Discourse to the ‘Latin Logic’ (1728a, §139), and in Meier (1752, §§415, 422). The method
is  evident  in  Crusius  (1745,  §29)  and  Knuten  (1735,  §§23  and  28).  A  paradigmatic
statement of Kant’s atribution of this method to ‘dogmatic metaphysics’ can be found at
A713/B735.
The potential of employing the methods of mathematics in philosophy or metaphysics is,
of course, traceable further afeld than its expression in German Rationalism. Descartes,
for example, is frequently cited as well-known proponent of the ‘geometrical method’ in
philosophy (see, for example, Part Two of the Discourse on Method of 1637). The method is
beautifully  evident  in  Spinoza’s  Ethica:  Ordine  Geometrico  demonstrata (1677),  and  also
clearly evident in Wolf’s predecessor, Von Tschirnhaus (1687).
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role in a priori cognition. As mentioned, I will, for the most part, focus on
the two primary texts in which Kant’s treatment of these methods is to be
found.  The  discussion  will  be  informed,  however,  at  various  points  by
Kant’s  other  Critical  and  pre-Critical  works  and  by  those  of  his
predecessors and contemporaries. 
As a fnal brief point of orientation, this part of the study along with
Parts  III  and IV proceeds  from the  general  to  the  more  specifc:  Part  II
examines the transition from Kant’s pre-Critical to his Critical account of
philosophical method in the broadest, and briefest, way. In Part III, I turn to
a more detailed examination of the frst stage of this method. And in Part
III,  I focus yet more closely on a particular feature in this frst stage – a
feature to which the case in the appendix will ultimately be seen to apply.
I. Mathematical method in the Inquiry
Turning to Kant’s understanding of mathematical method at the time of the
Inquiry,  we  fnd  the  following.23 Mathematical  cognition  begins  with
defnitions of its concepts and with frst principles or axioms (Inquiry 2:283,
§2  and  §3,  and  Blomberg  Logic [1770s]  24:278).  From  these,  all  further
propositions  are  derived.  The  concepts  in  question  are  concepts  of
mathematical objects, and in their defnition the features or marks of the
object are put forward as contained in the concept (Inquiry  2:280). These
defnitions take the form of propositions that take the marks as predicates
and the concept of the object in question as subject (Blomberg Logic 24:272).24
Full defnition of a concept involves specifying all and only the features or
23 It  is  worth  noting  that  not  all  of  these  features  are  treated  explicitly  in  the  Inquiry.
However,  most of them are implicit  or assumed in this  discussion,  and can be found
explicitly stated elsewhere. In these cases, I have given references to the relevant passages
in Kant’s  other  texts.  Further  confrmation of  this  basic  structure of the  mathematical
method can be gleaned from Kant’s discussion in the Doctrine of Method and from the
picture found in various accounts within the German rationalist  tradition (see below).
Although Kant’s understanding of the mathematical method has changed in signifcant
ways by the time of the Doctrine, it has not changed in the elements of the basic structure
presented here.
24 Cf. The false subtlety of the four syllogistic fgures [1762] 2:58. (Hereafter, ‘False Subtlety’.) In
this passage, Kant  formulates the point in terms of ‘judgements’,  where,  at this  point
prior  to  the  critical  account,  ‘judgement’  is  the  connection  of  subject  and  predicate
concepts by means of the copula. (The passage further complicates the picture with the
claim that a full defnition can only be given over the course of a syllogism. This is further
treated in Part III in our discussion of the distinction between immediate and mediate
marks.)
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marks of the object of the concept in question. These defnitions are put
alongside the axioms or frst principles in which the concepts feature as the
starting point of such cognition. The frst principles are those propositions
that are indemonstrable or immediately certain, needing no appeal to prior
principles for their certainty (Inquiry 2:281). From these defnitions and frst
principles,  all  further  propositions  are  to  be  derived.  The  later  are  the
demonstrable or derived propositions of mathematics.25
Such are the defning elements of mathematical cognition, and constitute
such cognition in its  entirety.  A number of  points might here be noted.
First,  the  certainty  aforded  in  mathematical  cognition  rests  on  this
structure of elements. The immediate certainty of our frst principles and
defnitions  yields  certainty  for  all  further  propositions  that  derive  from
them. In sum, the entire structure allows for an absolute degree of certainty
in our mathematical cognition.
Secondly, although Kant formulates his discussion in terms of certainty,
it seems clear that what is also at issue are the grounding relations among
the  propositions  themselves  –  and  so  among  the  objects  to  which  the
propositions  refer.  It  is  not  simply  that  the  frst  principles  bear  some
epistemic mark of certainty and are epistemically sufcient for deriving the
further  propositions  with  certainty.  Rather  it  is  that  the  frst  principles
ground all the rest, regardless of whether they are known to be certain or
not. It is not simply that the frst principles are those on the basis of which
the rest might be known to be true, but those on the basis of which the rest
are true.26 
German  Rationalism  is  commited  to  the  adoption  of  this  method
equally in our philosophical cognition. Philosophical cognition bears the
same structure as mathematical cognition and is to be obtained by using
precisely the same method. We are to begin with axioms or frst principles
and with  the  defnitions  of  the  concepts  featuring  in  these.  From  these
certain  propositions,  all  further  propositions  of  this  cognition  can  be
derived with similar certainty and the edifce of our philosophical cognition
can  be  established  in  its  entirety.  Philosophical  cognition,  however,  is
distinct from mathematical cognition in its objects. “The general object of
25 This, in broad outline, was the view of cognition in mathematics widely held at the time
of the Inquiry and indeed during Kant’s critical period. These commitments can be seen in
Lambert (1761,  §§1-3) and in Wolf (1712, Chapters 1,  3,  4,  1728a, §§115-124,  139,  and
1728b, §332f.)
26 This distinction, between the series of epistemic grounds and the series of grounds of
truth or being, is also put forward in De Jong (1995).
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mathematics“, as Kant puts it in the Inquiry, “is magnitude” (Inquiry 2:282)
or, as Kant puts it elsewhere,  quantity (Blomberg Logic  24:29). By contrast,
the  “real  object[s]  of  philosophy [are]  infnitely  many  qualities”  (Inquiry
2:282, emphasis my own). Although Kant does not, in the  Inquiry,  detail
this distinction any further, the transcripts of his lectures in Logic are more
illuminating:  The objects  of  philosophy are  “the  universal  qualities  and
characters  of  things  […]  [Philosophy]  only  asks,  what  is  posited?
[Mathematics], on the other hand, investigates how many times the thing is
posited, and investigates the [quantities] of things” (Blomberg Logic  24:29).
Thus, while German Rationalism recommends the same method across the
two disciplines, it recognises this diference in their objects.27
Although the  Inquiry does not explicitly contain any illustration of this
method in philosophy, a paradigmatic and beautiful case of such purported
philosophical  cognition is  found in  Baumgarten’s  Metaphysica (1739).  As
per  the  method,  philosophical  cognition  begins  with  defnitions  of  its
concepts, where the marks contained in the concept in question are to be all
and only the marks or features of the object of the concept: 
That which is not nothing is SOMETHING [i.e. a possible thing]. 
(1739, §8)
Along with the immediately certain frst principles in which these concepts
feature: 
Nothing – […] something impossible [...] – is both A and not-A. […] This
proposition is called the principle of contradiction, and it is absolutely
primary.
(1739, §7) 
From these, the further propositions of this cognition are derived: 
Everything possible either has a ground or does not. If it has a ground,
something is its ground. If it does not have one, nothing is its ground. If
nothing  were  the  ground  of  something,  it  would  be  knowable  from
nothing why that thing is, and hence the nothing itself […] would be 
27 This distinction in subject mater between mathematics and philosophy was prevalent
within the German rationalist tradition. Statements of it can be found variously in Kant’s
pre-critical writings (see,  for example,  Blomberg Logic  24:24, 24:29, 24:229, 24:797-8 and
Jäsche Logic 9:23),  and in his  contemporaries  (Meier  (1752,  §3),  Mendelssohn (1764,  p.
278)).
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something, […] which is absurd. Therefore, something is the ground of
every  possible  thing,  […]  which  is  to  say  that  nothing  is  without  a
ground.  
(1739, §20)
II. The Inquiry’s rejection of mathematical method
In the  Inquiry, Kant puts forward a number of reasons for rejecting this
picture of the route to cognition in philosophy. In each case, he points out
an important diference between mathematics and philosophy that renders
the method of the former unsuitable for ataining cognition in the later. I
will discuss each of these in turn. 
The frst point of diference raised in the  Inquiry  concerns the concepts
that feature in the defnitions and frst principles of mathematics and of
philosophy respectively. In particular,  there is  a crucial diference in the
way in which defnition of these concepts is achieved across the two cases.
That is, there is a diference in the way in which the marks found in the
concept are to be identifed. In mathematics, our concepts are arrived at,
Kant tells us, synthetically. The marks found in a mathematical concept are
combined  by  our  stipulation,  arbitrarily.  For  example,  a  trapezium  is
characterised by “four straight lines bounding a plane surface so that the
opposite sides are not parallel to each other” (Inquiry 2:276), but arriving at
this combination of marks is not a mater of identifying a combination of
marks  that  is  somehow given to  or  independent  of  us,  but  a  mater of
stipulating  the  concepts  with  which  we  are  dealing.  The  concepts  of
mathematics  “only  [come]  into  existence  as  a  result  of  the  defnition.”
(Inquiry  2:276) By contrast,  the concepts  that feature in the principles of
philosophy are, Kant tells us, given concepts. In philosophical cognition, the
“concept of a thing is always given, albeit confusedly or in an insufciently
determinate fashion.” (Inquiry 2:276) We cannot arrive at these concepts by
combining marks of our own choosing, but must, by means of an analysis,
identify and separate out all and only those marks belonging to the concept
in question and in this way arrive at defnition of the concept.28
28 This distinction between arbitrary or synthetic and given concepts is already to be found
in Meier (1752, §254) and was prevalent at the time. However, in the Inquiry Kant draws
out the implications of this distinction in an original way to reject the straightforward
application of the mathematical method to philosophical cognition.
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Second. Mathematical and philosophical cognition diverge in the aids
available  for  such  cognition  (Inquiry  2:278-9).  Mathematical  cognition
allows us recourse to something other than its concepts and propositions in
order  to  further  our  cognition.  The propositions  of  mathematics  can be
examined ‘in concreto’, either by means of particulars (a child counts up
beads  on  an  abacus,  a  geometer  draws  an  instance  of  a  triangle)  or  of
symbols  (the algebraist mechanically manipulates  symbols that  compose
the propositions of mathematics). The only aids to which philosophy has
recourse  are  words.  Words  do  not  show  their  composition  and do  not
admit of mechanical manipulation for the sake of furthering cognition of
their objects.  Philosophy must examine its concepts and propositions ‘in
abstracto’ or by means of the concepts alone. 
Third.  Mathematics  has  no  unanalysable  concepts.  Philosophical
cognition  has  a  great  many  unanalysable  concepts.  A  concept  is
unanalysable if it either does not nor cannot receive defnition within the
cognition within which it features. Mathematics has no such concepts. In
other  words,  all  concepts  in  mathematics  can and do receive defnition.
This  is  because defnition in mathematics  is  not  arrived at  by means of
analysis, but rather by synthesis. By contrast, philosophical cognition will
have  “uncommonly  many  unanalysable  concepts”  (Inquiry  2:280).  This
seemingly  stems  from  the  vastness  and  fundamentality  of  the  subject
mater of philosophy, viz. the universal qualities of things.
A further point of diference between mathematical and philosophical
cognition  concerns  their  indemonstrable  principles.  Mathematics  begins
with indemonstrable principles for whose concepts it has defnitions and
from which all further propositions are derived. In contrast, philosophical
cognition has a scheme of indemonstrable propositions of “immeasurable
scope” (Inquiry 2:281), for whose concepts it does not yet have defnitions,
and which are not the propositions from which all further propositions in
our  philosophical  cognition  are  derived.  This  is  because  philosophical
cognition  begins  with  concepts  that  already  feature  in  a  number  of
indemonstrable  propositions  before  proceeding  to  the  defnition  of  the
concepts. For example, before we arrive at a defnition of the concept of
space, and thus arrive at the possibility of frst principles, we already have,
claims Kant, cognition of a number of indemonstrable propositions about
space:  Space contains a manifold of which the parts  are external  to one
another.  This  manifold is  not  constituted by substances.  Space can only
have three dimensions. (ibid.)
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Four. The object of mathematics is simple. Mathematical cognition takes
as  its  only  object  that  of  magnitude  or  “how many times  something is
posited” (Inquiry  2:282).  Its  objects  are neither numerous  nor varied.  By
contrast, there are, Kant tells us, “infnitely many qualities which constitute
the real object of philosophy” (Inquiry 2:282). Its objects are both varied and
numerous.
Five.  Mathematics  proceeds  from the  simple  to  the  complex (Inquiry
2:282).  Mathematics begins by arbitrarily combining a number of simple
concepts  to  form  defnitions  of  its  concepts.  From  these,  its  further
propositions are derived. It thus increases in complexity as it progresses in
cognition.  Philosophical  cognition,  however,  begins  with  complex  given
concepts, which require analysis before arriving at the simple concepts that
are found in its defnitions. Philosophy thus begins with the more complex
and proceeds to the less complex as it progresses in cognition.29 
These diferences bear on the three elements of mathematical method in
the  following  way.  First,  it  is  not  that  defnition  is,  under  these
considerations,  impossible  tout  court.  However,  there  are  strong
qualifcations to its possibility. It is impossible for philosophical cognition
to proceed from defnitions of its concepts.30 And further, defnition will be
possible only with regard to certain concepts and not others, viz. only with
regard  to  those  that  are  not  unanalysable.  Nor,  secondly,  are  frst
principles, as indemonstrable propositions whose concepts have received
defnition  and  from  which  all  other  propositions  can  be  derived,
impossible.  Again,  the  impossibility  is  that  our  philosophical  cognition
begin with such propositions and proceed to further itself from these. As
Kant  emphasises,  “the  most  important  business  of  higher  philosophy
consists in seeking out these indemonstrable fundamental truths” (Inquiry
2:281). These two implications, along with certain of the difculties raised
above,  have  implications  for  the  third  of  the  elements,  derived
propositions. Under mathematical cognition, having begun with defnitions
of its concepts and frst principles, all further propositions in such cognition
29 In the  Blomberg Logic,  this  distinction  is  put  in  terms of  the  more familiar  distinction
between  synthetic  and  analytic  method.  The  former  involves  “[ascending]  from  the
lowest and simplest [marks] to the highest” (24:153), while the later involves a “[descent]
from  the  composite  and  highest  to  the  simplest  and  lowest”  (ibid.).  This  distinction
between analytic and synthetic method is prominent within the context of the  Critique
and  has  featured  ubiquitously  in  extant  literature  on  the  Critique.  The  distinction  is,
however, somewhat tangential to our purposes and I will thus set it aside.
30 Cf. Blomberg Logic 24:268-9. It is notable, however, that here Kant seems to be commited
to defnitions being as easily achievable in philosophy as mathematics.
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are derivable, both (i) in the sense that their truth is grounded by these frst
principles  and  defnitions,  and,  (ii)  in  the  epistemic  sense  that,  for  any
further derived proposition, it is epistemically possible for us to cognise it
(though there might be contingent psychological or other obstacles to our
doing so). There are then two ways in which the possibility of derivation of
further  propositions  contrasts  with  this  in  the  case  of  philosophical
cognition.  First,  given  the  non-exhaustiveness  of  the  propositions  from
which further propositions are to be derived and given the impossibility of
examining  philosophical  propositions  and  concepts  in  concreto,  the
demonstrable  propositions  of  philosophical  cognition  will  be  far  more
difcult  to  derive.  More  crucially,  however,  the  epistemic  possibility
mentioned above will be denied in the case of certain propositions. It will
not be that, in every case, it is epistemically possible for us to derive the
further proposition.
What  is  the  signifcance  of  these  claims  about  the  possibility  of  the
mathematical method in philosophical cognition? This is at least threefold.
First, and most trivially, Kant’s discussion here raises epistemic difculties
for philosophical cognition proceeding in this way in terms of the ease with
which we might acquire such cognition. Philosophical cognition encounters
difculties such that the time and efort required to progress in it are vastly
greater  to  those  of  mathematics.  Secondly,  Kant’s  discussion  raises
epistemic difculties that  afect our cognition proceeding in this way  in
principle. Mathematical cognition proceeds from an exhaustive statement of
defnitions  of  its  concepts  and  frst  principles  that  ground  all  further
propositions, both epistemically and as such. Philosophical cognition cannot
in  principle  proceed  in  this  way.  We  are  epistemically  barred  from
ataining  cognition  of  this  structure  in  the  case  of  philosophy.  Thirdly,
however, it is worth noting that the claims above do not pertain to the way
in  which  the  propositions  themselves  are  grounded.  It  remains  a
background assumption in the  Inquiry that the philosophical propositions
themselves  (or  rather  the  objects  themselves)  retain  this  structure  of
grounding.  The  claims  of  the  Inquiry pertain  to  the  possibility  of
philosophical cognition of these propositions proceeding in this way.31 This
pertains to all three elements of the mathematical method.
31 For this insight, I am indebted to de Jong’s excellent discussion of Kant’s method in ‘How
is metaphysics as a science possible?’ (1995) in which he notes that, in the  Inquiry, Kant
essentially separates the ordo essendi (series of grounds of truth) and the ordo cognoscendi
(series of epistemic grounds) of philosophical cognition.
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III. The ‘moderate method’ of the Inquiry
The  method  thus  proposed  by  Kant  in  the  Inquiry  for  philosophical
cognition contrasts with that of mathematics. Philosophical cognition does
not, as mathematical cognition does, begin with an exhaustive statement of
the defnitions of its concepts along with its frst principles, from which all
further  propositions are  derived.  Instead,  philosophical  cognition begins
with the identifcation of  some  marks of  some of its concepts and with the
indemonstrable  propositions  that  connect  these  identifed  marks  to  the
concept in question. These indemonstrable propositions, although neither
defnitions nor frst principles, are the point at which such cognition begins
and  are  capable  of  the  same  degree  of  certainty  as  is  found  in  the
defnitions and frst principles of mathematical cognition. With regard to
many of  the  objects  with which philosophy is  concerned,  Kant  tells  us,
there is a constant awareness of a number of their diferent marks in the
consciousness  of  the  object.  As  Kant  illustrates  with  regard  to  the
philosophical concept of appetite,  “Even if  I  had never defned what an
appetite was, I should still be able to say with certainty that every appetite
presupposed  the  representation  of  the  object  of  the  appetite;i  that  this
representation was an anticipation of what was to come in the future;i that
the feeling of pleasure was connected with it;i and so forth.” (Inquiry 2:284,
emphasis omited) Thus, in our merely being conscious of certain of the
objects of philosophy, we can identify with certainty some of the marks of
these objects. Philosophical cognition begins with the identifcation of such
marks, and the indemonstrable propositions that connect such marks to the
concepts  of  their  objects  are  the  propositions  with  which  philosophical
cognition begins.32 From these indemonstrable propositions, certain further
propositions of philosophical cognition can be derived with equal certainty.
In this, what we might term, ‘moderate’ method proposed by Kant, we
thus see a relinquishment of the exhaustiveness of cognition that is secured
under the mathematical method, but with the retention of certainty in the
32 This change to the German rationalist  mathematical  model is already evident in  False
Subtlety: 
“All  judgements  in  the  case  of  which  identity  or  contradiction  are  apprehended
immediately, […] are indemonstrable propositions […] Human knowledge is full of such
indemonstrable  judgements.  Every  defnition  is  preceded  by  a  number  of  such
indemonstrable  judgements,  for  in order to arrive at  a  defnition,  one represents  as a
characteristic mark of the thing that which one immediately cognises in a thing before
anything else. Those philosophers are mistaken who proceed as if there only unprovable
fundamental truth and no others.” (2:60-61)
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case  of  those  indemonstrable  propositions  that  can  be  cognised  by  the
identifcation  of  the  marks  of  the  concept  as  above  and  of  those
propositions derivable from these.33 
IV. Mathematical method in the Critique
Thus far, we have examined Kant’s account of philosophical method as it is
presented  in  the  pre-Critical  Inquiry.  By  the  time  of  Kant’s  Critical
understanding  of  philosophical  method,  however,  a  number  of
qualifcations and changes have taken place that prove crucial both to the
method that is to be adopted in philosophy and ultimately to our interest in
the appendix. I turn now to Kant’s Critical account of the correct method
for  philosophical  cognition.  The  key  discussion  both  of  the  method  of
mathematical  cognition  and  of  the  proposed  Critical  method  for
philosophical cognition is to be found in the second major division of the
Critique, viz. the Doctrine of Method. For our purposes, examination of the
frst  major  section  in  this  division  –  the  ‘discipline  of  pure  reason  in
dogmatic use’ – is the needed task.
Kant’s account of the fundamental elements of the mathematical method
have  not  changed  from  the  Inquiry to  the  Critique.  In  the  Doctrine,
mathematical  cognition  is  again  constituted  by  the  three  elements  of
defned concepts, indemonstrable frst principles, and derived propositions.
However,  this  basic  commonality  gives  way  to  a  number  of  important
changes in detail.
Mathematical  cognition  begins  with  defnitions  of  its  concepts.
However, defnition here involves three requirements. It requires that the
concept be exhibited (i)  exhaustively,  (ii)  within its  boundaries,  and (iii)
originally. Exhaustiveness of a concept involves a distinction of the all the
relevant marks from one another and from all others (the former fulflling
the requirement of clarity, the later that of completeness). Exhibiting the
concept  within  its  boundaries  involves  separating  these  marks  from  all
others (or, correspondingly, the abstraction of all marks not belonging to
the  concept)  in  order  to  yield  all  and  only the  marks  belonging  to  the
33 It  has  variously  been  noted  that  Kant’s  method  here  is  based,  in  part,  on  the  new
Newtonian method of the natural sciences. (See, for example, de Jong (1995) p. 250 and
Schönfeld (2000) pp. 219-220.) While this is a historically interesting influence in its own
right, our interest here is in the Critical divergence from the German rationalist model,
and I will thus leave aside any further discussion of the influence of the Newtonian – or
other – methods.
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concept (this fulflling the requirement of precision). Thus far, the account
is  similar  to  the  Inquiry.  Finally,  the  defnition is  to  exhibit  the  concept
originally. The ‘originality’ of a defnition concerns the grounding of the
defned concept. This is the requirement that the boundary of the concept
and the marks included therein are not grounded by something external to
or other than the concept – that they are not “derived from anywhere else”
(A727/B755n.)  Requirement  (iii)  ensures  that  the  concept  so  defned can
appear in the frst principles, or, Kant tells us, “[stand] at the head of all
judgements about an object.” (ibid.)34 
Mathematical  cognition  begins  with  frst  principles.  These  are  again
‘immediately  certain’  propositions  –  propositions  not  derived  from any
other propositions – and from these all further propositions are derived.
Both  of  these  propositions  –  indemonstrable  and  demonstrable  –  are,
however, now synthetic propositions. The predicate of the proposition is not
contained  in  the  concept  of  the  subject.  Neither  the  ground  of  their
connection (subject and predicate) nor their mark of certainty consists in
this.35
These  briefly  stated  changes  are  signifcant.  First,  there  is  a  further
distinction  to  be  drawn  between  the  frst  element  of  mathematical
cognition, viz. the concepts featuring in the propositions of mathematics,
and the second and third elements, viz. the indemonstrable and derived
propositions of this cognition. In the Inquiry, the distinction between these
is as follows. A defnitional proposition is distinguished by its connecting a
mark to its concept. A frst principle is a proposition derived from no other,
but from which others are derived. A derived proposition is derived from
some  other  proposition  or  propositions.  In  the  Doctrine,  a  defnitional
proposition is distinct from the later two. Only defnitional propositions
are analytic. The ground of the connection of the mark to the concept is
nothing other than containment in the concept itself. The indemonstrable
frst  principles  of  mathematical  cognition  and  its  derived  principles,
however, are synthetic, and the ground of the connection of their marks lies
34 Although this  last  requirement is  an addition to the  Inquiry’s account of defnition,  it
might  be seen in other  German rationalist  texts.  In  the  so-called ‘German Logic’,  for
example,  Wolf characterises  a  defnition  in  terms  of  the  essence  of  an  object  in  the
following way: “[That] which serves as the foundation for all other things atributable to
it, is what we call Essence. […] It follows from this that the defnitions of things uncovers
(we discover) their essence.” ([1712], p. 59)
35 The  distinction  between analytic  and  synthetic  propositions  is  already present  in  the
Blomberg Logic lectures, but Kant does not here insist that the propositions of mathematics
or of philosophy are synthetic (24:279).
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in something other than the concepts found in the propositions. Thus, in
the  case  of  these  now  synthetic  propositions,  in  order  for  them  to  be
established something further is needed over and above the concepts found
in the proposition, or indeed, over and above the concepts found in any
proposition. 
This  diference  in  the  nature  of  the  frst  principles  and  derived
propositions  of  mathematics  involves  the  introduction  of  a  further
complication to mathematical cognition. Cognition of such, now synthetic,
propositions is only possible because mathematics is able to construct its
objects  in  pure  intuition.  That  is,  Kant  has  an  account  of  how  the
propositions  of  mathematics  can  constitute  cognition,  despite  their
syntheticity.
Such is  the  nature  of  the  method,  in  the  Doctrine,  to which German
Rationalism is, perhaps unwitingly, commited in the case of philosophical
cognition.  If  philosophy  is  to  adopt  the  mathematical  method,  it  must
proceed by these means.  It  must begin with an exhaustive statement of
strict  defnitions  and  synthetic  frst  principles,  and  derive  all  further
synthetic principles from these. 
V. The Critical rejection of mathematical method
The  Doctrine  again  points  to  a  number  of  diferences  between
philosophical and mathematical cognition. These diferences imply that the
method of the later is not suitable for the former. Philosophy, if it is to
arrive at cognition at all, must do so by some other means. 
Again, under the Critical account, the concepts of mathematics are the
product  of  an  arbitrary  combination  or  synthesis  of  marks  by  the
understanding,  while  the  concepts  of  philosophy  are  ‘given’  concepts,
albeit  confusedly,  whose  combinations  of  marks  must  be  identifed  by
analysis. 
Secondly,  mathematical cognition difers from philosophical cognition
in its having recourse to the objects of its concepts, while philosophy has no
such recourse:  Both mathematics and philosophy are the a priori  use of
reason  by  means  of  concepts.  That  is,  both  begin  with  and  expand
cognition by means of  concepts  without appeal  to empirical  experience.
The propositions of both are synthetic. That is, the connection between the
concepts  in  its  propositions  is  not  containment.  In  order  to  connect  the
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concepts  in  its  propositions,  mathematical  cognition  now  examines  its
concepts independently of empirical experience by constructing its objects
in  pure  intuition.  The  connection  of  the  concepts  in  its  synthetic
propositions  is  grounded by appeal  to  these  constructed objects.   Thus,
indemonstrable propositions are possible in mathematical cognition and it
begins  with  frst  principles.  Philosophy,  by  contrast,  has  no  such
possibility.  It  cannot  construct  its  objects  independently  of  empirical
experience  and  proceeds  by  means  of  concepts  alone.  In  Kant’s
terminology, mathematical cognition is the ‘intuitive use of reason through
the construction of concepts’;i  philosophy is the ‘discursive use of reason
through concepts’ (A719/B747).
These diferences bear on the possibility of the use of the mathematical
method in philosophical cognition in a yet more severe way than those put
forward in the  Inquiry. First, philosophical cognition, because its concepts
are not synthetic,  but given, cannot begin with defnitions. (It  is unclear
how the more stringent requirement of originality bears on the possibility
of defnition in philosophical cognition. If the ‘unanalysable’ concepts of
the  Inquiry are now instead understood by Kant as containing their own
ground, then it would seem that defnition is, in principle, possible for all
concepts of philosophical cognition. This is not addressed, however, in the
Doctrine.)  Secondly,  given  the  syntheticity  of  the  propositions  of
philosophy,  but  the  impossibility  of  its  constructing  its  objects,
philosophical  cognition,  if  it  is  to  follow the  mathematical  method,  can
have neither  frst  principles  nor derived propositions.  These are now in
principle impossible.
VI. The Critical method
The situation for philosophical cognition seems bleak. How is philosophy
to proceed? The Doctrine  again distinguishes  a  method for  philosophy.
This method is again in certain ways similar to the moderate method put
forward in the Inquiry. However, crucial changes have taken place.
As  in  the  Inquiry,  philosophical  cognition  does  not  begin  with  the
defnition of its  concept,  but rather only with the identifcation of  those
marks that can be found to be contained in the concept with certainty. By
means  of  further  analysis,  we  can  identify  further  such  marks.  This
identifcation yields what Kant now terms an ‘exposition’. An exposition
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exhibits only the marks of the object, but it cannot be shown with certainty
that all the marks have been exhibited. Philosophical cognition begins with
expositions of its concepts.
With regard to the propositions of philosophy, the picture put forward
by Kant  is  now quite  diferent  to  that  of  the  Inquiry.  As in  the  case  of
mathematical cognition, the propositions of our philosophical cognition are
synthetic. While mathematical cognition has recourse to pure intuition in
order to connect the concepts of its propositions, philosophical cognition
has no such recourse. It proceeds by means of concepts alone. Due to its
uniqueness, philosophy must, if there is to be cognition of its propositions
at all,  proceed by a new method. This method is that of ‘transcendental
proof’.  Such a  proof,  the  Doctrine  tells  us,  consists  in  showing that  the
object is only possible under the concept and this is shown by means of
some principle. Such a proof, as Kant tells us, “proceeds solely from one
concept and states the synthetic conditions of the possibility of the object in
accordance with this concept.” (A787/B815)
There is  thus no distinction, under the Critical account,  between frst
principles  and  derived  propositions.  Due  to  its  unique  method  of
transcendental  proof,  all  of  the  synthetic  propositions  of  philosophical
cognition  are  derived.  There  is  thus  also  an  even  greater  distinction
between the synthetic propositions of this cognition and the expositional
propositions connecting a mark to its concept (in the identifcation of some
marks of  the given concept in analysis).  Under the Critical  method,  the
three  elements  of  our  philosophical  cognition  turn  out  to  look  very
diferent  to  those  of  mathematics  and,  indeed,  all  other  inquiry:
Philosophical cognition begins with expositions of its given concepts.  Its
synthetic  propositions  are  ultimately  cognised,  not  by  recourse  to  any
empirical or non-empirical objects, but by means of the unique method of
transcendental proof.
Thus, under the Critical method, we see a clear distinction between two
elements in our philosophical cognition: The expositional propositions that
merely clarify our already given concepts and the synthetic demonstrable
propositions  that  constitute  the  establishment  of  our  philosophical
cognition.  And indeed,  it  is  precisely  the  distinction between these  two
elements that is crucially distinguished in the Introduction to the Critique:
“One  could  call  [analytic  judgements]  judgements  of  clarifcation  and
[synthetic  judgements]  judgements  of  amplifcation,  since  through  the
predicate the former do not add anything to the concept of the subject, but
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only break it up by means of analysis into its component concepts, which
were already thought in it (though confusedly);i while the later […] add to
the concept of the subject a predicate that was not thought in it at all, and
could not have been extracted from it through any analysis.” (A7/B11) And
the fnal aim of philosophy, Kant tells us, now “rests on such synthetic, i.e.
ampliative principles;i for the analytic ones are, to be sure, most important
and necessary, but only for ataining that distinctness of concepts which is
requisite for a secure and extended synthesis as a really new acquisition.”
(A9-10/B14)
Now, much has been writen on the later of these two elements – the
synthetic  a  priori  judgements  of  the  Transcendental  Analytic  and  the
transcendental  proofs  by means of  which Kant means to establish these
judgements.  From this point, however, our interest will instead be in the
frst of these elements of philosophical cognition, viz. in the nature of the
claimed ‘given concepts’ with which we are to begin and with the method
of  arriving  at  expositions of  these  concepts. It  is  to  this  frst  stage  of
philosophical  cognition  that  we  must  look  if  we  are  to  understand  the
nature and role of the concepts of reflection in such cognition. 
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Part III
Bringing representations to distinctness from 
the Inquiry to the Critique
In Part II, we saw that the method for philosophical cognition, under both
German Rationalism and the Critical philosophy, involves establishing the
propositions that constitute such cognition as well as the implicit prior step
of arriving at the concepts that feature in these propositions. In this part of
the study, I turn to a closer examination of this prior, and lesser studied,
step.  Again,  our  interest  will  be  primarily  in  the  two texts  that  contain
Kant’s account of the philosophical method of his predecessors and of his
own  proposed  philosophical  method,  the  Inquiry and  the  Doctrine,
focussing now on the accounts that these contain of this prior step. Part III
falls  into  three  sections.  In  the  frst  section,  I  examine  the  German
Rationalist account of philosophical concepts, as it presented by Kant in the
Inquiry. In  Section  II,  I  turn  to  the  ‘moderate’  pre-Critical  account  of
concepts with which Kant responds in the Inquiry to the German Rationalist
account.  Finally,  in  Section  III,  I  turn  to  Kant’s  Critical  account  of  the
concepts of philosophy, as it  comes to light in the  Critique’s  Doctrine of
Method,  an  account  that  involves  certain  crucial  changes  to  the  two
preceding accounts.
I. Bringing to distinctness under German Rationalism
In this section, I begin with an examination of the Inquiry’s account of the
characterisation of the concepts of philosophy under German Rationalism.
Having then in hand some understanding of their characterisation, I will
turn to the German Rationalist account of the method whereby we are to
arrive at such concepts, again as put forward in the Inquiry.
If we recall, the concepts of philosophy are characterised in contrast to
mathematical  concepts  in  a  crucial  way.  In  mathematical  cognition,  the
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concepts  featuring in such cognition are “arbitrarily  combined” (Inquiry
2:276), while the concepts of philosophy, Kant tells us, are “given, albeit it
confusedly or an insufciently determinate fashion” (ibid.). What then is it
for the concepts of philosophy to be given? The Inquiry gives litle further
direct explication of this feature, but we might, even at this early point in
our  examination,  provide  a  minimal  account  of  this.  The  concepts  of
mathematics  are  concepts  whose  marks  are  arbitrarily  chosen  by  the
understanding and combined in order to form the concept. Given concepts
contrast  with  such  concepts.  Thus,  minimally,  given  concepts  are  not
concepts whose combinations of marks have been arbitrarily chosen and
combined  by  the  understanding.  That  is,  they  are  concepts  whose
combination  of  marks  rests on  something  other  than  the  act  of  arbitrary
combination  by  the  understanding.  Just  what  the  non-arbitrariness  of  the
combination consists in is, at this point, yet to be determined.
The second point of characterisation in the above is that the concepts of
philosophy  are  given  “confusedly”  (Inquiry  2:276)  or  “in  a  confused
fashion” (Inquiry  2:278).  This  confusedness  is  variously characterised by
Kant as a concept’s being given in an “insufciently determinate fashion”
(Inquiry  2:276)  and as a concept’s  being yet  “indistinct,  incomplete,  and
indeterminate” (Inquiry 2:283). Again, Kant does not explicitly discuss what
it is for a concept to be confused, indistinct, incomplete, or indeterminate.
Nonetheless,  it  is  minimally  clear  that  the  confusedly given concepts  of
philosophy  are  concepts  of  which  we  have  some  awareness,  albeit  an
awareness that is, in some way, lacking.
A third feature that seems to come to light in the case of philosophical
concepts as confusedly given as it is presented in the Inquiry is that they are
somehow part of our common stock of ordinary concepts. Kant mentions
the  concept  of  time  as  a  concept  that  “everyone has”  (2:276),  and later
discusses  philosophical  concepts  as  concepts  “given  in  accordance  with
[our…] ordinary representation” (2:278) of them. Again, not much more is
said as to how these concepts  come to be part  of  our common stock of
ordinary concepts, nor what characterises such concepts in contrast to any
others.
The  Inquiry  has similarly litle to say as to how we are to tell  which
concepts these are. Over the course of the discussion, a number of examples
of  such  concepts  are  mentioned;i  the  concept  of  time  (2:277),  of  space
(2:278), of representation (2:280), the sublime (ibid.), the beautiful (ibid.), and
God (2:296),  to  mention  a  few.  Later  in  §3,  we  are  told  that  there  are
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“infnitely  many  qualities  that  constitute  the  real  object  of  philosophy”
(2:282),  and so it  seems that  the concepts  of  philosophy are,  under this
account, in fact infnite in number. No indication is given as to how we
might identify  which these concepts are, but they are presumably at least
those that featured in standard debates within philosophy.
Thus far no mention has been made of any  objects – the objects of the
concepts,  the  objects  that  our  cognition  in  philosophy  ultimately  is  of.
Again, Kant does not treat this in any detail in the Inquiry, but we can glean
a  basic  picture  from  some  of  his  remarks.  First,  as  we  have  seen,  the
methods in question concern establishing with certainty the propositions of
philosophy.  Secondly,  in  a  number  of  places,  Kant  formulates  the
discussion  in  terms  of  ‘cognition’:  The  “[c]laims  to  philosophical
cognition”, he tells us, “generally enjoy the fate of opinions” (Inquiry 2:283).
And  later,  “[w]e  have  seen  that  the  diferences  which  are  to  be  found
between  cognition  in  mathematics  and  cognition  in  philosophy  are
substantial  and  essential.”  (ibid.)  Thirdly,  we  fnd  mention  of  objects
directly. For example we are told that in mathematics, “I have no concept of
my object at all until it is furnished by the defnition” (ibid., emphasis my
own). While in metaphysics, “I have  a concept which is already given to me,
although it  is  a  confused one” (ibid.,  emphasis  my own).  And yet  more
explicitly  later,  we  are  counselled,  “In  philosophy  and  in  particular  in
metaphysics,  one  can often  come to  know a  great  deal  about  an  object with
distinctness and certainty” (Inquiry 2:284, emphasis my own). Given these
remarks and others, it is clear that (i) when we establish a philosophical
proposition  with  certainty,  we  are  thereby  in  possession  of  some
knowledge  about  some  objects,  and  (ii)  the  concepts  found  in  such
propositions are  concepts  of  objects –  they stand us in relation to objects.
Thus, although Kant gives no account of the way in which this knowledge,
and the concepts as standing us in relation to objects, is to be understood, it
is  clear  that  the  concepts  of  philosophy  as  discussed  in  the  above  are
concepts of objects. 
Having noted this, we might gain some further insight into the sense in
which concepts are ‘given’. Recall that a crucial feature of the concepts of
philosophy  is  that  they  are,  in  contrast  to  those  of  mathematics,  given
concepts,  albeit  it  confusedly.  From  what  we  had  gleaned  so  far  from
Kant’s discussion, givenness is to be contrasted with arbitrary combination.
That  is,  givenness  is  the  non-arbitrary  combination  of  marks in  a  concept.
However, given our point highlighted above, it would seem that the non-
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arbitrariness of the combination of marks must rest on the object. When we
aim for the defnition of a concept, we aim to characterise exactly the object
of that concept. When we uncover the defnition of a concept and then use
these defnitions in deriving further propositions, we are discovering things
about objects. 
Thus,  the  picture  that  we  fnd  in  the  Inquiry of  the  concepts  of
philosophy, as under German Rationalism, is as follows. (i) The concepts of
philosophy are given concepts. They are combinations of marks such that
the combination does not rest on the arbitrary act of the understanding. (ii)
They  are  part  of  our  common  stock  of  concepts.  (iii)  They  are  given
‘confusedly’. Our initial awareness of them is in certain ways lacking. (iv)
They are  concepts  of  the  objects  of  philosophy.  (v)  The  combination of
marks in the concept rests on the object of which it is a concept. Thus, the
task of philosophy is to arrive at cognition by means of these confusedly
given concepts.  
The  above  account  of  philosophical  concepts  can  be  confrmed  and
detailed in certain ways by turning to the transcripts of Kant’s pre-Critical
lectures on Logic. In these lectures, the distinction between the concepts of
philosophy  as  given  rather  than  arbitrary  or  fabricated  is  found  in  a
number of  places.  For  example,  in the  Blomberg  Logic,  Kant divides  “all
concepts  of  the  human  understanding  [into…]  conceptus  dati  or  […]
conceptus facti, [where the former are] given [and the later are] made, as
such are created by us arbitrarily, or fabricated, without previously having
been given.”  (24:131)36 In  none  of  these  cases  does  Kant  give  a  further
explication or defnition of the givenness of a concept in general. There is,
however,  a  further  specifcation  of  the  distinction  to  be  found  in  these
discussions in the lectures that is not found explicitly in the Inquiry. In the
transcripts, the distinction between arbitrary concepts and given concepts
is  frequently  stated  as  the  distinction  between  arbitrary  concepts  and
concepts  that  are  given  either given  empirically or  given  by  pure  reason.37
Concepts  given  empirically  are  concepts  whose  combinations  of  marks
have  been,  Kant  tells  us,  “abstracted  from  experience”  (Blomberg  Logic
24:253), that is, from the objects of sensory experience. The marks combined
in the concept are those found combined in the relevant object(s) of sensory
experience.  By contrast,  concepts “given to me by means of reason, [are
36 The distinction can be found in a number of places in the Blomberg Logic. See, for example,
24:153, 24:253, 24:262.
37 See, for example, Blomberg Logic 24:131, 24:134, 24:253, 24:256, 24:270.
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concepts in which I may think […] only that which reason shows me in the
thing” (Blomberg Logic 24:270). The marks combined in a concept given by
reason then are those found combined in the relevant objects of  reason.
This is signifcant for our purposes in two ways. First, given this further
specifcation  of  the  givenness  of  a  concept,  we  can  see  that  our
characterisation above is accurate. Arbitrarily combined concepts contrast
with given concepts insofar as the combination of marks of a given concept
rest on the combination of marks found in the object of the concept, while
the combination of marks in an arbitrarily combined concept rests on the
arbitrary combination of marks by the understanding. Secondly, we have
uncovered  a  further  specifcation  of  the  concepts  of  philosophy.  The
concepts of philosophy are given concepts, but concepts given by reason. In
this  they  contrast  with  empirically  given  concepts  insofar  as  they  are
concepts  of  the objects  of  reason and not concepts  of  the objects  of  our
sensory experience.38
Having  put  forward  the  German  Rationalist  characterisation  of  the
concepts of philosophy, we might now ask after the method for arriving at
these concepts. If we are to establish any propositions that feature these
confusedly  given  philosophical  concepts,  and  indeed  these  concepts  as
fully defned,  as  is  required under the German Rationalist  method,  it  is
necessary  that  the  concept  be  “rendered  distinct  by  means  of  analysis”
(Inquiry  2:276).  That  is,  the  combination  of  marks  that  constitutes  the
confusedly given concept has to be brought to distinctness. The procedure
of rendering distinct the marks found in a given concept is, as mentioned,
the procedure of analysis. 
Analysis  is  carried  out,  according  to  the  Inquiry,  by  means  of  the
following steps. First, any marks that we take to be found in the concept are
identifed and separated out in thought from all other marks (Inquiry 2:276).
These  marks  are  then  compared  with  the  concept  across  “all  kinds  of
contexts”  (ibid.)  or  in  “all  kinds  of  relation”  (Inquiry  2:277)  in  order  to
discover whether they do indeed constitute the concept. Such a comparison
involves comparing the marks that are proposed as found in the concept
across diferent cases in which the concept applies.39 Thirdly, this process is
38 These details of the characterisation will be taken up in more detail in Part IV.
39 Cf.  Blomberg Logic  24:131 in which this  made more explicit:  “E.g., with the concept of
perfection I will frst direct someone to the cases in which he makes use of the expression
perfection, in order thereby to instruct him what he really understands by perfection [,]
what  sort  of  concept  he  makes  of  it,  and  what  he  thinks  when  he  uters  the  word
perfection and ascribes it to a thing.” (24:131)
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iterated in order to discover further marks. Finally, all marks so identifed
must be “collated with each other” (ibid.) to ensure that one is not covertly
contained in another. By means of this procedure, we render distinct the
characteristic marks whose combination constitutes the confusedly given
concept. Having thus rendered distinct all and only the marks found in the
concept, these are put forward in the defnition of the concept.40
It  is  worth  noting  a  number  of  distinctions  at  work  in  the  above
characterisation of philosophical concepts as confusedly given. First, there
is the question of how we are to arrive at the concepts in question. This is
the epistemic question of how we are to establish which marks are found in
the concept. In the case of mathematical concepts, the marks are established
as part of the concept by the arbitrary act of synthesis of the understanding.
It  is  by these means that  we arrive  at  the  distinct  representation of  the
concept required for defnition. In contrast, philosophical concepts, because
they are confusedly given, require analysis. Secondly, however, the means
of arriving at the marks found in the concept are distinct from that in virtue
of which the marks are found in the concept. This later concerns the ground of
the marks as unifed in the concept. In the case of mathematical concepts,
the concept rests on the arbitrary combination by the understanding – that
is,  it  rests  on  the  means  of  arriving  at  the  concept.  In  the  case  of
philosophical  concepts,  however,  the  two  come  apart  more  noticeably.
Even though it is by means of  analysis that we arrive at the concept, the
marks unifed in the concept are so in virtue of something other than these
means, that is,  on the object of the philosophical concept. We must thus
distinguish the epistemic question of the means of arriving at the concept
from the quite diferent question of the ground of the combination of marks
in the concept.41 Finally, it is worth noting that it is not merely the givenness
of a philosophical concept that implies the need for analysis. That is, it is
not the ground of a concept as the object that yields the need for analysis.
Indeed, in the case of empirically given concepts, the combination of marks
in the concept similarly rests on the object of the concept, but no analysis is
40 Similar  discussions  of  analysis  as  needed for  bringing  a  confusedly  given concept  to
distinctness can be found in Blomberg Logic 24: 130, 24:131, 24:134, and 24:272.
41 If the concepts of philosophy are arrived at analytically and grounded in the objects, and
the concepts of mathematics are arrived at synthetically and grounded in mere arbitrary
choice, then empirically given concepts constitute the contrastive case to both of these.
Empirically given concepts are, as noted, grounded in the objects of empirical experience
(insofar as the marks combined in the concept rest on a combination of marks found in
the object), but are arrived at synthetically (insofar as the marks are not established by
means of analysis of the concept, but by means of determining the combination).
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needed in the case of these concepts. (Similarly, the hypothetical case of
concepts given by reason, but which are not in need of analysis, is equally
consistent  with  Kant’s  account  here.)  It  is  due  to  the  manner  in  which
philosophical concepts are given to us that analysis is required. The need
for analysis  follows  from the  confusedness of  the  given concept  and not
merely from its givenness. 
Having in hand Kant’s characterisation of the procedure of analysis, we
are now in a position to gain further insight into a concept’s being given
confusedly. As noted, the  Inquiry formulates this variously in terms of the
concept’s  being ‘confused’,  ‘indistinct’,  ‘incomplete’,  and ‘indeterminate’,
though no more is said as to the precise nature of each these. We now have
before us, however, the contrastive case. Prior to analysis, the concepts of
philosophy  are  confused.  This  is  remedied  by  carrying  out  analysis.
Analysis,  as  we have seen,  involves  gradually  distinguishing the  marks
contained in a concept from all other extraneous marks. In so doing, the
concept is thus rendered distinct. Thus, minimally, a concept being given
‘confusedly’  consists in the lack of awareness of  each of the marks of a
concept. 
Again, Kant’s lectures on Logic provide us with further detail that is not
put  forward  explicitly  in  the  Inquiry.  In  these  lectures,  we  fnd  the
distinction between obscure and clear, indistinct and distinct, incomplete
and  complete,  and  fnally  confused  and  ordered  concepts.  In  the  frst
instance,  obscure  concepts  are  concepts  of  which  we  are  not  conscious,
while clear concepts are concepts of which we are conscious (Blomberg Logic
24:119).  Secondly,  indistinct  concepts  are  concepts  such  that  we  are
conscious of the concept as a whole, but not conscious of the manifold that
is contained in the whole concept (Vienna Logic  [1770s]  24:805).42 Thirdly,
complete concepts are such that we are conscious of all of the marks of the
essence of the object of the concept in question, while incomplete concepts
are not so (Blomberg Logic 24:116). Finally, confused concepts are such that
our consciousness of the manifold in them is not orderly (Blomberg Logic
24:42), while this is not so in the case of orderly concepts. Applying these
distinctions to the concepts of philosophy then, it would seem that, prior to
analysis,  these  concepts  are  clear,  indistinct,  and  incomplete.  Insofar  as
analysis  then  involves  progressively  distinguishing  the  marks  of  the
concept, the concepts are made distinct and, fnally, complete. And since
42 See also the Jäsche Logic 9:34-5, False Subtlety 2:58, and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point
of View [1789] 7:137-8.
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completeness is merely the terminal point of distinctness, we might say that
the task of analysis is to render concepts that are initially indistinct (such
that  we are conscious of  the whole concept,  but not  the manifold in it)
distinct (such that we are conscious of the manifold or marks contained in
the concept). It is worth noting then that the Inquiry’s use of ‘confusion’ in
‘confusedly given’ is in fact at odds with many of the other passages in
which Kant  puts  forward these  distinctions.  While  analysis  might  serve
also  to  render  our  consciousness  of  a  concept  as  orderly  rather  than
disorderly  (insofar  as  our  initial  awareness  of  it  was  disorderly),  its
essential task is to render indistinct concepts distinct. Thus, the ‘confusedly’
given concepts of philosophy discussed in the Inquiry are concepts that are
indistinct (and, by implication, incomplete). In what follows then, I will, for
the sake of precision and coherence with Kant’s other statements, substitute
the  term  ‘confused’  with  ‘indistinct’.  The  concepts  of  philosophy  are,
properly understood, concepts given ‘indistinctly’.
In  order  to  become  clearer  on  what  German  Rationalist  analysis
involves, we might schematise it as follows:
We begin  with  some indistinctly  given  concept,  C.  We  consider  our
given concept more closely and from the multitude of marks that might be
associated with the concept in this or that case, we distinguish the marks
M, N, P as the combination of marks that constitutes the concept. These
marks are combined into one concept and put forward as  the proposed
defnition  of  the  concept.  Now,  once  we  have  so  distinguished  the
combination of marks, M, N, P, it is necessary that we establish whether
this is indeed the combination of all and only the marks that are found in
the concept. In order to do so, we compare the combination of marks M, N,
P, frst, ‘across all kinds of contexts’. Suppose we consider the combination
M,  N,  P  within the  most  recent  context  in  which we were  aware  of  it.
Suppose  we  fnd  that,  in  fact,  we  had  overlooked  mark  Q  in  our
distinguishing  of  the  marks  in  C.  However,  when  we  consider  our
proposed combination against our most recent context, we fnd that mark
Q is indeed a mark found in the concept. Mark Q is thus added to our
proposed defnition  and  the  process  is  reiterated.  Supposing  no  further
marks are found, the fnal step is to compare the marks in the proposed
defnition  ‘with  each  other’,  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  marks  do  not
partially  overlap.  Having  carried  this  out  sufciently,  and  thereby
established that the marks M, N, P, Q are all and only those of the concept,
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we have  arrived  at  the  defnition  of  the  concept,  which  consists  in  the
combination of marks M, N, P, Q. 
Now, the above procedure allows us, according to German Rationalism,
to distinguish the marks found in the concept C. This is not, however, all
that it allows us to distinguish. Recall that the concepts of philosophy that
we  bring  to  distinctness  in  this  way  are  concepts  of  the  objects of
philosophy. Thus, when we distinguish the marks M, N, P, Q, these marks
ultimately  characterise  the  object  of  philosophy,  O,  of  which  C  is  the
concept.  Given that marks M, N, P,  Q are found in the concept C, they
allow  us  to  characterise  O  in  terms  of  its  essential  (objective)
determinations, and the marks M, N, P, Q of the concept put us in relation
to the object by means of these determinations. Thus, in this, distinguishing
the marks of  the concept at  once introduces an objective level  –  that  of
distinguishing the marks of the object. 
II. Bringing to distinctness in the Inquiry
In the above, we have seen the German Rationalist account of the concepts
that feature in our philosophical propositions and how we are to arrive at
these, as Kant understands it in the Inquiry. Now although at this time Kant
had  not  yet  arrived  at  the  vastly  diferent  philosophical  picture  of  the
Critique,  the  method  that  he  proposes  for  philosophy  in  the  Inquiry is
importantly diferent to that of German Rationalism. As we have seen, even
during this pre-Critical period Kant rejects the mathematical model, both
with  regard  to  its  demand  for  defnitions  and  its  demand  for  frst
principles. In this section, I will turn to the ‘moderate’ method that Kant
recommends in place of the mathematical model in the Inquiry and examine
in some further detail what the account has to say about the frst and prior
stage of arriving at the concepts of philosophy.
Kant’s  own account  in  the  Inquiry of  the  concepts  of  philosophy has
much in common with that  of  German Rationalism as examined above.
Under  Kant’s  moderate  method,  the  concepts  of  philosophy  are  still
distinguished  as  given  concepts,  and  indeed  as  given  indistinctly.  The
concepts  are  thus  non-arbitrary  combinations  of  marks,  which
combinations of marks rest, as under the German Rationalist account, on
the combinations of marks found in the relevant objects themselves. They
are still commonly-had concepts, obtained in some unspecifed way.
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Again, Kant is commited to the need for distinctness of the concepts
featuring  in  our  philosophical  propositions.  In  order  to  establish  the
propositions of philosophy and in order to derive further propositions from
those already established, it  is  necessary that the characteristic marks to
which we appeal are distinguished from any others and that we have them
in  mind  clearly.  Thus,  again,  what  is  needed  is  that  we  analyse  the
indistinctly given concepts by comparing them with the marks proposed as
found in them, across various diferent contexts, and that this procedure is
repeated  for  the  sake  of  establishing  the  further  marks  found  in  the
concept. 
A crucial point of disagreement with German Rationalism that emerges
in  Kant’s  pre-Critical  account,  however,  concerns  the  prospects  for  the
requirement of  defnition of the concepts of philosophy. If we recall, Kant
put forward a number of reasons for thinking that the German Rationalist
requirement that we begin with fully-defned concepts is too stringent and
impossible to fulfl. These claims have an efect on the method that Kant
proposes in the  Inquiry as the correct method for arriving at concepts in
philosophy.
In response to the intractability of defnition, Kant recommends that we,
“frst of all, by analysing [the given concept], seek out those characteristic
marks  which  are  initially  and  immediately  thought  in  that  concept.”
(Inquiry 2:281) Thus, the frst and primary diference to be found in Kant’s
pre-Critical moderate account in contrast to that of German Rationalism is
that  of  the terminating  point of  analysis.  We  do  not  demand  that  our
procedure carry us all the way through to all and only the marks contained
in the concept. Rather, we aim only to distinguish some of the marks that are
found  in  the  concept.  We  are  to  proceed  to  propositions  “from  a  few
immediately certain characteristic marks of the thing in question, and to do
so without a defnition” (Inquiry  2:284, emphasis my own). The concepts
that  feature  in  the  propositions  of  philosophy  under  Kant’s  moderate
account then are not concepts all and only whose marks have, by means of
analysis, been made distinct (concepts for which we have defnitions), but
are concepts some of whose characteristic marks have, by means of analysis,
been made distinct. 
A further point comes to light in Kant’s remarks above. In both of the
remarks quoted above and in numerous other places, Kant formulates the
procedure  for  arriving  at  concepts  as  a  mater  of  distinguishing  some
immediately certain characteristic marks of the concept. This distinction and
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point are found clearly in a later passage, within the context of the concept
of a body: 
[A] body is a compound is an indemonstrable proposition, for the predicate
can only be thought as an immediate and primary characteristic mark in
the concept of a body [...]
The proposition, a body is divisible, is demonstrable, for the identity of
the predicate and the subject can be shown […] indirectly: a body is a
compound, but what is compound is  divisible, so a  body is divisible. The
intermediate characteristic mark here is being compound. 
(Inquiry 2:295) 
Kant here emphasises a distinction between the immediate and mediate
marks  of  a concept.43 In the  case of  immediate marks,  the  mark can be
apprehended as a mark of the concept simply by comparing the concept
with the mark. It  is,  on this basis,  immediately evident that the mark is
found in  the  concept.  In  such  a  case,  the  proposition  that  connects  the
concept with the mark as predicate is indemonstrable and knowable with
certainty immediately. The mediate marks of a concept, by contrast, require
the identifcation of some further intermediate mark. In such a case,  the
mark  is  apprehended  as  a  mark  of  the  intermediate  mark,  which
intermediate  mark  is  then apprehended as  a  mark of  the  concept.  (The
number of intermediate marks and connections could also be iterated). In
this case, the proposed mark is shown to be found in the concept indirectly,
by means of the intermediate mark (though each linking connection must
ultimately be resolvable into immediate connections). In this later case, the
proposition  connecting  the  mark  as  predicate  with  the  concept  is
demonstrable – a syllogism taking the connections with the intermediate
marks as its premises can be given.
As it stands here, Kant’s distinction between the immediate and mediate
marks of a concept might seem to be a psychological distinction. Immediate
marks are those marks of which we are, for one or another reason, initially
or most aware of in our awareness of the concept (while mediate marks are
those of which we are not initially or usually aware). However, when we
look to the transcripts of Kant’s pre-Critical Logic lectures, we fnd that this
43 This distinction between immediate and mediate marks is not absent from the German
Rationalist account as Kant construes it in the Inquiry;i however, Kant’s proposed account
of  analysis  diverges  from  that  of  his  predecessors  on  the  basis  of  his  focus  on  this
distinction.
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is  in  fact  a  distinction  between marks  that  can  be  subordinated to  one
another  by  containment  and  those  that  can’t.  Immediate  marks  are
contained in a concept insofar as they are ‘coordinated’ with one another –
no immediate mark is contained in any other immediate mark, though all
are contained in the concept. Mediate marks, by contrast, are contained in
concept  insofar  as  the  concept  contains  some  prior  mark,  which  itself
contains the mediate mark in question. Mediate marks are thus contained
in a concept insofar as they are ‘subordinated’ to some prior (immediate or
mediate) mark. This distinction can be found in the Blomberg Logic at 24:108
and 24:725-6, and on into Kant’s Critical Logic lectures (Jäsche Logic 9:59).44
Thus, in the defnitions at which German Rationalist analysis aims, are
two sorts of marks. For some of the marks in such a defnition, the marks
will  be  identifable  only  mediately,  needing  appeal  to  some  other
intermediate marks in the concept. For others, however, these marks can be
identifed as part of the concept directly and at once. (German Rationalist
analysis required the comparison of the mark and concept ‘across all kinds
of contexts’ in order to secure all the marks of a concept. In the case of these
immediately certain marks, such comparison is seemingly not necessary.)
Recognising this distinction in German Rationalist analysis allows Kant to
put forward his moderate version of such analysis: If some marks can be
immediately apprehended as found in the concept, then it  is  possible to
identify some of the marks of a concept without identifying all the rest of
them,  with  which  marks  we  can  then  proceed  to  certain  further
propositions within philosophy. 
44 This distinction between a mark immediately contained in some concept and a mark that
is connected to a concept by an intermediate or ‘remote’ mark is also drawn in the earlier
work, False Subtlety (2:59). Here, the distinction is put forward along with the following
points: 
(i) The connection in the former case is put forward as a judgement, while the connection
in the later case requires a syllogism.
(ii)  The distinction  also  involves  a distinction between a concept  that  has  been made
distinct by analysis and a concept that has been made complete by analysis. As we have
already seen, analysis here involves the gradual distinguishing of the marks of a concept,
and thus involves a distinction between a complete and partial analysis of the concept.
The former renders the concept complete  (and a defnition of the concept).  The later
renders  the  concept  distinct.  The  point  emphasised  by  Kant  in  False  Subtlety is  that
distinctness requires only (a single) judgement, while the former requires syllogism (the
connection of judgements).
(iii) Finally, the distinction does not involve, claims Kant in False Subtlety, a distinction in
faculty. It is one and the same faculty that connects a concept in a judgement and in a
syllogism (2:59).  This  claim will  become relevant  in  our discussion  of  the  criteria for
establishing the marks of a concept in Part IV.
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Kant’s qualifcation here allows us to add further detail to our schematic
description of German Rationalist analysis. Recall that analysis of the given
concept, C, required distinguishing a combination of marks taken to be all
and only the marks found in the concept, which we supposed to be the
marks M, N, P, and Q. This combination of marks was then compared with
the concept across diferent contexts and the marks with each other in order
to establish that  they were  indeed all  and only the marks  found in the
concept. Now, given Kant’s qualifcation, for some of these marks, it will be
immediately apparent that a mark is found in a given concept. Suppose
that this is the case with marks M and N. All that is then needed in order to
set marks M and N down as being found in the concept is to abstract from
all marks other than M and N, and to apprehend immediately that these
marks are indeed found in the concept. These marks can then be put down
as marks found in C, and we can, according to Kant’s further qualifcations,
then  go  on  to  use  the  concept  C  in  establishing  the  propositions  of
philosophy.  There  is  no  need  to  distinguish  any  further  marks  of  the
concept in order to arrive at a defnition of the concept. 
We might, however, decide or need to distinguish further marks of the
concept,  perhaps  for  the  sake  of  establishing  certain  propositions  in
particular,  and  thus  might  continue  with  the  procedure  of  analysis.
Suppose that we continue with our procedure, distinguishing marks P and
Q as potentially marks of the concept C. Suppose that in the case of these
marks, however, it is not immediately apparent that the mark identifed is
to be found in the concept. Thus, in order to establish these marks as part of
the  concept,  we  will  need  to  compare  the  mark  in  question  with  the
concept,  and perhaps  along with  other  marks  already  identifed,  across
diferent  contexts.  Suppose  we  do  so  for  the  marks  P  and  Q,  and
apprehend,  this  time  mediately,  that  the  marks  are  to  be  found  in  the
concept: P is in fact a mark of M, and M is a mark of the concept. And
similarly for Q and N. Having so identifed the marks M, N, P, Q, we can
add these to the marks found in the concept. Importantly, it is worth noting
that, although the marks P and Q were established as found in the concept
only indirectly or mediately, this has no bearing on their status as marks
found in  the  concept.  Alongside  the  marks  M and N,  they  are  equally
marks to be found in the concept. 
Finally, we must remember that, for any marks distinguished as found
in the concept C,  either mediately  or  immediately,  these  marks are  still
taken, under Kant’s pre-Critical account here, to stand us in relation to the
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relevant determinations of the object of the concept, O. There is thus still, in
such analysis, a level of distinguishing the marks M, N, P, Q found in C
along with an objective level of distinguishing the marks of the object to
which the concept stands us in relation. 
III. Bringing to distinctness under the Critical philosophy
Such are the German Rationalist and pre-Critical accounts of the concepts
that feature in the propositions of philosophy, as these are presented in the
Inquiry.  Let  us  turn  then  to  the  Critical  account,  to  contrast  these  with
Kant’s fnal position on the correct method for arriving at concepts. The key
passages in which this Critical account is to be found are, again, in the frst
chapter of the Doctrine of Method, the ‘Discipline of Pure Reason’. 
Under the Critical philosophy, there is indeed still the question of how
we are to arrive at the concepts that are to feature in the propositions of
philosophy. In the Doctrine, we fnd that, in broad outline, this procedure
has  not  changed  from that  of  German  Rationalism and  the  pre-Critical
account.  The concepts of philosophy are “still confused” (A728/B756), or
indistinctly, given concepts. Again, in order to feature in any philosophical
propositions, it is frst necessary that we bring them to distinctness (ibid.).
Again, this is done by the process of analysis that involves distinguishing
some mark or marks that we take to be found in the concept in question
and comparing it with the indistinctly given concept. Further, the Critical
account retains the claim – this being the crucial point in the section on
defnitions  at  A727/B755  –  that  our  aim with  regard to  the  concepts  of
philosophy should  not,  and cannot,  be  their  full  defnition.  In  this,  the
Critical philosophy remains continuous with German Rationalist method
and the proposed moderate method of the Inquiry.  Beneath this general
commonality, however, a number of crucial changes have taken place. 
The frst and most fundamental of these changes is that by the time of
the Doctrine, the concepts of philosophy have received a more determinate
and complex characterisation.  In  order to  see  how this  is  so,  we might
begin with a point that Kant emphasises at length at the start of the section
(A712/B740f.).45  Here, as we have seen briefly in Part II,  Kant discusses
45 The relevant section here is Section I of the Doctrine of Method, a section entitled ‘The
discipline of pure reason in its dogmatic use’. As mentioned, it is here that Kant contrasts
the proposed mathematical model of German rationalism (as Kant came to understand it
at the time of the Critique and as labelled ‘the dogmatic use of reason’) with the Critical
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mathematics and philosophy, what he takes to be essential to both,  and
what he takes their essential diference to consist in. In the Doctrine, Kant
now explicitly recognises mathematics and philosophy equally as atempts
to establish propositions  a priori, that is, to establish propositions without
any  appeal  to  experience  (A712/B740).  Now  the  means  by  which
mathematics and philosophy set about doing this  indeed turn out to be
very diferent, but what is of interest to us here is that, in this recognition of
mathematics and philosophy as essentially establishing their propositions a
priori, Kant recognises that the concepts that feature in these propositions
are to be distinguished in an important way. The concepts that feature in
the  propositions  of  mathematics  and  philosophy  must  themselves  be  a
priori,  that  is,  concepts  that  are  non-empirical  (A719/B747).  Thus,  the
concepts relevant to philosophy have by now been explicitly distinguished
as concepts that are a priori.
More  specifcally,  in  contrast  to  the  threefold  distinction  between
concepts found in the Blomberg Logic, Kant has now put forward a fourfold
distinction of  concepts47 that  is  crucial  in understanding the concepts  of
philosophy  and  the  question  of  how  we  are  to  arrive  at  them.48 The
Doctrine distinguishes four types of  concepts;i  (i)  empirical  concepts,  (ii)
concepts given a priori, (iii) arbitrarily thought concepts, and (iv) arbitrarily
thought concepts which can be constructed a priori.  In order to become
clear on these distinctions it is helpful to begin with the more familiar third
of these divisions, viz. concepts that are arbitrarily thought. A concept is an
method that must substitute it.
47 We might note that, elsewhere, other distinctions among concepts are to be found (we
have of course, the pure concepts as distinct from the schematised concepts, and these
again  as  distinct  from  the  concepts  of  reflection).  And  thus  the  fourfold  distinction
mentioned here is merely that which is relevant to the method of philosophy and is not to
be taken as exhaustive of the division of concepts.
48 It must here be noted that the origins of this fourfold distinction are indeed present in
Kant’s pre-Critical thought: As noted at the start of this part, the Inquiry already draws a
distinction between arbitrarily combined concepts and indistinctly given concepts, which
distinction is clearly involved in the Doctrine’s fourfold distinction. In fact, the transcripts
of Kant’s lectures on Logic contain mention of a further distinction that is found in the
Doctrine: Already at the time of the Blomberg transcript, Kant has distinguished between
concepts  given  a  priori  and  concepts  given  a  posteriori  (24:252-3).  The  fourfold
distinction  of  the  Doctrine  does,  however,  signal  a  crucial  change  in  Kant’s
understanding of concepts insofar as it involves, as we will see, the separation of the
question of the ground of the combination of marks of the concept from the question of
the relation of the concept to an object. This separation is apparent in both the further
distinction of arbitrarily combined concepts into merely arbitrarily combined and those
for which an object can be constructed and in the requirement of a transcendental proof
for concepts given a priori.
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arbitrarily  thought  concept  if  it  is  a  concept  whose  marks  have  been
arbitrarily combined in an act of the understanding. For example, suppose I
think of the various marks contained in the concept of a bird and separate
of from  these  the  mark  ‘wings’,  and  then  think  of  the  various  marks
contained in the concept of a horse, and combine all these marks to form a
new combination.  In so doing,  I  have arbitrarily combined a number of
marks in order to form the concept, ‘Pegasus’. As we have noted earlier
with regard to the concepts of mathematics, the combination of marks that
constitutes  this  concept  rests  solely  on  the  arbitrary  act  of  the
understanding in combining the marks. 
Concepts of the last type, viz. arbitrarily thought concepts which can be
constructed  a  priori,  are  a  special  case  of  (iii),  and  the  concepts  of
mathematics  are  now identifed as  being of  this  fourth type.  Arbitrarily
thought concepts which can be constructed a priori are similarly concepts
that have been formed through the arbitrary combination of marks by the
understanding, but in contrast to arbitrarily thought concepts in general,
this last type of concept is such that, despite its arbitrary ground, it allows
for (a priori)  cognition.  Importantly,  the object  to which it  stands us  in
relation a priori  is  not  a non-empirical  object  of  traditional  metaphysics
(like the soul or God), but is an object of pure intuition. Now, whatever else
objects of pure intuition amount to, it is clear that, in the case of the last
type of concept, Kant is commited to the possibility of the concept puting
us in relation to something  in addition  to the combination of  marks that
constitutes  the  concept  itself  (viz.  the  object  of  the  concept),  the
intelligibility of this relation, and the possibility of cognition of this object
by  means  of  the  concept,  all  of  which  are  lacking  in  the  case  of  other
arbitrarily thought concepts. 
As  under  the  pre-Critical  account,  empirical  concepts  and  concepts
given a priori contrast with both of the above. Neither empirical concepts
nor concepts given a priori are concepts whose marks have been arbitrarily
combined by the understanding. The indication in the Doctrine as to what
their  distinction  consists  in  can  be  found  in  a  small  remark  found  at
A729/B757: In considering the possibility of defnition for the various types
of concepts, Kant writes, “[s]ince therefore neither empirical concepts nor
concepts given a priori can be defned, there remain none but arbitrarily
thought ones for  which one can atempt this  trick.  In such a case I  can
always defne my concept: for I must know what I wanted to think, since I
deliberately made it up, and it was not given to me either through the nature
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of  the  understanding  or  through  experience;i  but  I  cannot  say  that  I  have
thereby  defned  a  true  object”  (A729/B757,  emphasis  my  own).  Thus,
arbitrarily  thought  concepts  now  contrast  with  concepts  that  are  either
given ‘through experience’ or ‘through the nature of the understanding’.
Empirical concepts are again concepts whose combinations of marks have
not been arbitrarily combined by the understanding, but have been ‘given
through experience’. That is, the combination of marks found in them rests
(at least in part) on the combinations of marks found in empirical objects.49
As Kant states earlier in the passage, “we have in [an empirical concept]
only some marks of a certain kind of object  of the senses” (A727/B755).
Concepts  given  a  priori,  on  the  other  hand,  are  concepts  whose
combinations  of  marks  have  not  been  arbitrarily  combined  by  the
understanding,  but  have  been  ‘given  through  the  nature  of  the
understanding’. 
One fnal element in this fourfold distinction that is of interest to us is
not to be found here in Kant’s discussion of given concepts, but instead is
to be found a litle later on, in Kant’s discussion of the diference between
the concepts of mathematics and the concepts of philosophy in cognition.
As  we  have  seen  above,  the  concepts  of  mathematics  are  arbitrarily
combined concepts, but such that their object can be constructed a priori.
Because of this possibility, such (a priori and arbitrary) concepts stand in
relation to their objects and we are aforded cognition by means of them.
The concepts of philosophy are similarly a priori concepts, but, in contrast
to those of mathematics, are ‘given by the nature of the understanding’. In
order  to  stand  us  in  relation  to  their  objects,  these  concepts  require  a
deduction or transcendental proof (A732-3/B760-1). Thus, in contrast to the
‘concepts  given  by  pure  reason’  of  Kant’s  pre-Critical  lectures,  the
Doctrine’s concepts of philosophy, as concepts given by the nature of the
understanding and in need of a deduction to establish their relation to their
objects, are concepts whose combinations of marks rest on the nature of the
faculties of the subject. 
A number of important insights might be gained from the above. The
frst of these concerns the Critical picture of the concepts of philosophy as
given. In  the  Inquiry,  the  combination  of  marks  in  a  given  concept  of
49 As alluded to in Section I, the case of empirical concepts is complicated slightly by Kant’s
claim that our empirical concepts have a sort of fluidity to them, sometimes including
certain marks and at other times including others, depending on context and usefulness.
Nevertheless, though the combinations of marks found in an empirical concept are not
fxed, it is always the case, for any given temporary combination, that the combination
rests on the empirical object, i.e. that the marks are found combined in the object.
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philosophy rested on something other than arbitrary combination by the
understanding – the combination rested on the marks found combined in
the  object.  In  the  Doctrine,  again  the  combination  of  marks  in  a  given
concept rests  on something other than the arbitrary combination by the
understanding. However, the account of what this could be has now been
narrowed and subjected to an intelligibility requirement. If we recall, under
German  Rationalism,  the  combinations  of  marks  of  the  concepts  of
philosophy were straightforwardly assumed to rest on the combinations of
marks  found  in  the  relevant  objects  of  the  concepts.  For  example,  the
ultimate ground of the combination of marks found in the concept ‘simple
substance’ was assumed to be the simple substances themselves. By means
of this  concept,  we stood in relation to such objects,  despite  their being
inaccessible to the senses. By the time of the Critique, Kant has rejected this
German Rationalist  assumption.  In order for a concept now to count as
given,  rather  than  as  simply  an  arbitrary  combination  of  marks,  the
combination of marks in the concept must rest either on the marks found
combined in an empirical object (the object must be accessible by the senses)
or  they  must  rest  on  the  nature  of  the  understanding  (they  must  be
combinations whose source is in our faculties). The possibility of standing
in  relation  to  an  object,  including  the  objects  of  philosophy,  where  the
relevant combination of marks is both grounded in the object but also not
accessible by the senses, has been rejected. If there are any non-arbitrary,
empirically  inaccessible  combinations  of  marks,  these  must  be  now  be
taken to be in some way grounded in the subject’s faculties, rather than in
the object. Kant has introduced an intelligibility requirement.
It  is  further  important  to  note  the  way in  which  ‘given  through  the
nature of the understanding’ is distinct from ‘arbitrary combination by the
understanding’.  In  both  cases,  the  combination  of  marks  found  in  the
concept are in some way due to the understanding. Crucially, however, in
the  case  of  arbitrarily  thought  concepts,  the  combination  of  marks  is
arbitrary. There is nothing upon which the combination of marks rests other
than the  chosen act of the understanding. In arriving at such concepts, the
understanding is in no way constrained to combine some marks rather than
others. By contrast, in the case of concepts given a priori, the combination
of marks is  not arbitrary.  It is a combination of marks that arises in the
nature of the understanding of the subject – a nature that is in no way itself
chosen by the understanding. In distinguishing the marks found in such
concepts, the understanding is constrained to certain combinations.
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Secondly, there are now strict requirements on which concepts count as
concepts  of  philosophy  –  requirements  that  answer  the  intelligibility
demand.  Under  the  previous  picture,  philosophy  seemingly  dealt  with
some given concepts or other – those that everyone has, those dealt with in
philosophy.  This  was  not  made  exact.  Here,  however,  Kant  narrowly
distinguishes  the  relevant  concepts.  All  and only  those  that  rest  on  the
nature of our understanding are the proper concepts of philosophy. 
Relatedly, it is now possible that concepts that counted as given under
the pre-Critical account do not do so under the Critical account. Under the
German Rationalist  account,  it  was possible  for a concept that is  in fact
arbitrarily  combined  to  be  mistaken for  a  concept  of  philosophy.  Since
German Rationalism assumes the relation of  a concept to an object  and
requires no further work in establishing how we come to have the concept
to start with, it is seemingly possible for a concept to be arbitrarily thought,
handed down or inherited, and then taken to be a given concept. (In this
regard  it  is  worth  noting  that  arbitrarily  thought  concepts  need not  be
consciously combined by the understanding in question. It sufces for such
concepts  that  they,  in  some  way  or  other,  are  the  product  of  human
invention. Again, the concept of a simple substance, a concept recognised
as  philosophical  in  the  Inquiry,  turns  out  to  be  an arbitrarily  combined
concept under the Critical account.)
Thirdly,  the  concepts  of  philosophy  are  no  longer  simply  common
concepts or those that everyone happens to have. We now have an account
of how and why we must all have them. To see this, we need recourse to
the second step of the Critical method as well as the frst. In the frst step,
we identify and make distinct the concepts are due to the nature of our
faculties.  In  the second step,  the transcendental  proofs,  Kant establishes
that  it  is  only by means  of  these  concepts  that  we are  able  to  stand in
relation to any (empirical) objects at all. Thus, insofar as we do stand in
relation to empirical objects, the Critical account has the implication that
we must all have the concepts in question.50
Fourthly, and crucially, the assumption that such given concepts stand
us in relation to objects has now been questioned and given up. That we
have  given  concepts  that  do  not  rest  on  the  marks  found  in  empirical
objects is intelligible insofar as the concepts arise from the nature of our
50 The claim here is a simplifcation. Given the distinction between concepts and intuitions,
the  transcendental  proofs  are  not  the  only  point  at  which  Kant  establishes  that  the
representations of philosophy stand us in relation to objects. This point will be treated
again in Part IV, once we have covered the needed territory.
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understanding. That any such concept stands us in relation to an object is,
however,  then a further  thing to be established.  This  is  the second and
distinct step in the Critical method.51 
Finally, we can now see that the Critical account has distinguished the
‘givenness’ of a concept from its standing us in relation to an object. This is
a  crucial  distinction  introduced  by  the  fourfold  division  of  concepts.
Givenness is now not simply a mater of the combination of marks found in
the concept resting on the object,  whether the object be empirical or no.
Rather, givenness as such is a mater of the combination of marks found in
the  concept  resting  on  something  other  than  the  arbitrary  act  of  the
understanding. This is  then either a mater of the combination of marks
resting on the object (as in the empirical case) or in the combination resting
on the nature of the understanding. Thus, as we have seen above, a concept
can be given,  but not  stand us in relation to any object  whatsoever.  By
contrast, in the  Inquiry, the givenness of a concept and its combination of
marks as resting on the object did not come apart. This was due to German
Rationalism’s assumption of the concept as standing us in relation to the
objects of philosophy. Thus, in contrast to the  Inquiry, by the time of the
Doctrine Kant now explicitly recognises the question of the relation of a
concept to an object. This is explicitly recognised across both the concepts
of  mathematics  and of  philosophy.  The  concepts  of  mathematics  of  the
Inquiry  were  essentially  arbitrarily  thought  concepts.  By  contrast,
mathematical  concepts  now  have  an  object  under  the  Critical  account.
Mathematical concepts are a special variety of arbitrarily thought concept –
they  are  arbitrarily  thought,  but  such  that  an  object  for  them  can  be
constructed. And with regard to the concepts of philosophy, as we have
seen, the question of whether or not they stand us in relation to objects has
indeed been recognised.
In the above, we have seen that the Critical account involves a number
of crucial changes with regard to the characterisation of the concepts of
philosophy. Further,  these changes have signifcant implications for how
we are to set about arriving at such concepts. To begin, it is worth noting
that  under  the  Critical  account,  the  task of  identifying our  philosophical
51 It is worth here noting that not all concepts given a priori do turn out to stand us in
relation to objects, under the critical account. In addition to identifying the categories as
concepts given a priori, the critical philosophy identifes, across the course of the three
Critiques, a large number of concepts that arise in the nature of our faculties, and which,
in virtue of this, we necessarily have. These later concepts, however, cannot be shown to
stand us in relation to objects, but feature in our cognition in other ways (for example, as
concepts of limits or as ‘regulative’ concepts’).
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concepts – of identifying which concepts are given a priori – has become
explicit.  We are to identify those concepts whose combinations of marks
rest on the nature of our understanding (in contrast, as we have seen, to
those whose combinations rest on the objects of empirical experience and
those that the understanding has arbitrarily thought up). In this, there is a
clue as to how we might go about doing this. If the concepts to be identifed
are those that rest on the nature of the understanding, then it would seem
that,  instead  of  sorting  through  our  concepts,  we  can  begin  with  an
examination  of  the  nature  of  our  understanding.  We  can  begin,  not  by
identifying  those  concepts  we  suppose  might  rest  on  the  nature  of  our
understanding, and thereafter seeking to show that they are such, but by
identifying frst the nature of our understanding, and from this deriving the
concepts that are possible when considering this faculty in isolation. Now,
Kant does not lay this out in the Doctrine, but it is to be seen in the way in
which  the  Transcendental  Analytic  proceeds.  As  we  fnd  in  the
Metaphysical  Deduction  that  begins  the  Analytic,  Kant  begins  with  an
exhaustive  examination  of  the  faculty  of  the  understanding  in  puting
forward the table of judgements,  and from this derives exhaustively the
concepts of philosophy.52
Secondly, although the concepts have been qualifed as ‘given a priori’
in the sense of being grounded in the nature of the understanding, these
concepts are still given indistinctly. What is still necessary, according to the
Doctrine,  is  the  “distinct  representation  of  a  (still  confused)  concept”
(A728/B756).  Thus,  analysis  of  the  given  concepts  of  philosophy is  still
necessary  in  order  to  bring  them  to  the  distinctness  needed  for  their
employment in philosophical cognition. The need for analysis as such has
not changed under the Critical account.
In contrast, the Doctrine’s treatment of the terminating point of analysis
– that is, with what is required in terms of distinctness for philosophical
cognition – involves some of Kant’s pre-Critical position and some changes.
Again, Kant denies that defnition for the concepts of philosophy can be
achieved. We are to rest  content with the identifcation of  some,  but  not
52 The account presented here is, of course, a simplifcation, for Kant does not at all claim
the concepts  derived from the table of  judgements  to  be the  concepts  of  philosophy.
These concepts require the addition of further, intuitive, representational elements, and it
is only these later, schematised, concepts that might properly be considered to be the
concepts of philosophy under the critical account. We will not consider the distinction
between concepts and intuitions, between understanding and sensibility, and its bearing
on the critical method until Part IV. For that reason, the discussion here is simplifed to
overlook this distinction.
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necessarily  all,  marks  of  the  concept.  Such  analyses  are  now  termed
expositions. However, Kant does seem commited to nearness to defnition
being desirable. In contrast to the Inquiry’s proposed method of beginning
with only a few immediately certain marks, the Doctrine does propose a
longer  procedure  of  analysis  that  brings  to  light  as  many marks  of  the
concept  as  possible.  Nonetheless,  he  still  diverges  from  his  German
Rationalist  predecessors  in  the  claim  that  exhaustiveness  can  never  be
certain (A729/B757).
Finally, it is important to recognise the implications of the distinction
between the ground and objectivity of a concept for the carrying out of
analysis. We noted above that Kant’s fourfold distinction between concepts
in the Doctrine distinguishes a concept’s standing us in relation to an object
from the ground of the combination of marks of the concept. While German
Rationalism took the later always to be the former,  the Critical account
distinguishes the possibility of a concept having a ground other than the
object.  In the case of the concepts of philosophy, this ground is,  in fact,
always other than the object – our philosophical concepts are grounded in
the nature of our faculties. Thus, if these concepts are to stand us in relation
to  any  objects,  under  the  Critical  account,  this  needs  to  be  established
independently of simply bringing the combination of marks found in it to
distinctness. The Critical method involves a subsequent step of establishing
the objectivity of the concept. 
Thus, arriving at the concepts of philosophy under the Critical account
involves a number of additional steps. While the procedure of analysis is
again the  means  by which the  concepts  are  to  be  arrived at,  two steps
additional to this, not found in the Inquiry are, frst, establishing the concept
to be given a priori and, secondly, establishing the relation of the concept to
an  object.  Thus,  under  the  Critical  account,  we  see  that  arriving  at  the
concepts of philosophy involves crucially diferent steps, some of which are
achievable only after the transcendental proofs. 
In the above, we have traced out the ways in which the Critical method
for  arriving  at  the  concepts  of  philosophy  diverges  from  that  of  its
predecessor. We will not yet to return to our schematic example, however,
for there are further crucial changes found under the Critical account and it
is to these that we now turn in Part IV.
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Part IV 
An implicit commitment
In Part III, we have examined a number of crucial changes that have taken
place  under  the  Critical  philosophy  with  regard  to  the  concepts  of
philosophy and how we are to arrive at them. There is a further change,
however, that has taken place – a change which involves a commitment
implicit  in  German Rationalist  analysis,  and which constitutes  a  further
crucial  point  at  which  the  Critical  philosophy  takes  dispute  with  this
predecessor.  This  commitment  can  initially  be  identifed  in  the  way  in
which  German  Rationalism  establishes  the  marks  of  the  concepts  of
philosophy. As we will  see,  this initial implicit  commitment is  part of a
more  complex commitment  –  and it  is  this  complex commitment  in  its
entirety that Kant rejects by the time of the Critical philosophy. In Section I,
we  return  to  Kant’s  pre-Critical  discussion  of  analysis  in  the  Inquiry in
order  to  bring  to  light  the  complex  implicit  commitment  in  German
Rationalist  analysis.  In  Section  II,  our  task  is  to  uncover  the  Critical
response  to  this  commitment.  Finally,  in  Section  III,  we  turn  to  the
proposed Critical method that is to replace the problematic commitment. 
I. The implicit commitment of the Inquiry
In order to bring to light this implicit commitment, let us return to some of
the workings of German Rationalist analysis. Let us return to our schematic
example.
Suppose we take some indistinctly given concept C for analysis. In order
to arrive at a defnition of the given concept, we must distinguish the marks
found in it. Again suppose that, having carried out the entire procedure of
analysis,  we establish that  in  the  concept  C are  found all  and only the
marks, M, N, P, Q. If we recall Kant’s qualifcation, some of these marks can
be  established  immediately  as  found  in  the  concept,  while  others  only
mediately and by comparing the concept across various contexts. Suppose
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that  mark  M  is  such  that,  having  distinguished  the  mark,  it  could  be
established as an immediately certain mark of C, while mark N is such that
it can be established as a mark of the concept only mediately and by means
of  further  steps.  A  crucial  question  that  arises  here  is,  how  are  we  to
understand this immediate connection between the given concept C and
the  mark  M?  And  similarly,  how  are  we  to  understand  the  mediate
connection that is established with certainty in the case of N?
One characterisation of the former is found at 2:284 in the Inquiry, with
regard to the concept ‘appetite’:
In the case of any particular thing, I can be  immediately certain about a
number of  diferent predicates,  even though I am not  acquainted with a
sufciently  large  number  of  them to  be  able  to  furnish  a  completely
determinate concept of the thing, in other words, a defnition. Even if I
had never defned what an appetite was, I should still be able to say with
certainty that every appetite presupposed the representation of the object
of the appetite;i that this representation was an anticipation of what was
to come in the future;i that the feeling of pleasure was connected with it;i
and  so  forth.  Everyone  is  constantly  aware  of  all  this  in  the  immediate
consciousness of appetite. 
(2:284, emphasis my own)
As Kant construes it in these passages then, the immediate connection
between a proposed mark and an indistinctly given concept is such that our
initial  indistinct  awareness  of  the  concept  (or  object  of  the  concept)  in
question in  some way  always  already involves the  mark  in  question.  The
mark is, as Kant puts it in the Inquiry, ‘presupposed’ in the awareness of the
concept.  A  similar  statement  can  be  found  in  the  transcripts  of  Kant’s
lectures on Logic: 
The mater is already there, then, we are only supposed to give the thing a
form. By means of analytical distinctness we do not cognise any more in a
thing than we have already thought in it previously;i instead we only cognise
beter, i.e., more distinctly, more clearly, and with more consciousness,
what we already actually knew. E.g., with the concept of perfection I will
frst direct someone to the cases in which he makes use of the expression
perfection, in order thereby to instruct him what he really understands by
perfection [,] what sort of concept he makes of it, and what he thinks when
he utters the word perfection and ascribes it to a thing.
 (24:131, emphasis my own)
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This characterisation, however, is yet vague in a number of ways. First,
it  is  not  clear,  as  it  stands,  whether  some  further,  more  determinate,
characterisation has been given in these passages, or whether this is merely
a restatement of  the requirement of  analysis to bring to distinctness the
marks  of  our  initially  indistinct  concepts.  Further,  if  the  presupposed
awareness of the mark is indeed a further characterisation, then it is not, as
it stands, clear whether the awareness of the mark is part of what it is to be
aware of the concept or part of what it is to be aware of the concept. In other
words, is the characterisation here a psychological one, in the sense that the
awareness of the mark is in some way psychologically correlated with the
awareness of the concept? Or does it concern the content of the concept –
that is, is the awareness of the mark an awareness of that which is part of
the concept? 
Now, Kant does not treat this in any detail in the Inquiry, and indeed the
discussion  seems  to  assume  a  shared  understanding  of  a  mark  as
‘presupposed’  or  as  one  of  which  we  are  ‘already  constantly  aware’.
However,  in  some of  Kant’s  later  Logic  lectures,  the  characterisation  is
given a clearer statement: 
[Distinctness of a concept] rests on the analysis of the concept in regard
to the manifold that lies contained within it. Thus in the concept of virtue,
for example, are contained as marks (1.) the concept of freedom, (2.) the
concept of adherence to rules (to duty), (3.) the concept of overpowering
the force of the inclinations, in case they oppose those rules. Now if we
break up the concept of virtue into its individual constituent parts, we make
it [i.e. the concept] distinct for ourselves through this analysis. By thus
making it distinct, however, we add nothing to a concept;i we only explain
it. With distinctness, therefore, concepts are improved not as to mater
but only as to form. 
(Jäsche Logic 9:35, emphasis my own)
Thus,  in  this  clearer  characterisation  of  the  connection  between  an
immediate  mark  and  an  indistinctly  given  concept,  we  see  that  the
connection  as  it  is  characterised  in  the  Inquiry is  to  be  understood  as
constitutive. Our awareness of the mark is not merely correlated with our
awareness of the concept, but the mark is in fact part of the content itself.
The  connection  between  a  concept  and  an  immediate  mark  is  to  be
understood as the connection between a concept and one of its constituent
partial concepts.
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A further, more determinate – and, for our purposes, more signifcant –
characterisation of this connection can be found in the Third Reflection of
the Inquiry, in the midst of a discussion of the supreme formal principles of
human reason: 
The form of every afrmation consists in something being represented as
a  characteristic  mark  of  a  thing,  that  is  to  say,  as  identical  with  the
characteristic mark of a thing. Thus, every afrmative judgement is true
if the predicate is identical with the subject. And since the form of every
negation consists in something being represented as in conflict with a
thing,  it  follows  that  a  negative  judgement  is  true  if  the  predicate
contradicts the subject. The proposition, therefore, which expresses the
essence of every afrmation […] runs as follows: to every subject there
belongs a predicate which is identical with it. This is the law of identity.
The proposition which expresses the essence of all negation is this: to no
subject  does  there  belong  a  predicate  which  contradicts  it.  This
proposition  is  the  law  of  contradiction  […]  Any  proposition  […]  is
indemonstrable  if  it  is  immediately  thought  under  one  of  these  two
supreme principles and if it cannot be thought in any other way. In other
words,  any  proposition  is  indemonstrable  if  either  the  identity  or  the
contradiction is to be found immediately in the concepts, and if the identity and
the contradiction cannot or may not be understood through analysis by means
of intermediate characteristic marks. 
(2:294, emphasis my own)
Now if  we recall,  in the case of establishing any immediately certain
marks of a concept, the propositions expressing the connection between the
mark  and  the  concept  were  to  be  understood  as  indemonstrable
propositions. Thus, given Kant’s characterisation here of an indemonstrable
proposition,  we  can  now see  that  the  immediate  connection  between a
mark and a concept is to be understood either as the connection of identity
(in which case the mark is to be taken as found in the concept) or as one of
contradiction (in which case the mark is to be taken as not found in the
concept). Importantly, however, Kant also here indicates how the mediate
connection between a mark and a concept is to be understood. It is again a
mater of identity or contradiction. However, in the case of such identity or
contradiction, appeal is made to intermediate marks in order to establish
the  connection.  Presumably  in  the  case  of  any  intermediate  marks,  an
immediate connection would be found in each intermediate step. Thus, the
picture is  as follows: A mark is found in a concept if  (and only if)  it  is
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identical with some characteristic mark of the concept. Similarly, a mark is
not found in a concept if  (and only if)  it  contradicts  some characteristic
mark  of  the  concept.  For  some  marks  found  in  a  concept,  this  can  be
established immediately (in which case the proposition connecting the two
is  indemonstrable,  falling  under  no  proposition  other  than  the  formal
principle  mentioned  in  the  passage),  while  for  others,  the  identity  or
contradiction  must  be  established  by  means  of  intermediate  marks  (in
which case the proposition connecting the two is demonstrable, falling also
under the propositions that invoke the intermediate marks).53 
Having seen, in the above, what the connection between an indistinctly
given concept and a mark that is  (or is  not) found in it  consists in,  it is
possible to identify a commitment implicit in German Rationalist analysis.
In such analysis, we begin with some indistinctly given concept and aim to
progressively establish the marks in it.  However, we have now seen the
implicit criteria by means of which this is to take place. The marks of an
indistinctly given concept are to be established by determining, for each
mark in question,  whether the mark is  identical with some mark in the
indistinctly given concept or whether the mark contradicts some mark in
the  indistinctly  given  concept.  These  criteria  are  the  implicit  terms  of
diferentiation with which we begin our analysis.  They are the terms of
diferentiation according to which the marks for any and all  indistinctly
given concepts are to be determined and they sufce for determining all
such marks. This is a frst implicit commitment that we might identify in
German Rationalist analysis.
53 The appeal to these as the criteria for establishing the marks of a concept in analysis can
be found ubiquitously in Kant’s published and unpublished writings, both from the pre-
critical and critical periods. (We might here recognise that Kant’s treatment of judgement
is the more fundamental context for these criteria. Nonetheless, given that analysis yields
analytic  judgement,  these are equally  the criteria to be found in analysis.)  Within the
Critique,  mention  of  them is  found in the  Introduction  (A6-7/B9-11)  and the  Dialectic
(A596/B624n.) In the former passages, Kant tells us, a “great part […] of the business of
our reason consists in analyses of the concepts that we already have of objects […] which
aford us  a  multitude  of  cognitions  that  […] are  nothing  more than illuminations  or
clarifcations of that which is already thought in our concepts […] In these cases, I call the
judgement analytic […] Analytic judgements (afrmative ones) are thus those in which
the connection of the predicate is thought through identity” (A6-7/B9-11). Similarly, in
the earlier pre-critical discussion of the various types of judgement, Kant distinguishes
indemonstrable  propositions  as  those  in  which  “identity  or  contradiction  are
apprehended immediately” (False Subtlety 2:61) and demonstrable propositions as those
“in which identity or contradiction can be cognised mediately (ibid.).  Further cases in
which these are the criteria put forward by Kant as those of analysis can be found in the
Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science [1783] (4:267),
in On a discovery whereby any new critique of pure reason is to be made superfuous by an older
one [1790] (8:242), and in the Notes and Fragments (17:258 and 17:616-7).
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Now, it is important to note just what else is implicitly at work in the
adoption of these terms of diferentiation. A clue to this is equally to be
found  in  the  passage  from  the  Third  Reflection.  These  terms  of
diferentiation, Kant tells us there, are the terms that respectively yield the
“form […] of every afrmative judgement [and] the form of every negation
[i.e. negative judgement]” (Inquiry  2:294). And considered in their general
formulation, the terms constitute the “supreme universal principles, in the
formal sense of the term, of human reason” (ibid.). In other words, in their
general formulation these terms of diferentiation constitute the laws of the
faculty of reason. Now, at the time of the Inquiry, Kant has not yet drawn the
Critical  distinction  between  the  intellectual  faculties  of  understanding,
judgement, and reason, and so by ‘reason’ here in the  Inquiry, we should
not  understand  the  Critical  faculty  for  inference.  Rather,  the  laws  put
forward here are laws ultimately included among the laws of, what is more
familiar in Critical terms as,  the understanding. Thus,  in adopting these
terms of diferentiation, it is by means of the laws of the understanding that
the analysis of a concept is carried out. It is the understanding alone that is
involved in determining whether a mark is  or  is  not  to be found in an
indistinctly given concept.54
This  commitment  can  be  found  more  explicitly  in  the  Inquiry,  in  a
passage in which Kant contrasts philosophy with mathematics as having
no use for or aid of symbols:
By  contrast,  the  only  help  which  words,  construed  as  the  signs  of
philosophical cognition, aford is that of reminding us of the universal
concepts which they signify. It is at all times necessary to be immediately
aware of their signifcance. The pure understanding must be maintained in
a state of constant atention;i how easy it is for the characteristic mark of
an abstracted concept to escape our atention without our noticing, for
there  is  nothing  sensible  which  can  reveal  to  us  the  fact  that  the
54 Although our account in Parts III and IV has turned its focus almost exclusively to Kant’s
understanding  of the German Rationalist method, it is worth noting the extent to which
the commitment  identifed here,  and its concomitant commitments,  can potentially be
atributed to a number of other fgures typically associated with, or influencing, German
Rationalism: Leibniz ([1686?], p. 30), Wolf (1730, §§54-5) and Baumgarten (1739, §7 and
§11) all adopt the principles of identity and contradiction as principles that underlie the
truth of all propositions. Insofar as analysis yields all and only the propositions that are
true of the object of the concept analysed, all three are thereby commited to the crucial
claims above, viz. that the fundamental criterion for analysis must be that of identity and
diference, and thus that it is the understanding alone that determines the marks found in
an indistinctly given concept.
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characteristic  mark  has  been  overlooked.  And  when  that  happens,
diferent things are taken to be the same thing, and the result is error. 
(2:292-3, emphasis my own)
A crucial corollary of this commitment also comes to light in the passage
above: The understanding alone is at work in determining whether or not a
mark is to be taken as found in an indistinct concept and thus whatever is
indistinctly given must ultimately be a representation of the understanding alone .
The  terms  adopted  by  German  Rationalist  analysis  are  the  terms  of
diferentiation  for  distinguishing  the  marks  of  representations  of  the
understanding. Marks are to be diferentiated as predicates of a concept. That
is, there is the implicit commitment that  whatever is indistinctly given is a
concept  and that  whichever  marks  we  might  distinguish and separate  out  are
predicates of some concept. 
This  is  again  evident  when we  consider  the  passage  from  the  Third
Reflection: We saw that the connection between a mark and the concept in
which it is found is that of identity (or contradiction in the case of a mark
not found in the concept). Further, we were told that such identity consists
in the truth of the universal afrmative proposition that connects the two.
Thus, identity consists in the connection between universals or predicates
and concepts. So, in diferentiating the marks of whatever is  indistinctly
given, the terms of diferentiation adopted by German Rationalism make it
such  that  our  analysis  recognises  only  the  relations  that  hold  between
concepts  and  predicates.  Whatever  is  indistinctly  given  to  us  is
distinguished only in these terms.
Thus, when we examine the terms of diferentiation implicit in German
Rationalist analysis a litle more closely, what comes to light is a complex
subjective commitment. German Rationalist analysis is at once commited to
(i)  the  terms  of  diferentiation  stated  above  as  the  sole  criteria  for
establishing  the  marks  of  an  indistinctly  given  concept,  (ii)  the
understanding alone as the faculty for representing and diferentiating the
marks of that which is indistinctly given, and (iii) the subjective nature of
that which is indistinctly given as being always and only a representation
of the understanding or concept. 
The trifold subjective commitment above might also be put another way.
Recall, a mark is to be taken as found in a concept if and only if the later
cannot be thought without it. To put this another way, a mark is to be taken
as found in that  which is indistinctly given if  and only if  that which is
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indistinctly  given  cannot  be  represented  by  means  of  the  understanding
without  the  mark.  Is  it  possible  to  represent,  by  means  of  the
understanding, that which is indistinctly given without the mark? If  no,
then the mark is found in it. Is it possible to represent, by means of the
understanding, that which is indistinctly given with the mark? If no, then
the mark is not to be found it. Thus, the terms of diferentiation of German
Rationalism are those of representability by the understanding alone. They are
the terms of diferentiation that characterise the understanding’s capacity
for the diferentiation of representations. This shows why the adoption of
these terms at once commits us to the understanding as the only faculty at
work  in  representing  that  which  is  indistinctly  given  and  whatever  is
indistinctly  given  as  always  and  only  a  representation  of  the
understanding.
To  set  this  in  our  minds,  let  us  return  briefly  to  our  schematic
description. As we had it, concept C was indistinctly given and we were to
set  about  establishing  all  and  only  the  marks  found  in  it.  Suppose  we
identify the mark M by separating it out from all other marks. Now, given
the above, in order to establish that M is found in the concept C we must
establish that it is identical with some mark of C or presupposed in every
awareness of C. Suppose that in the case of M, it is immediately evident
that  this  mark  is  so.  That  is,  it  is  immediately  evident  that  M  is
presupposed in the awareness of C – that we cannot think the concept C
without the mark M. M is then to be found in the concept. Suppose we
identify the further mark N, but do not fnd it immediately evident that N
is presupposed in the awareness of C. Seemingly we can think C without
N. Suppose, however, that in continuing our examination, we compare N
with M and fnd that N is after all presupposed in the awareness of M,
though we hadn’t  recognised this  is  comparing  N with C.  In  this  case,
given that M is identical with a mark of C and that N is identical with a
mark of M, we have established that N too is to be found in the concept.
The connection between C and M is  established immediately,  while  the
connection between C and N is established mediately via the intermediate
mark M. Despite this diference, both M and N are equally to be found in C,
and the criterion employed in establishing this is that of the identity of the
relevant marks.
Before  we  proceed  further  with  our  examination  of  this  complex
commitment,  it  is  worth  emphasising  what  the  mentioned  terms  of
diferentiation diferentiate. In analysis, we are to establish whether or not
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some mark, which we have separated out from the rest, is to be found in an
indistinctly given concept in question or not. As we have seen, the terms of
diferentiation uncovered above are employed in order to do this. Now we
might  think  that  what  these  terms  allow  us  to  diferentiate  is  the
indistinctly given concept – indeed, they are the terms employed in order
to bring this concept to distinctness in analysis. And it is correct that these
terms  are  needed  in  order  to  bring  the  concept  to  distinctness  and  to
diferentiate  it  from  other  concepts.  However,  what  these  terms  might
properly  be  said to  diferentiate  is  not  simply the  concept  as  such,  but
rather is whether or not some mark is to be found in the concept. The point at
which these terms are at work is the connection between proposed mark
and concept. What they thus allow us to diferentiate is the  connection  or
relation that holds between the concept (as a combination of marks) and the
mark  in  question.  They  are  thus  the  terms  of  diferentiation  for  the
connections or relations between a mark and a concept as a combination of
marks.
In  the  above,  we  have  thus  far  uncovered  a  complex  subjective
commitment that is found in the terms of diferentiation implicitly adopted
under German Rationalist analysis. This is not, however, where the implicit
commitment  ends.  Crucially,  these  terms of  diferentiation equally  have
implications  for  the  objects of  our  cognition.  If  we  recall,  the  concepts
brought to distinctness, according to German Rationalism, are concepts  of
the objects of philosophy. German Rationalism assumes that in such analysis
our representations stand us in relation to their objects. (Indeed, this is the
assumption that  gives such analysis signifcance.)  Thus,  we saw that,  in
determining  the  marks  of  some  concept  by  means  of  analysis,  what
German Rationalism ultimately takes  itself  to  establish are the objective
determinations of the object of that concept. Now, given the further detail
of  the  terms  of  diferentiation  and  the  complex  subjective  commitment
uncovered above, this assumption can be further detailed. According to the
terms of diferentiation adopted, the marks of an indistinctly given concept
are  solely  diferentiable  according  to  the  terms  of  diferentiation  of  the
understanding.  It  was  assumed that  the  understanding  sufced  for  the
diferentiation of all such marks. Thus, given that the marks are ultimately
assumed by German Rationalism to be the objective determinations of the
objects  in  question,  the  terms  of  diferentiation  imply  that  the  objective
marks of the objects of philosophy are solely diferentiable according to the
terms of diferentiation of the understanding. It is assumed that these terms
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of diferentiation sufce for diferentiating our indistinctly given concepts,
and thus for diferentiating the objects of those concepts, viz. the objects of
our  philosophical  cognition.  Thus,  along  with  the  complex  subjective
commitment  comes  an  implication  for  the nature  of  the  objects  of  our
cognition. They are such that the understanding’s terms of diferentiation
sufce  for  their  diferentiation.  They  are  objects  cognisable  by  the
understanding alone.
To  set  this  complex  commitment  in  our  minds,  let  us  return  to  our
schematic example. Recall that we began with indistinctly given concept C
and were to determine all and only the marks found in it. Given the terms
of diferentiation that have now come to light, we now know that in order
for some proposed mark to be taken as found in the concept C, we must
establish  that  C  cannot  be  thought  without  the  mark  (and  similarly,  to
show that  it  is  not  so  to  be  taken,  we must  establish that  C cannot  be
thought with the mark). Thus, suppose that, in our analysis, we establish
that C cannot be thought without M or N. M and N are thus immediately
established as a mark of C. Suppose that we further establish that M cannot
be thought without the further marks P and Q, and that P and Q are thus
mediately  established  as  marks  of  C.  Finally,  having  reiterated  this
procedure for all other proposed marks and having sufciently compared
these marks ‘across all kinds of contexts’ and ‘with each other’, we thereby
establish that M, N, P, Q are all and only the marks of the concept C and
have arrived at its defnition. Thus, we thereby establish the marks of the
object  of  the  concept  –  we  establish  M,  N,  P,  Q  to  be  objective
determinations of the object O. 
Given  our  discussion  above,  we  might  emphasise  two  dimensions
present  in  the  example.  In  the  example,  certain  terms  of  diferentiation
were employed in order to establish the connection or relation between the
marks M, N, P,  Q and the concept C (of object O).  Now these terms of
diferentiation  were  the  terms  for  diferentiating  the  marks  of  a
representation of the understanding or concept. That is,  they were terms
such that the only connection or relation recognisable between M, N, P, Q
and  C  were  those  recognisable  or  representable  by  the  understanding.
Thus, the procedure of analysis of C does not solely involve certain terms
of  diferentiation  that  distinguish  the  marks  ultimately  as  objective
determinations. Our diferentiation of M, N, P as the objective marks of O
involves  an  implicit,  complex,  and  prior  commitment  at  the  subjective
level:  M,  N,  P,  Q  are  marks  that  are  representable  and represented by
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means of the understanding alone. They are predicates of some concept. C
is  a  combination of  marks  that  is  representable  and represented by the
understanding  alone.  These  are  commitments  at  the  subjective  level  –
commitments with regard to the subjective nature of the marks M, N, P, Q
and the combination of marks C. Correlatively, this involves a commitment
with regard to the subjective faculty that represents O by means of C (viz.
that it is the understanding alone). (And, this has implications for O itself.
The marks of O are diferentiable, and O itself is cognisable, by means of
the understanding alone.) 
Thus,  we  see  that,  while  it  was  implicit  before,  analysis  involves  a
diferentiation at  two levels.  Insofar  as  it  involves  the  commitment that
whatever  is  indistinctly  given  is  a  representation  of  the  understanding
alone, whose marks are to be diferentiated by its terms alone, such analysis
involves a diferentiation of the marks of a representation as a representation.
This is diferentiation at the subjective level. However, given the German
Rationalist commitment that, in carrying out such analysis, the marks of the
object of  the concept are  thereby diferentiated,  such analysis  involves a
diferentiation at the objective level. 
Finally, it is worth re-emphasising that this complex commitment is one
that is made prior to any given representations. It is a commitment not only
regarding  whatever  representations  are  given,  but  whatever
representations could be given. The terms of diferentiation are adopted as
the prescriptive terms for diferentiating the marks of an indistinctly given
concept prior to embarking on analysis.
From the above then, we can see that, in its adoption of these terms of
diferentiation in analysis, German Rationalism at once involves itself in a
complex  and  inter-related  commitment.  This  includes  a  number  of
interdependent  subjective  commitments  and,  given  the  additional
assumption  that  such  analysis  allows  for  the  analysis  of  the  objects  of
cognition, these commitments imply a number of commitments concerning
the objects of our cognition. 
II. The Critical response
In the above,  we have brought  to light  a complex implicit  commitment
found in German Rationalist analysis. Now, what is the Critical response to
this  commitment? Indeed,  we  might  wonder  whether  the  Critical
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philosophy is opposed to German Rationalism on this at all. As we have
seen, under the Critical philosophy, the concepts of philosophy are indeed
still  concepts  that  are  given  indistinctly,  and  we  are  still  to  go  about
bringing them to distinctness by distinguishing their relations to various
marks  in  analysis.  Indeed,  these  are  precisely  the  terms  in  which  the
Doctrine of Method sets it out: Philosophical concepts receive ‘exposition’,
rather than defnition, which is achieved by the “distinct representation of a
(still confused) given concept” (A728-9/B756-7) in analysis. Surely this is
then  precisely  what  we  are  doing  under  this  commitment  of  German
Rationalist  analysis  –  adopting  terms  that  allow  us  to  diferentiate  the
marks of the various given concepts that are to feature in our philosophical
cognition? 
Now, Kant does not in fact explicitly mention the commitment identifed
above in the Doctrine of Method at all. Instead, the response is, as I hope to
show, to be found in the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic – the
section  with  which  we  began  our  study.  Let  us  return  again  to  the
argument that Kant puts forward there:
If we recall, the primary point of concern of the appendix is, what Kant
terms, the ‘relations of  our representations among themselves’  and with
establishing these. The concepts of reflection are concepts of these relations,
and the appendix is concerned with their correct employment. In the course
of  discussing  these  concerns,  Kant  distinguishes  one  way  in  which  we
might  go  about  establishing  these  relations.  That  is,  in  employing  the
concepts of reflection, we might compare them such that all are taken to be
representations of the understanding. We might, as Kant terms it, carry out
“mere  comparison,  [in  which]  there  is  complete  abstraction  from  the
cognitive  power  to  which  the  given  representations  belong,  and  [the
representations] are thus […] treated the same as far as their seat in the
mind  is  concerned”  (A262-3/B318-9,  emphasis  my  own).  In  such
comparison  then,  we  establish,  for  whatever  representations  are  in
question,  their relations by comparing them as if  they were one and all
representations of the understanding. 
Mere comparison was not the only way of comparing representations
for their relations. The line of reasoning of the introduction distinguishes a
second sort of comparison – a comparison that is sensitive to the faculty of
the representations in question. In such comparison, we frst compare “the
representations  in  general  with  the  cognitive  power  in  which  they  are
situated” (A261/B317) – we are frst “[conscious] of the relation of given
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representations to our various sources cognition” (A260/B316) and then go
on to compare our representations for their relations. As we have already
seen,  such  consciousness  of  the  source  of  our  representations  is
transcendental refection, and thus the contrast Kant draws is that between
mere comparison and (comparison preceded by) transcendental reflection
(A262-3/B318-9).
Finally, according to this line of reasoning, the possibility of a priori or
philosophical cognition rests on recognising this contrast and adopting the
later sort of comparison: It is only in the case of comparison preceded by
transcendental  reflection  that  the  relations  between  our  representations
among  themselves  are  established  correctly.  This  is  because  those
representations  might  belong  to  one  of  the  two  distinct  faculties  of
understanding and sensibility and because a diference in the faculty to
which  we  take  some  representation  in  question  to  belong  involves  a
diference  in  the  relations  we  are  to  take  it  to  bear  to  any  other
representations.  Thus,  correctly  establishing  the  relations  of  our
representations among themselves requires transcendental reflection (and
is  thus  impossible  under  mere  comparison).  Further,  since  objective
comparison (i.e.  comparison such that  not only the relations among our
representations  but  also  the  relations  among  the  objects  of  those
representations  are  established)  requires  that  the  relations  between  our
representations  be  established  correctly,  objective  comparison  requires
comparison preceded by transcendental reflection (and is thus impossible
under mere comparison). Finally, since a priori cognition requires objective
comparison,  a  priori  cognition  requires  comparison  preceded  by
transcendental reflection (and is thus impossible under mere comparison).
Thus,  it  is  recognition  of  the  contrast  between  these  two  forms  of
comparison  and  adoption  of  comparison  preceded  by  transcendental
reflection over mere comparison that, according to the appendix, secures
the possibility of a priori cognition. 
Such is  the now familiar argument found in the appendix.  Now, the
import of this line of reasoning to the discussion at hand might already
have struck us over the head. In this line of reasoning, we fnd mentioned
the implicit commitment of German Rationalist analysis identifed above:
In the case of mere comparison, according to the appendix, we compare
our  representations  for  their  relations  as  representations  of  the
understanding or concepts. As we have seen, German Rationalist analysis
begins with an indistinctly given concept and sets about gradually bringing
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it to distinctness by identifying the marks found in it. Such a bringing of the
concept to distinctness involves establishing the connection or relation of
various proposed marks to the indistinctly given representation. However,
as we also have seen, in establishing these relations German Rationalism
adopts the terms of diferentiation of the understanding. It compares that
which  is  indistinctly  given  with  various  marks  as  representations  of  the
understanding. Thus, we see that, in this line of reasoning of the appendix,
Kant is concerned with precisely the sort of comparison of representations
that  takes  place  in  bringing  concepts  to  distinctness  under  German
Rationalism.  The  analysis  of  our  representations  under  German
Rationalism  is  a  case  of  mere  comparison.  Mere  comparison  is  the
comparison  of  representations  insofar  as  they  are  taken  to  be
representations of the same faculty, viz. the understanding, and the terms
of diferentiation employed by German Rationalist  analysis commit it  to
carrying out just such a form of comparison.55
Thus, the Critical response to this commitment is now clear. Recall the
claims of the appendix regarding mere comparison: In the atempt to secure
a priori cognition, such comparison is problematic. Mere comparison rules
55 We  might  here  note  a  potential  objection  and  clarifcation  to  the  above  proposed
connection between the appendix and German rationalist analysis. In the appendix, as we
have  seen,  Kant  is  concerned  with  establishing  the  relations  between representations as
representations.  By contrast, in our discussion of German rationalist analysis,  we have
been concerned with establishing the relation or connection between a proposed mark
and an obscurely given concept or combination of marks. In my proposed reading of the
appendix, I claimed that establishing the later relation in German rationalist analysis was
a certain species of establishing the former relation. Now, it might seem that the two do
not  line  up.  Comparing  two  representations  (taken  as  representations  of  the
understanding) for their relations is seemingly not the same as diferentiating the relation
between  a  mark  and  a  combination  of  marks  (taken  as  a  representation  of  the
understanding  or  concept).  However,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  issue  here  is  merely
terminological: Insofar as a mark is compared with a combination of marks or a concept,
it  too  is  a  representation.  It  is  simply  a  more  elemental  representation  than  the
combination with which it is compared. Comparing proposed marks with a concept is
still, under German rationalism, a mater of comparing certain representations with other
representations.  The  diference  in  terminology  between  the  two  signals  only  the
diference between a greater combination (obscurely given and at whose distinctness we
are aiming) and a smaller or smallest combination. (This is again evident in the procedure
of analysis described in the Inquiry in which we are to collate the marks with one another
in order to ensure that they are each presented distinctly in our defnition and one is not
covertly contained in the other. Such collation is not a mater of dealing with something
other  than representations.  We are again simply comparing representations  with  one
another,  but  this  time  merely  at  a  more  elemental  level  than  that  of  the  greatest
combination  in  question  in  relation  to  its  marks.)  Thus,  when  Kant  discusses  the
‘comparison of representations for their relations among themselves’ in the appendix, we
now see that the German rationalist ‘comparison of a concept with its marks for their
relation’ can, without too much difculty, be understood as a case of the former.
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out the possibility of a priori cognition. Kant rejects the German Rationalist
adoption of these terms of diferentiation in its analysis. Let us look more
closely at why this might be.
Recall  the  complexity  of  the  commitment  involved in  adopting these
terms of diferentiation. As noted, the adoption of these terms involves a
commitment  to  the  understanding  as  the  only  faculty  at  work  in  such
diferentiation and, correlatively, to all such representations being those of
the understanding. It is crucial to remember, however, that such analysis is
not merely a mater of diferentiating our representations. It is equally a
mater  of  thereby diferentiating  the  objects  of  those  representations.  In
adopting  these  terms  of  diferentiation,  German  Rationalism  thereby
assumes  that  these  terms  sufce  for  diferentiating  the  objective
determinations  of  the  objects  of  these  concepts.  It  assumes that  it  is  by
means of the understanding alone that we stand in relation to these objects
– that our philosophical cognition is by means of the understanding alone.
And it is here that we fnd the crux of Kant’s rejection of these terms of
diferentiation. The Critical philosophy rejects the claim that cognition is
possible  by  means  of  the  understanding  alone.  As  the  appendix
emphasises, “the understanding and […] sensibility […] judge about things
with objective validity only in conjunction” (A271/B327, emphasis omited).
It is by means of both the understanding  and sensibility that we stand in
relation to the objects of our cognition, and this holds true even in the a
priori case of philosophy. Let us look more closely at how, if correct, this
Critical  recognition  of  two  faculties  in  cognition  afects  the  outcome  of
German Rationalist analysis.
Let us begin by considering how such analysis must be working when
we take the German Rationalist assumption to be correct. Suppose that we
do ultimately stand in relation to the objects of philosophy by means of the
representations made distinct in its  analysis,  and that it  is  ultimately by
means of the understanding alone that we do so. Now, if we are to bring
the marks of  these objects to distinctness,  we must bring to distinctness
whatever is already involved or found in the given representation – the
representation by means of which we do stand in relation to the object –
albeit only indistinctly. Given that the representation is ultimately one of
the understanding, the marks that are yet only indistinctly found in the
representation  are  marks  that  are  diferentiable  by  the  understanding.
Thus, in order to bring the given representation to distinctness, we must
employ explicitly the terms that  are only implicitly employed when the
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representation  is  still  indistinct.  That  is,  we  must  employ  explicitly  the
understanding’s  terms  of  diferentiation.  Now,  the  consequence  of  this
explicit  employment  is  twofold.  First,  given  that  they  are  the  terms  of
diferentiation of the understanding, they serve to diferentiate the marks of
the  representation  as  a  representation  of  the  understanding.  Secondly,
since,  under  the  given assumption,  the  understanding does  stand us  in
relation to the objects of these representations,  the employment of these
terms also thereby serves to diferentiate the marks of the objects of the
representations.  These  terms  suffice  for  diferentiating  the  marks  of  the
objects themselves.  Thus,  having brought the relevant representations to
distinctness for the sake of furthering our philosophical cognition by means
of proofs in which they feature, we can be sure that we have brought to
distinctness, not only the marks of the representations, but also thereby the
marks  of  the  objects  of  the  representations.  We  can  be  sure  that  the
representations appearing in our philosophical propositions or cognition
stand us in relation to the objects of philosophy.
Thus, if German Rationalism were correct in this assumption, that is, if it
were by means of the understanding alone that we stand in relation to the
objects  of  philosophy,  then  these  terms  would  indeed  sufce  for  the
diferentiation of the objects. If what we were aware of in being aware of
the concepts of philosophy were also thereby their objects as objects of the
pure  understanding,  whose  indistinct  representation  needed  only  to  be
made distinct,  then the adoption of  these terms in the analysis  of  these
representations would ultimately stand us in a cognitive relation to their
objects. 
By contrast, let us introduce the Critical account of the faculties into this
picture.  How  does  the  Critical  recognition  of  two  distinct  faculties  as
necessary for cognition afect the outcome of such analysis if it is carried
out according to the German Rationalist commitment above? According to
the Critical account, we stand in relation to the objects of our philosophical
cognition  by  means  of  both  the  understanding  and  sensibility.  The
understanding  alone  is  not  sufcient.  If  this  is  so,  then,  when  we  are
considering our various indistinctly given representations for the sake of
bringing them to distinctness, it will not, for all of these representations, be
the case that  we stand in relation to the object  of  the representation by
means  of  the  understanding.  In  the  case  of  some  indistinctly  given
representations, it will be by means of sensibility that we stand in relation
to  the  object  of  cognition  with  regard  to  the  representation.  That  is,
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included  among  these  various  yet-indistinct  representations  will  be
representations  of  sensibility.  Suppose,  then,  that  for  some  indistinctly
given  representation  R,  it  is  by  means  of  sensibility  that  we  stand  in
relation to the object of cognition with regard to R. In order to bring to
distinctness  the  marks of  the  object  of  R,  we must bring to  distinctness
whatever  is  involved  in  R,  albeit  only  indistinctly.  We  are  to  employ
explicitly the terms of diferentiation that are yet employed only implicitly
in the case of the indistinct representation. Now, the terms to be adopted
for this  under German Rationalism are those outlined above.  We are to
establish whether the representation cannot be thought without the mark
or whether it cannot be thought with it. However, given that it is by means
of sensibility that we stand in relation to the object of R, the marks of which
we are  yet  only  indistinctly  aware  in  the  case  of  R  are  marks  that  are
diferentiable  and diferentiated  by  sensibility.  Thus,  insofar  as  German
Rationalism adopts the terms above with regard to R, it adopts terms of
diferentiation  for  representations  of  the  understanding  in  the  case  of
representations of sensibility. 
The  outcome  of  this  is  again  twofold.  What  we  manage  to  do  in
applying the terms of diferentiation of the understanding in the case of R
is  to  diferentiate  the  marks  of  R  as  if  it  were  a  representation  of  the
understanding, and not as the representation that it is. That is, applying the
terms  of  the  understanding in  the  case  of  R  will  mean that  we do  not
diferentiate the marks of the representation correctly as a representation.
Further, given that it is by means of sensibility that we stand in relation to
the object with regard to this representation, when we apply the terms of
diferentiation  of  the  understanding,  our  analysis  thereby  also  fails  to
diferentiate the marks of the object of the representation. Thus, when these
representations  thereafter  appear  in  our  philosophical  propositions  or
cognition, they fail to stand us in relation to the objects of that supposed
cognition.
Thus, insofar as German Rationalism adopts the terms of diferentiation
of the understanding  tout  court  – insofar as  German Rationalist  analysis
employs  the  terms  of  diferentiation  for  concepts  with  regard  to  all
indistinctly  given  representations  –  it  succeeds  only  in  bringing  these
representations to distinctness  as if they were representations of a certain
sort,  viz.  representations  of  the  understanding  or  concepts.  It  does  not
succeed in bringing these representations to distinctness correctly as the
representations that they are and so does not succeed in establishing the
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marks of the objects of those representations. It thereby fails to secure the
possibility of a priori cognition by means of those representations.
At the outset of this  part,  we identifed a feature implicit  in German
Rationalist  analysis:  In  carrying  out  its  analyses,  German  Rationalism
employed certain terms of  diferentiation for the marks of  the concepts,
which  terms  of  diferentiation  formed  one  part  of  a  complex  fourfold
commitment. We have now seen the response of the Critical philosophy to
this feature of German Rationalist analysis. The Critical philosophy rejects
these terms of diferentiation. It does so by rejecting a more fundamental
assumption found in the German Rationalist  fourfold commitment – the
assumption  that  philosophical  cognition  is  possible  by  means  of  the
understanding  alone.  In  its  so  assuming,  German  Rationalism  at  once
commits  itself  to  the  objects  of  such cognition  being such that  they  are
diferentiable  by  the  understanding  alone,  to  the  faculty  of  the
understanding  as  the  only  one  involved  in  such  cognition,  and  to  all
indistinctly given representations ultimately being representations of the
understanding and their marks thus diferentiable as such. It thus commits
itself  to adopting the terms of  diferentiation in question:  All marks are
diferentiated  as  marks  of  representations  of  the  understanding  (as
predicates of concepts).  The Critical philosophy rejects this picture at its
very  centre  –  in  its  assumption  concerning  the  faculties  necessary  for
cognition.  Philosophical  cognition  is  not  possible  by  means  of  the
understanding alone, but requires the distinct faculties of sensibility and
understanding. Thus, insofar as German Rationalism adopts the terms of
diferentiation that it does in bringing the indistinct representations needed
for our philosophical cognition to distinctness, and insofar as these terms
introduce the fourfold commitment and its failure to recognise this Critical
claim  concerning  the  faculties  involved  in  cognition,  the  Critical
philosophy  involves  a  rejection  of  the  German  Rationalist  account  of
analysis at its very core. 
III. The Critical commitment
In the above, we have seen Kant’s Critical objection to the implicit terms of
diferentiation adopted by German Rationalist  analysis.  Now, what does
the Critical philosophy propose in place of these? What is  the proposed
Critical method for the analysis of our indistinctly given representations
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that  is  to  replace  the  German  Rationalist  analysis  that  has  been  found
wanting?
Recall the fundamental point of disagreement between the two accounts.
Kant  diverges  from the  preceding tradition in  his  claim of  the  faculties
needed for philosophical cognition. The understanding and sensibility are
distinct faculties, both of which are necessary for such cognition. It is this
divergence from the German Rationalist account that lies at the heart of the
method to be adopted for analysis.  Let us then examine in a litle more
detail  how  analysis  must  proceed  under  the  Critical  account  of  the
faculties, if it is to succeed. 
As under German Rationalism, analysis  must begin with our various
indistinctly given representations. Of these,  those relevant to philosophy
are to be identifed and made distinct. At this point, the Critical account of
the  faculties  for  cognition  introduces  a  qualifcation.  In  all  cases  of
cognition, thus including philosophical cognition, we stand in relation to an
object only by means of both the understanding and sensibility playing a
role.  What this  Critical  insistence on two faculties  means is  that,  at  this
point prior to commencing our analysis, of the various representations that
are ultimately to feature in our philosophical propositions and of which we
are  yet  only  indistinctly  aware,  some  will  be  representations  of  the
understanding and some will be representations of sensibility.56 They are
not, as German Rationalism assumes, all ultimately representations of the
understanding.  The  distinctness  and  mutual  necessity  of  the  faculties
implies, at this point prior to analysis, that the various indistinctly given
representations relevant to philosophical  cognition will  be both those of
sensibility and of the understanding. Of these various representations then,
some  of  sensibility,  some  of  the  understanding,  we  are  to  bring  to
distinctness the marks of which we are yet only indistinctly aware. 
Now,  as  noted  above,  these  marks  are  already  diferentiated  in  our
having the indistinct representation, albeit only implicitly, and they are so
diferentiated by the faculty by means of which we indistinctly have the
representation. In order to diferentiate these marks then, we must employ
those  terms  of  diferentiation  explicitly  that  are  yet  only  implicitly
employed in the case of the indistinct representation – we must employ the
56 It is worth here noting that, while the Critique is indeed ultimately concerned with our a
priori  concepts (viz.  the schematised categories),  these  concepts are composed of more
elemental  representations  that  are  both  intellectual  and  sensible.  Thus,  when we are
considering our various obscurely given representations and atempting to analyse them
into their most elemental parts, some of these parts will be representations of sensibility.
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terms of diferentiation of the faculty to which the representation belongs.
Thus, if the representation under analysis is one of the understanding, in
order to bring it to distinctness, we must bring its marks to distinctness by
employing  explicitly  the  terms  by  means  of  which  the  understanding
diferentiates  these  marks  in  the  case  of  the  indistinct  representation.
Similarly, if the representation is one of sensibility, we employ explicitly
the terms of sensibility that already serve to diferentiate the marks in our
having the indistinct representation. In this way, we diferentiate explicitly
– and now distinctly – those marks that are already diferentiated implicitly
by the faculty in question in having the indistinct representation. As in the
case of German Rationalist analysis, the procedure is progressively carried
out  with  regard  to  our  indistinctly  given  philosophical  representations
until they are all brought to distinctness. 
Thus,  the  Critical  method introduces  a  step  prior  to  that  of  German
Rationalist analysis. Under both accounts, we are to begin with the various
representations available for analysis, which are yet still indistinctly given
to us. Prior to beginning such analysis, however, we are, under the Critical
account,  to determine to which faculty each of these various indistinctly
given  representations  is  to  be  atributed.  It  is  only  once  this  has  been
determined that our analysis can proceed according to the relevant terms of
diferentiation.  Thus,  the  Critical  method  demands  that  our  analysis  is
preceded by the “consciousness of the relation of given representations to
our various sources of cognition” (A260/B316). Or, in a word, the Critical
method demands the prior step of transcendental refection. 
Having thus determined the faculties of our various representations by
means of transcendental reflection, we are then, as we have seen above, to
diferentiate their marks by employing the terms of diferentiation of the
faculty to which they are correctly atributable. Thus, secondly, the Critical
method involves  a  change in  the  terms of  diferentiation that  are  to  be
adopted in analysis. Now, to look more closely at what this involves, we
must recall what it  is that these terms diferentiate. As is  familiar,  these
terms are employed in order to diferentiate the marks of an indistinctly
given  representation  –  to  tell  whether  a  mark  is  to  be  found  in  the
representation  under  analysis  or  not.  Properly  speaking,  however,  we
noted  that  these  terms  diferentiate  not  the  marks  themselves,  but  the
relation between the mark and the representation (as a combination of marks).
Thus,  the  Critical  method involves  a  change in  the  relations  –  between
mark and representation – that are recognised and recognisable in analysis.
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If we are dealing with a representation of the understanding, the terms of
diferentiation are those of the understanding. Under these terms, certain
relations  will  be  recognised.  If  we are  dealing  with  a  representation  of
sensibility, the terms of diferentiation to be adopted – and the relations to
be recognised – are those of sensibility.
Now, in the above, we identifed the relevant criteria for representations
of the understanding to be as follows. If a representation, a concept, cannot
be thought without a mark, the mark is to be taken as found in the concept.
If the representation could not be thought with the mark, the mark is to be
taken as not found in the concept. These criteria were given an alternative
formulation  in  terms  of  representability  by  the  faculty  of  the
understanding. If the combination of marks that constitutes the indistinctly
given concept could not  be  represented by means  of  the understanding
without  the  mark,  the  mark  is  found in  the  concept.  If  it  could  not  be
represented by means of the understanding with the mark, the mark is not
found in it. Transposing these criteria to the case of sensibility, the criteria
must then be as follows. If a representation, now an intuition, cannot be
represented by means of sensibility without a mark, then the mark is to be
taken as found in the intuition. That is, we ask, ‘Can the representation in
question be intuited without the mark?’ Similarly, if an intuition cannot be
represented by means of sensibility with the mark, then it is not included in
it. ‘Can the representation in question not be intuited with the mark?’ In the
case of representations of sensibility then, our criteria concern what is or is
not representable by means of sensibility or, alternatively, what it is or is not
possible to intuit.
To set this more concretely in our minds, let us return to our schematic
example.  Recall that we considered the indistinctly given concept C with
the  aim  of  making  distinct  the  marks  found  in  it.  Under  the  Critical
method, we must carry out a prior step. Prior to bringing to distinctness the
marks  found  in  a  given  concept,  we  are  to  carry  out  transcendental
reflection  with  regard  to  the  concept.  Beter  put,  prior  to  bringing  to
distinctness the marks found in an indistinctly given representation, we are
to determine whether it is a representation of the understanding (a concept)
or a representation of sensibility (an intuition). Let us suppose then that we
carry out this prior step with regard to representation C and that, for the
sake of our example, we establish the representation C not to be a concept,
but to be an intuition. Having established this, we then set to work bringing
it to distinctness by establishing its marks. 
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Suppose  again  that  we  identify  M  as  a  potential  mark  of  the
representation and are to fnd out whether it is indeed so. Crucially, at this
point,  the  Critical  method requires  that  we adopt  the  relevant  terms of
diferentiation. Given that the representation is an intuition, we are not to
adopt the terms of diferentiation identifed in Section I. This would be to
treat C as a representation of the understanding, which it is not. We are
instead to adopt terms of diferentiation that treat it as a representation of
sensibility. Thus, in the case of a representation of intuition, we are not to
ask  whether  the  representation  can  be  thought  without  the  mark  in
question,  but  to  ask  whether  or  not  the  representation  can  be  intuited
without the mark in question. That is, we are to determine whether mark M
is  found  in  the  representation  C  by  determining  whether  C  cannot  be
intuited without M. If M is such that C cannot be intuited without M, then
M is to be taken as a mark of the representation C. If M is such that C can
be intuited without M, then M is not to be taken as a mark of C. This is to
employ the terms of diferentiation of sensibility.
In our previous version of the example, we supposed that C could not be
thought without M, and thus – under the (now erroneous) assumption that
C was a concept – M was found to be part of the concept C. Let us suppose,
however, that – this  time employing sensibility’s terms of diferentiation –
C can in fact be intuited without the mark M. We are then to put M aside as
a  mark  not  found  in  the  representation  C  and  to  search  for  further
proposed marks found in the representation. Suppose that we identify a
diferent mark, mark N, which is needed for the intuition of C. That is, it is
not possible to intuit C without N. Thus, N is to be put down as one of the
marks found in C. As under German Rationalism, this procedure is then
reiterated for further marks and further indistinctly given representations.
In each case, we identify the faculty to which the representation is to be
atributed  (transcendental  reflection)  and  then  set  about  identifying  its
potential  marks  and establishing – by means of  employing the relevant
terms  of  diferentiation  –  whether  or  not  the  marks  are  found  in  the
representation.  In  this  way,  we  gradually  bring  our  indistinctly  given
representations to distinctness, this time distinguished as representations of
either the understanding or sensibility. 
We have now seen by means of a schematic example how the Critical
method of  analysis  difers  to that  of  German Rationalism.  A number of
clarifcations  and  elaborations  are  worth  noting  before  we  turn  to  the
outcome  of  such  analysis.  First,  it  can  be  seen  in  the  above  that  the
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employment  of  diferent  terms  of  diferentiation  allows  us  to  recognise
further  relations  that  might  hold  between  a  proposed  mark  and  an
indistinctly given representation. The question we are to ask, in the case of
a representation of the understanding, is  whether or not the indistinctly
given concept can be thought without the mark. The question, in the case of
a  representation  of  sensibility,  is  whether  or  not  the  indistinctly  given
intuition can be intuited without the mark. This is to ask after the relation
between the  mark  and the  representation –  whether  or  not  they bear  a
certain connection.  But it  is  to  ask after  a relation or  connection that  is
diferentiable by means of the faculty in question. Supposing that C is a
representation of the understanding, can C be thought without M? Or, put
in alternative terms introduced in Part II, do M and C bear the relation such
that  the  combination (C)  is  unrepresentable  by  means  of  the  understanding
without the mark (M)? Or, supposing that C is a representation of sensibility,
do M and C bear the relation such that the combination (C) is unrepresentable
by means of sensibility without the mark (M)? The later introduces a further
set of possible relations between an indistinctly given representation and its
proposed marks.
Second  and  relatedly,  once  we  have  changed  and  corrected  our
commitment  regarding  the  subjective  nature  of  the  indistinctly  given
representation C,  the relation that  we uncover between C and M might
very well be diferent to those determined in the case in which C was taken
to be a concept. And, given that only an analysis that correctly takes into
account the faculty of the representation and employs the relevant terms of
diferentiation can determine the relation between C and M correctly (i.e.
analysis preceded by transcendental reflection), only that relation between
C and M that involves a correct assumption about the subjective nature of
the  representation  in  question  is  to  be  taken  to  be  the  actual  relation
between C and M. Thus, the Critical method introduces not only further
possible relations  between  a  proposed  mark  and  indistinctly  given
representation, but the relations determined as the results of our analysis
will be diferent. Under the Critical method, we will arrive at diferent and,
according  to  Kant,  corrected  expositions  of  our  indistinctly  given
representations.
Thirdly,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  Critical  correction  does  not
involve  doing  away  with  the  terms  of  diferentiation  employed by  German
Rationalism  as  such.  Although  Kant’s  rejection  of  German  Rationalist
analysis here is a rejection of the terms of diferentiation, it is rejection of
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these terms as sufficient for carrying out analysis. It is not a rejection of the
terms as such. Given the Critical directive to recognise both representations
of  sensibility  and  the  understanding,  where  German  Rationalism
recognised  only  the  later,  the  correction  is  to  employ  additional  terms
alongside  those employed by such analysis – viz.  the terms of sensibility
alongside those of the understanding.
Finally, we might note that the Critical method does not consist in or
imply  the  identifcation  of  further or  previously  unrecognised  given
representations,  though it  is  consistent  with this.  Kant’s  claim is  not  that
German  Rationalism  fails  to  recognise  certain  representations  in  its
analysis, but that it treats the representations it does analyse incorrectly. So,
although  treating  our  indistinctly  given  representations  correctly  might
lead us to recognise further representations as needed for establishing the
propositions  of  philosophy,  or  indeed  to  do  away  with  certain
representations recognised under German Rationalism,57 the correction is
prior  to  and  independent  of  this.  The  correction  consists  in  diferent
resulting  analyses  for  the  same  representations  treated  by  German
Rationalism. 
Having  noted  these  clarifcations,  let  us  turn  then  to  the  outcome  and
signifcance of this Critical correction to analysis. As touched on above, in
contrast  to  German  Rationalist  analysis,  what  this  prior  step  of  the
determination of the faculty of an indistinctly given representation, and its
consequent  employment  of  the  relevant  terms  of  diferentiation,  brings
about is the correct determination of the marks of the representation given
the  representation  that  it  is.  If  we  recall,  because  German  Rationalism
employed the terms of diferentiation of the understanding with regard to
all philosophical representations, it thereby treated all such representations
as  if  they were  representations  of  the understanding.  A mark was  only
recognised as a mark of an indistinctly representation if the representation
could not be thought without it and recognised as a mark not found in the
concept if the representation could not be thought with it. In so doing, such
analysis  misidentifed  the  marks  of  any  representations  that  were  not
representations  of  the  understanding  and  failed  to  treat  these
representations as the representations they are. In contrast, in its demand
57 Indeed,  in  the  Dialectic,  Kant  does  precisely  this  for  a  great  number  of  the  central
representations of German rationalist analysis.
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for the prior step of the recognition of the faculty of a representation and
the  adoption  of  the  terms  of  diferentiation  of  that  faculty,  the  Critical
method  now  succeeds  in  determining  the  marks  of  a  representation
according to the representation that  it  is.  Thus,  in the frst  instance,  the
Critical philosophy corrects the determination of the marks of our various
indistinctly given philosophical representations as representations. 
In  order  to  see  how this  correction  ultimately  allows  for  the  correct
determination  of  the  marks  of  the  objects of  our  philosophical
representations,  it  is  crucial  that  we  return  to  a  feature  of  the  Critical
method  that  we  noted  previously.  In  Part  III  we  saw  that  the  Critical
account  no  longer  accepts  the  German  Rationalist  assumption  that  the
combinations of marks found in our philosophical representations rest on
combinations  found  in  the  objects  of  those  representations.  Under  the
Critical  account,  the  combinations  of  marks  of  the  representations  of
philosophy are due to the nature of the faculties of the subject. (This was the
only way to explain the necessary relation – and our apprehension of the
necessary relation – that these representations bear to the objects of our
cognition.) Now, a crucial consequence of this change for the procedure of
arriving  at  philosophical  cognition  was  that,  even  once  an  indistinctly
given concept has been made distinct and been shown to be relevant to the
propositions  of  philosophy,  the  relation  to  an  object  by  means  of  such  a
representation  is  still  to  be  established.  We  still  need  to  show  that  these
representations have objects. Under German Rationalism, it is assumed that
the  representations  of  philosophy  have  objects.  Under  the  Critical
philosophy,  establishing this  is  a  distinct  step – a step that  comes after
analysis.58
Thus, under the Critical account, it is not straightforward that correcting
the terms of diferentiation in our analysis, such that they correctly line up
with the faculty of a representation, sufces for the diferentiation of the
objects  of  those  representations.  Even  once  we  have  brought  our
representations to distinctness correctly, there remains the further step of
showing that such representations do indeed have objects. 
Two points follow from the above. First, under the Critical account, it is
clear that what we analyse and bring to distinctness are our representations
as representations.  Given the Critical  claim that  the combinations of  the
marks  of  these representations rest  in  the nature  of  the  subject  and the
58 An important qualifcation here is, as mentioned, to be found in the case of a priori given
representations of sensibility (a priori intuitions). We will treat this in detail in Part V.
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required further step of establishing their relation to an object, all that is in
question in analysis are these indistinctly given representations and their
marks. Now, German Rationalist analysis equally involves determining the
relations among our representations. In such analysis, we do determine the
relations among indistinctly given concepts and their marks – indeed, the
commitment regarding their subjective nature is found in the very terms of
diferentiation.  But  this  is  only  incidental.  What  is  carried  out  in  such
analysis,  according  to  German  Rationalism,  is  the  determination  of  the
relations among the objects of those concepts and their marks. Thus, while
under both accounts,  determining the  relation between a  representation
and its marks is distinct from determining the relation between the object
of the representation and its marks, the accounts diverge insofar as German
Rationalism takes the procedure of analysis to be the determination of both
simultaneously  while  Critical  analysis  explicitly  is  the  determination  of
only the former. 
Secondly, although the correct diferentiation of our representations as
representations in analysis does not, under the Critical account, itself suffice
for  the  diferentiation  of  the  objects  of  those  representations,  it  is
nevertheless clear that the correct diferentiation of our representations as
representations is needed for the possibility of such objective diferentiation:
Given  that  the  indistinctly  given  representations  of  philosophy  are
representations that have their source in the nature of the subject, and that
these must then be subsequently shown to stand us in relation to an object,
if they are diferentiated incorrectly as representations, then they will not
be the representations that do in fact stand us in relation to the objects of
philosophy.  Such  an  erroneous  diferentiation  will  thus  rule  out  the
possibility of philosophical cognition. If, however, the representations have
frst  been  brought  to  distinctness  correctly  as  representations  and  then
shown to stand us in relation to objects by means of the transcendental
proofs,  these  representations  will  stand  us  in  relation  to  the  objects  of
philosophy. Thus, transcendental reflection can now be seen as a necessary
prior step for the possibility of philosophical cognition. It is necessary for
the  correct  diferentiation  of  the  marks  of  our  representations  as
representations,  which  diferentiation  itself  is  necessary  for  the  correct
diferentiation of the marks of the objects of those representations – and
ultimately necessary for the possibility of philosophical cognition. 
Thus,  the outcome of  the Critical  method is  manifold:  Under Critical
analysis, preceded as it must be by transcendental reflection, the marks of
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our  representations  as  representations  are  determined correctly.  That  is,
our indistinctly given representations are brought to distinctness correctly
considered  as  representations.  Secondly,  assuming  the  later  step  of
transcendental proof is carried out for the representations in question, our
bringing to distinctness of the marks of the representation correctly is at
once  a  bringing  to  distinctness  of  the  marks  of  the  object  of  the
representation.  Finally,  given  this,  philosophical  cognition  by  means  of
these representations in the synthetic  a priori  judgements of  philosophy
will  now  be  possible  on  the  basis  of  such  correct  analysis.  We  have,
according to the Critical method, corrected the complex German Rationalist
assumption and secured the possibility of philosophical cognition.
And, indeed, our clue to these conclusions has been all along the line of
reasoning of the appendix, to which we will return in Part VI:
The action through which I make the comparison of representations in
general  with  the  cognitive  power  in  which  they  are  situated,  and
through which I  distinguish whether they are to  be compared to one
another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition, I
call  transcendental  reflection.  […]  The  correct  determination  of  [the
relations of representations among themselves] depends on the cognitive
power  in  which  they  subjectively  belong  to  each  other,  whether  in
sensibility or in understanding. For the diference in the later makes a
great diference in the way in which one ought to think of the former.
[…]  [I]t  is  transcendental  reflection,  i.e.,  the  relation  of  given
representations  to  one  or  the  other  kind of  cognition,  that  can  alone
determine their relation among themselves, and whether the things [that
is,  the  objects  of  the  representations]  [bear  these  relations]  cannot
immediately be made out from the concepts themselves through mere
comparison (comparatio), but rather only through the distinction of the
kind  of  cognition  to  which  they  belong,  by  means  of  transcendental
reflection (refexio). […]
(A261-2/B317-8, emphasis omited)
__________________________________
In  this  is  part,  we  began  by  identifying  an  implicit  feature  in  German
Rationalist  analysis.  This  feature  was  the  terms of  diferentiation that  it
employed  in  order  to  determine  the  marks  of  an  indistinctly  given
representation. We saw that these terms were those of the understanding
and thus that German Rationalism involved a complex implicit assumption
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about the nature of the faculties involved in our philosophical cognition
and,  thereby,  about  the  objects  of  that  cognition.  We saw also  that  the
Critical  philosophy is  not  silent  on  this  implicit  feature.  Examining  the
procedure of analysis under the corrected Critical assumption about the
nature of the faculties in cognition, the Critical account yields a demand for
transcendental  reflection  and  the  adoption  of  further  terms  of
diferentiation in our analysis, which terms of diferentiation allow us to
bring  our  indistinctly  given  representations  to  distinctness  correctly  –
ultimately allowing for the possibility of philosophical cognition by means
of  those  representations.  In  this,  the  line  of  reasoning  of  the  appendix
served as the crucial clue to the Critical response, and we saw that the line
of reasoning there is  in fact an explicit  and comprehensive statement of
Kant’s response to this implicit feature.
Before  we  return  to  the  line  of  reasoning  of  the  appendix  and  the
questions it raised at the very start of our exploration, we will turn to an
examination of analysis, as under the new Critical method that we have
now uncovered in Parts III and IV. This carrying out of analysis is to be
found, as we might expect,  at the start of the  Critique,  and it  is  to these
sections that we will turn in Part V – to the Transcendental Aesthetic.
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Part V
The culmination of the Critical method for 
arriving at the concepts of philosophy
In  the  preceding  parts,  we  have  examined  the  method  of  German
Rationalism for arriving at concepts in philosophy, along with the various
ways in which the Critical philosophy responds to this method. In this ffth
part,  I  set  aside  German  Rationalist  analysis  and  turn  to  the  Critical
philosophy and corrected analysis. I hope to show that the early parts of
the  Critique,  viz.  the  fndings  of  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic,  are  the
culmination of the Critical method for arriving at concepts, as it has been
uncovered  in  preceding  discussions.  This  part  proceeds  as  follows.  In
Section I, I provide a brief summary of the early parts of the Aesthetic as
they are familiar to us. In Section II, I examine these early passages in light
of our fndings in Parts III and IV, viz. as the culmination of the corrected,
Critical method for arriving at concepts. Section III then points to the ways
in which this  examination is  illuminating of  the Aesthetic  in relation to
extant discussions of the section. The following section,  IV,  is  a lengthy
closer examination of the proofs of Metaphysical Exposition. As I hope to
show, the workings of these proofs can now be understood in a new light,
having in hand an understanding of the Transcendental Aesthetic as the
culmination of the correct method for arriving at concepts. Section V then
turns to a fnal broader discussion of the Critique as involving a corrected
frst stage of analysis, to examine it as both continuous and discontinuous
with the preceding tradition, and to understand more clearly the place and
signifcance of the Transcendental Aesthetic within the Critique.
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I. Overview of the Metaphysical Exposition
Let us then turn briefly to the well-known early parts of the Transcendental
Aesthetic.59 As is familiar, in the Aesthetic’s frst main section, ‘On Space’,
Kant begins with a brief introduction and then proceeds to a number of
well-known  proofs  from  A22/B37  to  A25/B41.  Each  proof,  with  the
exception  of  the  last,  begins  with  a  statement  of  its  conclusion.  These
conclusions  seemingly  concern,  not  space  itself,  but  the  nature  of  the
representation of space: (1) Space is not an empirical concept. (A23/B38) (2)
Space is a necessary representation, a priori. (A24/B38) (3) Space is not a
discursive concept, but a pure intuition. (A24/B39) (4) Space is an a priori
intuition, not a concept. (A25/B40) 
The respective proofs for these conclusions are, in all cases, compact and
progress seemingly quickly from their premises to these conclusions. The
frst  proof  proceeds  by  an  appeal  to  the  possibility  of  “representing
[sensations as related to things] outside and next  to one another […] in
diferent places” (A23/B38). This possibility in turn rests on the possibility
of “certain sensations [being] related to something outside me” (A23/B38).
On  the  basis  of  these  premises,  the  proof  then  concludes  with  an
asymmetric dependence claim: “Outer experience,” the proof tells us, “is
[…] frst only possible through [the representation of space]” (A23/B38) and
“the  representation  of  space  cannot  be  obtained  from  [this  outer
experience]” (A23/B38), or, in other words, “is not an empirical concept”
(A23/B38).
In a, yet shorter, second proof, two contrasting claims concerning certain
possibilities of representation are put forward: It is impossible to represent,
we are told, “that there is no space” (A24/B38). Though it is, by contrast,
“possible  to  think  that  there  are  no  objects  to  encountered  in  [space].”
(A24/B38-9)  On  the  basis  of  this  contrast,  the  proof  concludes  that  the
representation  of  space  is  “not  a  determination  dependent  on  [outer
appearances]”  (A24/B39),  but  instead  “is  an  a  priori  representation  that
necessarily grounds outer appearances” (A24/B39).
59 In what follows, I will give an exposition of the proofs in terms that remain very close to
Kant’s own. Though my exposition is not void of interpretation, it is, I hope, sufciently
neutral to avoid many of the primary points of dispute regarding the proofs. In Section
III,  I  turn  more  explicitly  to  extant  interpretations  of  the  proofs,  for  their  points  of
signifcant contrast with the account presented here.
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The  third  proof  again  appeals  to  a  claimed  impossibility  of
representation,  which  is  seemingly  supported by a  disambiguation  of  a
contrasting possibility. It is impossible, claims the third proof, to represent
“many spaces” (A25/B39), or, alternatively, it is only possible to represent
“a single space” (A25/B39). The proof then turns to a sense in which it is
possible to represent ‘many spaces’: This is possible when we understand
‘space’  here  to  mean  the  “parts  of  one  and  the  same  unique  space.”
(A25/B39) Thus,  the proof distinguishes space as a whole from its parts,
claiming the possibility of representing more than one of the later, but the
impossibility of representing more than one of the former. The proof then
adds a priority claim concerning the relation between the two: The parts of
space cannot precede the whole of space (the composition of space from its
parts is impossible), but the whole of space must precede the parts of space
(the parts of space “rest[…] merely on limitations” (A25/B39)).  Thus, the
proof concludes, the representation of space “is not a […] general concept
of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition.” (A24/B39)
The  fourth  and fnal  proof  under  the  ‘Metaphysical  Exposition’  puts
forward a claim concerning what is involved in the representation of space.
“Space,”  we  are  told,  “is  represented  as  an  infnite  given  magnitude”
(A25/B39),  or  alternatively,  “thought  as  if  it  contained an infnite  set  of
representations within itself.” (A25/B40) A concept cannot be thought in
this way, and the representation of space is, therefore, “an a priori intuition,
not a concept.” (A25/B40)
Such  are  the  proofs  presented  to  us  in  this  early  section  of  the
Transcendental  Aesthetic.  Now, as  noted,  these proofs  are compact  and
proceed  seemingly  quickly  from  their  premises  to  their  respective
conclusions. This apparent simplicity, however, conceals proofs that are, on
the one hand, quite opaque in their meaning and plausibility and, on the
other, incredibly signifcant within the Critical philosophy insofar as they
ground the  further  crucial  claim  of  the  Aesthetic,  viz.  the  claim  of  the
transcendental ideality of space and the objects in it. And indeed, much has
been writen both on the workings of the proofs themselves and on how
this further claim is established on their basis. In what follows, our interest
will be to examine these proofs in light of our fndings in Parts I to IV. As
will  come to light,  this  deeper understanding of the Critical  method for
bringing  our  given  representations  to  distinctness  illuminates  certain
features of these early parts of the Transcendental Aesthetic in new ways,
and we can gain a clearer understanding of certain details of the workings
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of the proofs and of the place of the Transcendental Aesthetic within the
Critique on their basis.60 
II. The Metaphysical Exposition as Critical bringing to distinctness
Such are the early parts of the Transcendental Aesthetic as they are familiar
to  us.  When we  examine  the  section  more  closely,  however,  we  fnd a
number of details that show the Transcendental Aesthetic to be part of the
culmination  of  the  Critical  method  for  bringing  the  representations  of
philosophy  to  distinctness.  In  what  follows,  I  will  focus  on  the
Metaphysical Exposition of the representation of space,  for I  take it  that
what is put forward here can be applied mutatis mutandis to the case of
time – at least insofar as Kant intended for both to be understood in the
way put forward below. 
Our frst point of interest is a number of additions found in the B-edition
of  the  section.  In  the  B-edition,  the  section  is  now  titled  ‘Metaphysical
Exposition of [the concept of space]’. At the end of the brief introduction,
Kant tells us what is to be expected in such an exposition: “I understand by
exposition (expositio) the  distinct (even if not complete) representation of that
which belongs to a concept;i but the exposition is metaphysical when it contains
that which exhibits the concept as a priori given.” (B38, emphasis my own) 
Now  this  remark  is  signifcant  in  two  ways.  First,  if  we  recall  the
discussion in the Doctrine, what we are to expect in the case of the concepts
of philosophy are not defnitions but expositions. As we saw, as early as the
Inquiry,  Kant  questions  the  possibility  of  providing  defnitions  for  the
concepts of philosophy. Because the concepts of philosophy are indistinctly
given, we cannot aim for their exhaustive analysis or defnition as a starting
point in philosophy. Instead, what Kant recommends in the  Inquiry is the
distinguishing of “a few immediately certain characteristic marks” (2:284)
by means of which we might make the concept (at least partially) distinct.
By the time of the Doctrine, Kant has allowed that our analyses might serve
to distinguish many – and nearly all – the marks of a concept, but denies
that such analysis could ever be shown exhaustive. Such partial analyses as
are possible in philosophy now contrast with defnitions and are termed
60 In  what  follows,  I  will  examine  the  accounts  found in the  literature  in  Part III,  after
having brought to light the proposed implications of our fndings for the proofs in Part II.
In Part III, I will then consider the various accounts in the literature insofar as the account
presented here might be considered an improvement on these accounts.
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‘expositions’. And now in the Aesthetic, as mentioned, Kant tells us that
what we are to expect in the case of the expositions from B37 onwards is
the “distinct (even if not complete) representation of that which belongs to
a concept” (B38). It is thus clear that the ‘expositions’ put forward in the
Aesthetic  are  indeed  ‘expositions’  of  the  concepts  of  philosophy  as
discussed in  the  Doctrine  and  the  results  of  precisely  the  procedure  of
analysis that we have been examining over the course of our discussions. 
Thus,  in  the  frst  instance,  the  passages  are  the  specifcation  of  the
various characteristic marks of the concept in question, the distinguishing
of which constitutes bringing the concept to distinctness as is required for
any philosophical cognition that is to feature the concept. This is clearly
seen in the case of the fourth exposition, for example, in which we are told
that  what  belongs  to  the  concept  of  space  is  the  representation  of  “an
infnite  given magnitude […],  [such that]  all  the parts  of  space,  even to
infnity,  are  simultaneous.”  (B39-40)  ‘Having  an  infnite  number  of
simultaneous parts’ is thus distinguished or separated out from any other
marks or representations that might be associated with the representation
of space as a characteristic mark of the concept, thereby serving to bring the
concept to distinctness. 
The specifcations of marks found in the Aesthetic are not, however, as
straightforward as this. There is a further, second point of signifcance to be
found in the remarks added in the B-edition. These passages are indeed
expositions of the concept of space, but they are expositions of a special
sort. Kant does not merely mean to put forward a specifcation of as many
as  possible  of  the  characteristic  marks  of  the  concept,  for  the  sake  of
bringing  it  to  distinctness.  As  Kant  notes  at  B38,  the  passages  are  an
exposition of those characteristic marks of the concept that  show it  to be
given  a  priori –  what  Kant  terms  ‘metaphysical’  expositions.  Now  this
formulation should strike us as signifcant. Recall that under the Critical
method, Kant has introduced a fourfold division of the possible grounds of
a  concept  –  arbitrarily  combined,  arbitrarily  combined but  such that  an
object for the concept can be given, empirically given, and given a priori.
We saw that Kant explicitly distinguished the concepts of philosophy as the
later – concepts that are given a priori.  In contrast to empirically given
concepts,  the  ground  of  which  is  empirical  objects,  and  in  contrast  to
arbitrarily thought concepts, the ground of which is the arbitrary act of the
understanding, concepts given a priori are concepts whose ground is the
nature  of  the  understanding.  According  to  the  Doctrine,  these  were  the
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concepts with which philosophy was to deal, and in order to arrive at the
concepts of philosophy it was ultimately necessary to establish, of all of our
ostensibly philosophical concepts, which were a priori given. As we saw,
this  new  characterisation  of  the  concepts  of  philosophy  and  the
introduction of  this new task were evidence of  Kant’s  recognition of  an
intelligibility  requirement  on  the  necessary  applicability  of  concepts  to
objects  not  constructible  by  us.  Not  much  was  ofered  by  Kant  in  the
Doctrine, however, as to how we were to go about establishing a concept as
given a priori, as opposed to simply an arbitrarily thought concept made
familiar by habitual use. Kant did not there spell out the Critical method to
its  full  extent.  Yet  here  in  the  Aesthetic,  we  fnd  that  Kant  not  only
mentions the concepts as given a priori, but also tells us that he is going to
show these concepts to be given a priori – and that he is going to do so by
means of specially chosen expositions of the concept.61 
As we have it then, the Metaphysical Exposition is, frst, an exposition of
the concept of space such that, secondly, it shows space to be given a priori.
This much is clear from Kant’s remarks in the introduction to the section.
Now, if we bring to mind the characterisation of a priori givenness found
in the Doctrine, we will recall that concepts given a priori are concepts such
that the combination of marks that constitutes the concept is due to or has
its ground in  the nature of the understanding (A729/B757). The concepts are
given insofar as their combination of marks is not arbitrary, but originates
in something other than the arbitrary act of synthesis by the understanding,
and a  priori insofar  as  this  combination  originates  not  in  the  objects  of
cognition (as is the case with empirical concepts), but in the nature of the
subject’s faculty of understanding. Given this, what we might expect in the
Metaphysical  Exposition is  to proceed from some characteristic  mark or
marks of the concept to a conclusion that has a bearing on the concept as a
priori  given.  That  is,  we  might  expect  the  proofs  to  proceed  from
61 Thus, a qualifcation to our initial discussion in Part IV arises here. In Part IV, I claimed
that Kant’s characterisation of the concepts of philosophy as given a priori provided us
with a clue as to how the concepts might be identifed as such, and thus as concepts
relevant  to  philosophy.  I  claimed  that  instead  of  beginning  by  sorting  through  our
various indistinct concepts, the critical account can now proceed from an examination of
the nature of the understanding to an identifcation of the relevant concepts. Here we can
see,  however,  that  Kant  carries  out  such  an exhaustive  derivation  of  concepts  in  the
Metaphysical  Deduction of the Transcendental Logic only. We can now see, by contrast,
that  in  the  Metaphysical  Expositions of  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic  Kant  means  to
establish a concept as given a priori by means of an exposition of the marks of the concept. In
what follows, we will examine Kant’s carrying out of this later task in more detail.
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characteristic marks of the concept to claims that concern the concept as
non-arbitrary and as originating in the understanding (or non-empirical). 
Turning to the proofs,  this is  indeed what we seem to fnd: The frst
proof proceeds to the conclusion that space is  not an empirical  concept.
This is  precisely to rule out one of  the four types of  concepts  in Kant’s
fourfold division in the Doctrine, viz. the concept of space as given, but
empirically so. The second proof proceeds to the conclusion that space is a
necessary,  or  a  priori,  concept.  Thus,  the  second  proof  rules  out  the
remaining two types of concepts at once. To establish the concept of space
as a priori is to rule out the concept as arbitrarily combined (and thus to
rule  it  out  as  arbitrarily  combined  but  such  that  its  object  can  be
constructed  a  priori.)  Thus,  when  we  consider  expositions  against  the
background of the fourfold distinction of concepts of the Doctrine, we fnd
that the conclusions of the frst two proofs of the Metaphysical Exposition
proceed  to  conclusions  that  progressively  rule  out  the  other  possible
grounds of space as put forward in this fourfold distinction and thus are
indeed an exposition containing “that which exhibits the concept as given a
priori.” (B38, emphasis my own) 
Thus,  the  Metaphysical  Exposition  section  of  the  Aesthetic  has  a
complex structure. At the broadest level it is concerned with showing the
obscurely given concept of space to be a concept given a priori. Each of the
subsections  to  the  Exposition then  involves  establishing,  by  means  of  a
proof, an intermediate conclusion that goes part way towards establishing
this primary conclusion. This is why at the outermost level, the exposition
is  structured  as  a  set  of  proofs.  Once  we  understand  how  the  proofs
proceed,  however,  we  fnd  that  there  is  a  further  inner  level  to  the
Exposition.  Each  of  the  proofs  proceeds  from some  characteristic  mark  or
marks of the concept to the relevant intermediate conclusion. Thus, the section is
indeed  an  exposition of  the  concept  of  space,  in  the  sense  of  being  a
statement of the marks of the concept that constitutes bringing it (partially)
to distinctness, though its nature as such is hidden within the broader aim
of  showing  the  concept  to  be  given  a  priori.  In  puting  forward  the
Metaphysical  Exposition of  the concept,  Kant  is  undertaking two of  the
three  tasks  necessary  for  arriving  at  philosophical  concepts  under  the
Critical  account at  one and the same time.  He is  bringing the indistinct
concept to distinctness and establishing it to be a concept given a priori.
Continuing  through  these  passages,  however,  we  fnd  a  further
unexpected, albeit very familiar, feature. The conclusions of the proofs do
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not  solely  concern  the  a  priori  givenness  of  the  concept  of  space.  The
concern of the third and fourth proofs is to show the ‘concept’ of space not
to be concept at all,  but to be an intuition. When we look to the proofs
themselves,  Kant’s  aim  is  seemingly  not  only  to  show  the  concept  in
question to be one given a priori, but also to show the given ‘concept’ not to
be  a  representation of  the  understanding at  all,  but  a  representation  of
sensibility. Why then should we fnd this further conclusion in the proofs?
And how could it contribute to the stated primary conclusion, the truth of
which has already seemingly been established by the second proof?
In order to see that there is indeed more at work in these proofs, and
why there must be more at work in these proofs given Kant’s stated aim, we
need to recall the changes to the Critical method of Part IV, changes that
rest on the case in the appendix. In Part IV, we saw that German Rationalist
analysis  involved  an  implicit  complex  commitment,  a  commitment
introduced by the terms of diferentiation adopted in this analysis: German
Rationalist  analysis  diferentiated  its  obscurely  given  representations  by
means  of  the  understanding’s  terms  of  diferentiation,  thus  treating  all
obscurely given representations as  concepts,  the understanding alone as
sufcient to yield a priori  cognition,  and the objects  of our cognition as
objects whose marks were diferentiable solely according to the terms. The
appendix counselled us otherwise. On the basis of Kant’s Critical claim of
the distinctness of understanding and sensibility, the correct diferentiation
of our representations – and the subsequent possibility of a priori cognition
by  means  of  these  representations  –  required  the  recognition  that  the
obscurely given representations available for analysis could be of either of
these two faculties. The analysis of our given representations requires not
merely  that  these  be  diferentiated  from  one  another.  It  requires  an
awareness of the faculty of the representation in diferentiating our given
representations  from  one  another.  Thus,  the  appendix  introduced,  in
contrast to other extant analyses of our philosophical concepts, the crucial
requirement that analysis involve diferentiating our given representations
according  to  whether  they  are  representations  of  the  understanding  or
representations of sensibility. 
Returning to the Aesthetic, we recall that the Metaphysical Exposition is
indeed an exposition of the representation of space. Kant there puts forward
various  characteristic  marks  of  the  representation.  He  brings  the
representation to partial distinctness by distinguishing these. In the case of
the  third  and  fourth  proofs,  however,  Kant  appeals  to  certain  of  these
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marks in order to show, not that the representation is given a priori, but
that the representation of space is an  intuition. Indeed, in the third proof,
Kant argues from the singularity of space to its being “not a […] general
concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition” (A25/B38),
and in the fourth argues from the infnitude of space to the conclusion that
the “original representation of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept.”
(A25/B39,  emphasis  omited)  Now,  considering  the  appendix,  with  its
ensuing  directive  to  diferentiate  our  representations  from  one  another
correctly as representations of the relevant faculty, what we fnd Kant to be
doing  in  these  third  and  fourth  proofs  is  establishing  that  the
representation of space is to be diferentiated as one of sensibility. In the third
and fourth proofs, Kant is distinguishing for us one of the representations
that previously was diferentiated from the rest of our representations as a
concept  or  one  of  the  understanding,  when  it  should  have  been
diferentiated as one of sensibility. 
It is worth noting that in these two proofs, Kant not only distinguishes for
us the representation of space as a representation that, in our analysis, is to
be  diferentiated  as  one  of  sensibility,  but  also  shows it  to  be  such.  As
mentioned,  Kant  appeals  to  certain  characteristic  marks  of  the
representation of space to show that the representation is one of sensibility.
The proofs proceed from certain characteristic marks of the representation
of space to the conclusion that the representation of space is an intuition. In
these third and fourth proofs then, Kant does not only mean to put forward
a corrected analysis of our representations, but also shows why, in contrast
to other treatments of the concept of space, this  is its correct analysis. In
these passages, Kant identifes that the representation of space as one of
those to be treated as one of sensibility and proves that it is.
Thus,  the  Metaphysical  Exposition  is  the  culmination  of  the  Critical
account of arriving at concepts on a number of fronts. As we saw in Parts
III  and IV,  analysis  under the Critical  philosophy involves a number of
further complications or requirements, viz. those of the Doctrine and the
appendix.  The former introduces  the  characterisation of  the  concepts  as
being all and only those given a priori. The later introduces the need to
distinguish  the  faculty  of  the  indistinctly  given  representations  in  our
analysis. Here in these proofs of the Metaphysical Exposition, we thus fnd
Kant carrying out three tasks: First, he provides an exposition of various
marks  of  the  representation of  space  thereby bringing it  to  distinctness.
Secondly,  he  shows,  by  appeal  to  these  very  marks,  that  space  is a
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representation relevant to philosophy, that is, it is a representation given a
priori.  Finally,  again  by  appeal  to  these  various  marks,  that  the
representation of space properly belongs in the Transcendental Aesthetic
and not  in  the  Logic,  that  is,  that  the  representation of  space  is  one of
sensibility.
Thus far we have seen that Kant uses the proofs of the Metaphysical
Exposition to carry out three tasks that emerge under the Critical account of
analysis  with  regard  to  the  concept  of  space,  viz.  to  establish  the
representation  of  space  to  be  given  a  priori  and to  establish  it  to  be  a
representation of sensibility rather than of the understanding. If we look
more  closely,  however,  these  proofs,  with  their  seemingly  independent
conclusions, can be found to constitute a systematic complex argument, the
primary conclusion of which is precisely as explicitly stated, viz. that the
representation of space is a representation “given a priori.” (B38) As we
have already seen,  by the  time  of  the  Critique,  the  concepts  relevant  to
philosophy have been narrowed in a crucial way. In order for a concept to
be relevant to philosophy and potentially to feature in our philosophical
cognition, it must be a given or non-arbitrary concept and a concept given a
priori.  Now  this  classifcation,  as  we  know,  concerns  the  ground  of  the
combination of marks that constitute the concept: The source of a concept is
either the arbitrary act of the understanding (‘arbitrarily thought’ concepts)
or it is something other than this (‘given’ concepts). If it is the later, then
the  ground  of  the  combination  of  marks  is  either  empirical  experience
(‘empirically  given’  concepts)  or  the  nature  of  the  understanding  itself
(concepts ‘given a priori’). Thus, establishing a concept to be given a priori
– that is, a concept of philosophy– is at once to rule out the frst two sources
and to establish the ground of the concept to be the last of these three.62
However, this does not yet go far enough. There is a further distinction
to be  made  with  regard to  the  ground of  a  concept.  Given the  Critical
commitment to the understanding and sensibility as mutually dependent
but  distinct representative  faculties  in  cognition,  a  concept,  or  rather
representation,  given a priori could have its  ground in the understanding
62 As is now familiar, the distinction put forward in the Doctrine is a fourfold distinction
that involves, as the fourth classifcation of concepts, those that are arbitrarily thought but
which are constructable a priori. While this further distinction poses interesting questions
regarding  the  relations  between  ground,  marks,  and  object,  it  is  not  relevant  to  our
purposes  here  and  we  can  set  it  aside.  We  are  here  concerned  with  distinguishing
concepts as given a priori and, given that arbitrarily thought concepts whose objects are
constructable a priori are a species of arbitrarily thought concepts,  we need only deal
with the genus.
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alone or in sensibility alone (or indeed in neither of these alone but in both
together). Thus, to establish that a concept is non-arbitrary or given and yet
not empirically given is only to establish that the ground of a representation
lies in the nature of one or another of the subject’s faculties. It is not yet to
establish  the  ground  of  the  representation.  Thus,  we  can  see  how  the
Metaphysical  Exposition  does  indeed  constitute  a  single,  systematic
argument. The frst proof rules out the concept of space as one empirically
given.  The  second  proof  rules  out  the  concept  of  space  as  arbitrarily
thought by showing it to be a priori or having its ground in the faculties of
the subject. The third and fourth proofs then rule out the concept (or now
rather representation) of space as a ‘general concept’ or one whose ground
is the nature of the understanding and show its ground to be the nature of
sensibility.  Thus,  together,  these  four  proofs   form  an  argument  (by
elimination) that shows that the combination of marks of the representation
of space is non-arbitrary but given, and not given empirically but given due
to the nature of the subject’s  faculties,  and not due to the nature of the
subject’s faculty of understanding, but of sensibility. In other words, the
Metaphysical Exposition is a systematic complex argument that shows the
representation of space to be “given a priori” (B38), and specifcally given a
priori ‘through the nature of sensibility’.63 
III. Illumination of the Aesthetic
In the above, we have seen that the Metaphysical Exposition is a systematic
treatment of the analysis of the representation of space in accordance with
the Critical method. In this next section, I will discuss the ways in which
this  proves  illuminating  of  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic  and  its  early
passages, in special relation to extant literature on the section. 
63 As a point of clarifcation then, it is worth noting that Kant’s discussion of the fourfold
distinction  of  concepts  as we examined  in the  Doctrine  is  seemingly  abbreviated.  As
noted, Kant there characterises a concept given a priori as a concept given “through the
nature of the understanding” (A729/B757). However, it simply is not the case that Kant is
commited to all  of  our philosophical  representations  originating in the  nature  of  the
understanding in isolation. While there are some representations whose ground is the
understanding in isolation (viz.  the pure concepts as listed in the table of categories),
many others – and indeed all those that go on to feature in our philosophical cognition –
have their ground either in sensibility in isolation (e.g. space) or in the understanding
and  sensibility  operating  together  (e.g.  the  schematised  categories  featuring  in  the
principles). I thus take it that Kant’s reference to the ‘nature of the understanding’ in the
Doctrine is to be understood as abbreviated. Correctly, a representation’s being given a
priori should be understood as its grounded in  ‘the nature of the subject’s faculties’.
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First, it is worth noting that the nature of the Metaphysical Exposition,
as  an  exposition of  the  representation  of  space,  is  seldom  recognised in
discussions of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Typically, discussions of the
Exposition  tend  immediately  to  focus  on  the  details  of  the  proofs
themselves – on the meaning and plausibility of their premises and on their
support  for their  respective conclusions.64 However,  as  we have seen in
Parts II – IV, the Critical philosophy retains the commitment to a frst stage
in  philosophical  cognition  that  involves  bringing  to  distinctness  the
representations relevant to such cognition and contains a complex account
of how and why this frst stage is to be accomplished. By the time of the
Doctrine,  the  results  of  this  procedure  are  ‘expositions’,  where  such
expositions  put  forward  some  of  the  characteristic  marks  of  the
representation  and  are  established  with  the  Critical  awareness  of  the
distinctness of sensibility and the understanding. This background picture
of the proofs as expositions of the representations of sensibility is generally
overlooked in literature on the proofs.65 
This recognition of the proofs as expositions is signifcant in a number of
ways. First, understanding the proofs to be, in the frst instance, expositions
of the representation of space allows us to beter comprehend the place and
role of the Transcendental Aesthetic in relation to subsequent parts of the
Critique. The Transcendental Aesthetic is of-a-piece with the early parts of
the Transcendental Logic – that is, with the Logic prior to the deduction of
the  pure  concepts.66 Both  of  these  sections  serve  to  distinguish  and
taxonomise the representations that are later to feature in our philosophical
64 Instances of this treatment of the Exposition can be found in Allison (2004) pp. 99-112,
Bird  (2006)  pp.  139-145,  148-150,  Ewing  (1938)  pp.  33-39,  Gardner  (1999)  pp.  49-52,
Hatfeld (1990) pp. 89-91, Kemp Smith (2003) pp. 99-109, Parsons (1992) pp. 67-72, Paton
(1936) pp. 109-122, Pippin (1982) pp. 59-60, 62-4, and Walker (1978) pp. 29-30, 42-44. Some
of these discussions do include a nominal reference to the defnition of a metaphysical
exposition  as  it  is  found at  B38,  but  in  none  of  these  cases  is  the  nature  of  such an
exposition addressed in any further detail.
65 Three important exceptions to this  are McGoldrick (1985), Leirfall (2004), and Messina
(2015).  These  accounts  are  closest  to  the  account  presented  here  and they  all  have a
number of points in common. Our account presented here, however, diverges from each
of these three accounts in important ways. In what follows, I will highlight these points of
contrast as we proceed.
66 Subsequent  to  this  point,  we  fnd  the  two  further  steps  necessary  for  arriving  at
philosophical cognition: The deduction of the pure concepts serves as the distinct step of
‘transcendental  proof’,  in  which  the  representations  taxonomied  in the  frst  stage are
shown to stand us in relation to objects. Thereafter, the Analytic of Principles establishes
the synthetic a priori principles in which these concepts feature, which principles fnally
constitute our philosophical cognition.
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cognition (this cognition being established in establishing the synthetic a
priori principles). They do so, in part, by puting forward the characteristic
marks of these representations in order that the representations with which
the  Critique begins  are  distinct.  Admitedly,  this  is  carried  out  quite
diferently  across  the  Aesthetic  and  the  Logic,67 with  each  of  the  two
sections  involving  diferent  demands  and  aims.  Nonetheless,  the  early
parts  of  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic  and the  Transcendental  Logic  are
uniform in this task, a task that we would expect to be carried out at the
very  start  of  the  Critique and  which  task  is  distinct  from  and  prior  to
securing  philosophical  cognition.  This  construal  of  the  project  of  the
Critique as  involving  a  taxonomy  of  representations  is  certainly  not
unfamiliar,  but  this  further  detail  to  the  taxonomy –  the  proofs  of  the
Aesthetic as beginning with premises that constitute an exposition of the
representations in question – has gone under-appreciated.
Further,  and  more  signifcantly,  this  recognition  of  the  proofs  as
expositions allows for a subtly diferent understanding of  certain of  the
proofs’  key premises.  Commonly,  the  proofs  are  taken to  proceed from
premises that are, in some way, ‘immediately obvious’, uncontroversial, or
commonsensical.68 This understanding of the proofs seemingly stems from
the recognition that the proofs are found at the very start of the  Critique,
and  thus  cannot  be  interpreted  as  resting  on  any  of  its  subsequent
conclusions.69 In recognising the Metaphysical Exposition as an exposition,
however,  it  becomes clear  that,  at  least  in the case  of  their expositional
premises, the proofs are not put forward on the basis of claims that are in
some way or another obvious or uncontroversial. (Indeed, it seems difcult
to reconcile the further and substantial claim of the transcendental ideality
of the objects in space and time with a starting point  in claims that are
merely uncontroversial in some vague way.) Rather, once we recognise the
nature  of  the  proofs  as,  in  the  frst  instance,  expositions,  the  nature  of
67 This has already been noted in Part III, in which we distinguished the possibility of an
examination of  the faculty,  in the case of the understanding,  in order to arrive at the
concepts relevant to philosophical  cognition. In the case of sensibility,  by contrast,  the
identifcation and taxonomising of its representations must proceed by the normal means
of analysis.
68 Although the accounts difer quite signifcantly  in their  details,  instances  of  this  basic
view can be found in Allison (2004) pp. 99-112,  Bird (2006) pp. 139-145, 148-150, Ewing
(1938) pp. 33-39, Gardner (1999) pp. 49-52, Hatfeld (1990) pp. 89-91, Kemp Smith (2003)
pp. 99-109, Parsons (1992) pp. 67-72, Paton (1936) pp. 109-122, Pippin (1982) pp. 59-60, 62-
4, and Walker (1978) pp. 29-30, 42-44.
69 See, for example, Parsons (1992) p. 62.
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certain of their key premises can be viewed in a more determinate way. We
can view certain of their key premises as expositional claims – as claims that
put forward the characteristic marks of the representation in question. This
understanding  of  these  premises  places  the  proofs  within  the  Critical
philosophy as a response to its roots of German Rationalism and, as we will
see, allows us an account of the nature and ground of these premises that is
more illuminating than their usual construal as ‘obvious’ in some way or
another.
Finally,  the  recognition  of  the  premises  as  expositional  allows  us  to
recognise and emphasise the starting point of the Critical philosophy put
forward  in  the  Critique,  which  philosophy  ultimately  culminates  in  the
principles put forward in the later parts of the Logic. In continuity with
German  Rationalist  philosophy,  the  Critical  philosophy begins  with  the
various  and  haphazard  representations  of  the  objects  of  our  ordinary
experience  and philosophy must  proceed by distinguishing,  from these,
those  that  constitute  the  necessary  representations  of  the  objects  of  our
cognition.
A second point of illumination provided by our account here concerns
certain details  of the workings of the proofs,  details  that,  again,  are not
sufciently appreciated in extant discussions. As we have mentioned, each
proof contains an exposition that could serve self-standingly to bring the
representation to a partial distinctness. But these expositions are particular
in their being used to  show the  ground –  in this case,  subjective – of the
representation of space. This move from the characteristic mark or marks
stated in the exposition to the ground of the representation then yields the
proofs that are the usual focal point of the Metaphysical Exposition. We can
thus come to a subtler understanding of the way in which the proofs are
meant  to  be  working.  It  is  Kant’s  view that,  by means  of  the  marks  of  a
representation, we can show its  ground. The exposition of a representation
can, apparently, shed light on the nature of the representation itself. This is
an  interesting  claim  in  its  own  right,  and,  again,  has  seldom  been
recognised in discussions of the proofs. In what follows, we will examine
the  Metaphysical  Exposition  more  closely  and  atempt  to  gain  some
understanding of how Kant ultimately claims to do this.70
70 A standard view of the Metaphysical Exposition might at this point be usefully outlined
as follows. Although the accounts falling under this view difer widely in their details,
they might nonetheless be grouped together insofar as they contrast  with the account
presented here on each of the points discussed. (Again, the cases of this view include
Allison  (2004)  pp.  99-112,   Bird  (2006)  pp.  139-145,  148-150,  Ewing  (1938)  pp.  33-39,
Gardner  (1999)  pp.  49-52,  Hatfeld  (1990)  pp.  89-91,  Kemp  Smith  (2003)  pp.  99-109,
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This second point brings to light a common misconception as to what
the Exposition is meaning to establish. Frequently it is supposed that the
proofs of the Metaphysical Exposition are ultimately concerned with the
subjective nature of the representation of space, that is, with establishing it to
be a priori and to be an intuition. It is thought that Kant’s inquiry here is
directed  towards  establishing  something  subjective.  If  the  account  put
forward  thus  far  in  the  above  is  correct,  however,  then  Kant  is  not
straightforwardly and initially concerned with the subjective nature of the
representation of space. Rather, this concern arises as a result of the inquiry
into a prior question. In the above,  we have seen that  the Metaphysical
Exposition  is,  in  the  frst  instance,  an  exposition  or  analysis  of  the
representation  of  space.  It  constitutes  the  partial  distinguishing  of  the
representation  from  other  philosophical  and  non-philosophical
representations.  Secondly,  and  more  importantly,  the  Metaphysical
Exposition  is  a  complex  argument  for  the  a  priori  givenness  of  the
Parsons (1992) pp. 67-72,  Paton (1936) pp.  109-122,  Pippin (1982) pp. 59-60,  62-4,  and
Walker (1978) pp. 29-30, 42-44.)
Under standard discussions, the overall aim of the Metaphysical Exposition is to establish
the representation of space to be a priori  and to be an intuition.  The former claim is
established by the frst and second proofs, and the later by proofs three and four. The
frst two proofs are standardly taken to proceed from a premise concerning the concept of
space as presupposed in some other representation, awareness, or experience, while the
later  two  proofs  proceed  from  a  premise  concerning  certain  other  features  of  the
representation of space, which features have a bearing on whether it is a concept or an
intuition. 
Standardly,  these  premises  are  interpreted  with  the  aim  that  they  emerge
uncontroversial,  commonsensical,  or  in  some  way  self-evident.  Paton,  for  example,
formulates the premises of the frst proof as follows: “The ideas of space and time are
presupposed by experience. If sensa are to be related to physical objects outside my body,
and even if they are to be known as outside and beside […] one another (as they must be
in human experience) then clearly space [is] already presupposed, whether we are aware
of this or not.” (1936, pp. 110-111, emphasis my own) Debate over the premises typically
concerns (i) that in which the concept of space is claimed to be presupposed and whether
this  is  plausible,  (ii)  the  sense  in  which  the  concept  of  space  is  such  a  necessary
presupposition (whether psychological, phenomenological, psychological, for example),
(iii)  the sense in which the representation of space bears the further claimed features.
Discussions tend to focus immediately on the content of the claims in question and with
their most plausible rendering.  
The inference from these premises to their respective conclusions is then taken to proceed
relatively straightforwardly. Typically, the inference to the claim of a priority in the frst
two proofs is underlain by a background distinction between empirical concepts and a
priori concepts (the former being derivable from empirical experience, the later being
part of the constitution of the mind),  while the inference to the claim of the intuitive
nature of the representation of space is underlain by the distinction between concepts and
intuitions.
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representation  of  space  by  appeal  to  the  marks  put  forward  in  the
exposition.  Now,  in  aiming  to  establish  the  a  priori  givenness  of  the
representation of space, Kant is not straightforwardly aiming to establish
the  subjective  nature  of  the representation as  such.  As we have seen,  a
representation’s  being  a  priori  given  is  a  mater  of  the  representation
having  a  certain  ground  of  the  four  possible  grounds  outlined  in  the
Doctrine of Method, and the question of the ground of a representation is
not essentially a question of the subjective nature of the representation. In
the  case  of  empirically  given  concepts,  for  example,  the  ground  of  the
concept are the combinations found in the objects of empirical experience,
and this has litle to do with the subject.  Rather,  the question about the
ground of a representation is a question about the ground of the combination
of marks that constitutes the representation. It might be, as in the case of our
philosophical representations, that this ground is the subject, but this does
not imply that claims about the ground of a representation are equivalent
to claims about the subjective nature of the representation. Although they
might  receive  the  same  answer,  the  question  ‘what  is  the  ground  of
representation  x?’ and ‘what is the subjective nature of representation  x?’
are  distinct  questions,  and  in  the  Metaphysical  Exposition  Kant  is
concerned with the former, not the later.
Fourthly,  the  examination  above  brings  to  light  an  unrecognised
structure  across the  proofs  –  the  structure  and  nature  of  the  complex
argument formed by the Metaphysical Exposition as a whole. Commonly,
the series of proofs are taken together to establish that the representation of
space is a priori and an intuition, establishing the former by means of the
frst two proofs and the later by means of the third and fourth. This way of
proceeding is standardly made intelligible on the basis of the crucial role
that  these  conclusions  play  in  establishing  the  subsequent  claim  of
transcendental  ideality.  That  is,  in  the  Metaphysical  Exposition  Kant
establishes that the representation of space is,  one,  a priori  or necessary
and, two, an intuition, because these are the conclusions needed in order
for him to show that the objects to which we stand in relation by means of
these  representations  are  transcendentally  ideal.  Our  fndings  here,
however, yield a subtly diferent understanding of the series of proofs and
render them intelligible in a way that is prior to any claim of transcendental
ideality: 
As we have emphasised in our discussion above, Kant’s stated aim for
the proofs is to establish the representation of space to be “a priori given”
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(B38, emphasis omited). Now, if we are correct in the above, this aim is not
straightforwardly synonymous with showing the representation of space to
be a priori and intuitive, but is instead a reference to the fourfold division
of concepts discussed in the Doctrine. And, as we have noted, this fourfold
division  does  not  straightforwardly  concern  the  subjective nature  of  a
representation,  but  is  a  distinction  among  the  possible  grounds  of  the
combination  of  marks  found  in  a  representation  (in  relation  to  the
combination of marks of the object of the representation). If this is correct,
then the series of proofs has a unity that is not captured in their standard
construal  as  establishing  the  representation  of  space  to  be  a  priori  and
intuitive, and an intelligibility prior to any claim of transcendental ideality.
The proofs, under this account, are to be understood as a series of proofs
that progressively eliminate the other species of concepts of the Doctrine’s
fourfold division. As we saw above, it is possible, and indeed plausible, to
understand the proofs in this way. If this is correct, then the proofs do not
together serve to show some conjunctive claim (’the representation of space
is a priori and the representation of space is intuitive’), but in fact serve to
rule out the alternatives of an exhaustive list  of possibilities that can be
gleaned from an examination of the Doctrine and the appendix. The series
of  proofs  of  the  Metaphysical  Exposition  form  a  complex  argument  by
elimination, and thus are unifed in a way that cannot be recognised without
the details brought to light in the above. 
And the need for carrying out this complex argument by elimination is
prior  to  any  claims  of  transcendental  idealism.  Under  the  Critical
philosophy, the frst stage of analysis involves both bringing the relevant
representations to distinctness and establishing which representations these
are by establishing which representations involve a combination of marks
that is due to the nature of our faculties. The argument by elimination that
is  constituted  by  the  series  of  proofs  of  the  Metaphysical  Exposition  is
precisely  the  carrying  out  of  these  frst  two  tasks  of  arriving  at
philosophical  cognition,  which  tasks  are  prior  to  the  further  claim  of
transcendental idealism that is established upon their basis.
(Related to the above, it is worth noting the sense in which ‘given’ is to
be understood in the introduction to Metaphysical Exposition as well as in
the proofs themselves. As noted, the Exposition is usually emphasised as
showing (i) the a priority, and (ii) the intuitive nature of the representation
of  space,  where  ‘given’  is  frequently  taken  to  be  synonymous  with
‘intuitive’ or ‘being a deliverance of sensibility’. It is not, as we have seen
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above, mistaken that the Metaphysical Exposition is intended to show the
intuitive nature of the representation of space;i however, it is important to
note that ‘given’ is not straightforwardly synonymous with ‘intuitive’. As
we have seen, the relevant term is that of ‘a priori given’ as it appears in the
Doctrine,  in  which  ‘givenness’  contrasts  with  the  arbitrariness  of  an
arbitrarily  thought  concept  and  ‘a  priori  givenness’  consists  in  non-
arbitrariness that is due to the nature of the faculties of the subject. Within
the context of the Exposition, specifcally, this non-arbitrariness is due to
the  nature  of  sensibility  –  however,  ‘given’  is  not  to  be  understood  as
synonymous with ‘intuitive’.) 
Finally,  our account above renders the move to the representation of
space as an a priori intuition intelligible in a new way. In many discussions
of  the  Aesthetic,  the  possibility  and  necessity  of  identifying  a  priori
intuitive representations is emphasised as a key novel feature of the Critical
philosophy. Indeed, Kant himself emphasises the need for the addition of
the  Transcendental  Aesthetic  prior  to  the  Logic.71 This  novel  feature  is
made intelligible by appeal to the crucial Critical claim of the necessity of
both  the  understanding  and  sensibility  in  all  cognition,  including
philosophical cognition, the possibility of which is then secured only by
fnding such a priori intuitive representations. Again, Kant puts it in this
way  in  the  Critique itself.72 The  account  above,  however,  makes  the
possibility  and  need  for  fnding  a  priori  intuitive  representations
intelligible in a somewhat deeper way. In the frst instance, it allows us to
recognise the identifcation of such representations as the outcome of an
analysis  of  our  given  representations  that  has  its  origin  in  German
Rationalist analysis. Secondly, however, it allows us to see how a corrected
form  of  such  analysis  will  yield  the  possibility  of  fnding  a  priori
representations of sensibility. And it is the appendix that is crucial in this
regard. As we have seen, and as we will come to see in more detail below
in the case of the representation of space, the appendix puts forward the
considerations that underlie the possibility of an alternative analysis of our
obscurely  given  representations,  and  it  is  this  later  that  yields  the
possibility of identifying a priori representations that are due to sensibility,
that  is,  intuitive  representations.  Thus,  although  the  conclusion  of  the
intuitive nature of the representation of space is indeed necessary, both for
the  possibility  of  philosophical  cognition  and  for  the  claim  of
71 See, for example, A21/B35-6.
72 See, for example, B73.
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transcendental  ideality,  this  conclusion  is  possible due  to  the  prior
recognition of the distinctness of the faculties and the implications that this
recognition has  for  our  analysis,  an analysis  that  is  continuous with the
German Rationalist  tradition from which the  Critique has emerged.  This
later has not, to my knowledge, been recognised in extant literature on the
Aesthetic. 
As we will see in the next section, recognising this and the above details
of the proofs allows us to bring to light certain details of the workings of
the proofs that have, until now, gone unappreciated. 
IV. Detailed examination of the Metaphysical Exposition
In this fourth section, I turn to a closer examination of the Metaphysical
Exposition and its proofs in order to examine these in light of the foregoing.
A number of things have been brought to light in the above in terms of
which we might now examine the Exposition. First, and beginning with the
innermost  structure,  each  of  the  proofs  proceeds  from  a  mark  of  the
representation of space that together serve as the exposition of space. These
are the claims that are the result of the analysis of the representation of
space and constitute the “distinct (even if not complete) representation of
that which belongs to” (B38) the representation. Our frst task will be to
identify these marks across the various proofs. Secondly, as we saw, each of
the proofs proceeds from the stated mark(s) to a conclusion concerning the
ground  of  the  representation.  Each  of  these  proofs  is  crucial  to  Kant’s
overall aim of showing the ground of the representation of space to be due
to  the  nature  of  sensibility  insofar  as  each  rules  out  one  of  the  other
possible grounds of the representation. Our second task will be to bring to
light  the  premises  and  workings  of  these  crucial,  and  somewhat
mysterious,  proofs  that  proceed  from  the  distinct  marks  of  the
representation  to  a  conclusion  concerning  its  ground.   Finally,  we  will
briefly review the workings of the overall  complex argument formed by
these proofs. 
Before we proceed to the proofs, it is worth noting a few preliminary
remarks about the Metaphysical Exposition. As we have mentioned, in the
Metaphysical Exposition, Kant is concerned to establish the ground of the
representation of space. It is worth beginning with a reminder of one of the
changes to the method of analysis under the Critical account. The Critical
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account,  as  we  have  seen,  emphasises  the  necessity  of  both  the
understanding and sensibility in philosophical cognition. In analysis, this
introduces  the  need  to  examine  our  given  representations  for  those  of
sensibility  as  well  as  the  understanding.  It  introduces  the  need,  in  the
analysis of our given philosophical representations, to look for philosophical
representations of sensibility in addition to those of the understanding. Thus,
the  Critical  method  introduces  the  possibility  of  representations  that
feature in the propositions of philosophy, but which are not concepts given
a priori, but intuitions given a priori. This is a frst point.
A second crucial point is that, prior to the Aesthetic, it is not clear that
there will be any such representations. Under the traditional picture of the
concepts of philosophy, the representations relevant to philosophy are one
and all  representations of the understanding. Further,  under the Critical
account, even supposing the distinctness of the faculties, sensibility is the
faculty  predominantly  for  sensations,  these  being  precisely  the
representations to which philosophical cognition involves no appeal. Thus,
as a default position, we might think that the only representations to be
found in the case of sensibility in isolation are a posteriori or empirical. The
Critical philosophy, however, requires the question of whether we might
identify any representations in the case of sensibility that are a priori. If it
emerges  that  there  are  no such  representations,  then,  given  the  Critical
claim of the necessity of understanding and sensibility, no philosophical
cognition would be possible. 
Given the above, it is understandable why Kant should, at the outset of
the Aesthetic, immediately preceding the Metaphysical Exposition, give the
directive that we “frst isolate sensibility by separating of everything that
the understanding thinks through its concepts [… and] then detach from
the later everything  that  belongs  to  sensation” (A22/B36).  The question
that lies in the background to the Metaphysical Exposition, and to which its
exposition  and  proofs  are  aimed  is  that  mentioned  above:  Are  there
representations  of  sensibility  that  can  feature  in  our  philosophical
cognition? Within the context of our analysis of all the representations of
philosophy, we are here, in the Aesthetic, focussed on those of sensibility.
We can abstract from all those of the understanding in order to bring to the
fore only those of sensibility, if there be such. This is what Kant is doing at
the start of the Aesthetic. He is puting our atention to this portion of the
analysis, with the question of whether there are any such representations in
the background.
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Thus,  we set aside all  clearly irrelevant representations – those of  the
understanding alone, as captured in the table of pure concepts – leaving
behind  only  the  plausible  candidates  for  analysis  (with  Kant  of  course
knowing that he will be able to show that these are indeed relevant). These
are then brought to distinctness by means of some marks, and it is then by
means of these marks, the marks of the representations, that we are able to
show their ground as being given a priori through the nature of sensibility,
and thus to show – thankfully! – that there are representations of sensibility
that can play a role in our philosophical cognition.
Such is the broad outline of the Metaphysical Exposition as I understand
it. A fnal point of overview before we proceed to the proofs themselves
concerns the diferent claims that are to be found in the proofs. First, as we
have seen, each proof involves a premise or premises that puts forward a
mark  or  marks  of  the  concept  of  space.  Now  importantly,  and  as  was
brought to light in our discussion in Part V of the marks distinguished in
analysis, such marks are always  possible objective marks,  in the sense that
these are marks that correspond to the objective determinations of an object
in cognition. They are marks that ultimately characterise the object or objects
of the representation, if there turn out to be such. In contrast, the conclusions
of  these  proofs  are  not  claims  that  put  forward  the  marks  of  space  so
understood, but are claims about the ground of the representation of space.
Such  claims  concern  the  ground  of  the  combination  of  marks  that
constitutes the representation of space.  Thus,  the proofs proceed from a
premise or premises that concern what I have called the ‘objective’ level of
the representation of space (the objective determinations it represents space
as having) to a conclusion that concerns the ground of the representation.
Additionally,  as  we  will  see,  the  inference  from  the  ‘objective  level’
premise(s) to the conclusion is made by means of a claim or claims that
specify a general  relation between the marks of a representation and its
ground. Thus, we can see that, in their premises and conclusions, each of
the  proofs  involves  at  least  three  diferent  sorts  of  claim:  (i)  The
expositional  or  ‘objective  level’  claims,  (ii)  the  claims  that  connect  the
exposition of the representation to the ground of the representation, and,
fnally, (iii) the conclusions that concern the ground of the representation.
Let us then proceed to the proofs themselves. For the most part, I will
restrict my explicit discussion to the frst and second proofs. This is in part
because the points I want to make can be made most clearly and easily in
reference to these proofs, and in part due to constraints of length. However,
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I believe that the picture put forward can be applied mutatis mutandis to
the omited cases, viz. to the third and fourth proofs. Our examination here
will proceed from the parts to the whole – from the claims that constitute
the  exposition  of  the  representation  of  space,  to  the  proof  of  the
intermediate conclusions on the basis of these, and fnally to the complex
argument  that  constitutes  the  Exposition  as  a  whole.  I  begin  below by
distinguishing the marks of the concept of space to which Kant in each case
appeals and the statement of which serves as the premise or premises that
concern what I have termed the ‘objective’ level of the representation.
If we recall, I claimed that the mark to which Kant appeals in the case of
the fourth proof could be identifed as that of ‘having an infnite number of
simultaneous  parts’.  Now this  proof  lent  itself  nicely  to example as  the
mark to which Kant appeals in it is naturally understood as a mark ‘found
in’ the representation of space, in the sense that part of what is represented
in representing space is an infnity of simultaneous parts. When we turn to
the other proofs, however, the case is not so straightforward. It is far less
clear, for example, what the relevant marks or ‘objective level’ in the frst
proof are:
For in  order  for  certain sensations to be  related to something […] in
another place in space from that in which I fnd myself […] thus in order
for me to represent them as […] in diferent places [to one another], the
representation of space must already be their ground [...] 
(A23/B38)
Here, Kant does not at all seem to put forward anything like a list of
characteristic marks of the concept of the sort we might expect to fnd in an
exposition. ‘Sensation as related to something in a diferent place to myself’
is certainly not a characteristic mark of space in the same way that ‘having
an infnite  number of  simultaneous parts’  is.  Nor is  ‘being a  thing in  a
diferent place to another’. None of these would naturally come to mind as
marks that essentially characterise space. And we seem to fare no beter
with the second and third proofs. 
It is, at this point, important to remind ourselves of the special sort of
exposition that Kant is puting forward in these passages. As we have seen,
Kant does not solely mean to be specifying the various characteristic marks
found in the concept, thereby bringing it to distinctness. He means to be
puting forward a metaphysical exposition that “contains that which exhibits
the concept as given a priori.” (B38, emphasis omited) Thus, at this stage
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and without having any further understanding of which of the marks of
space might fulfl this aim and why, we might expect to fnd any marks of
space being appealed to in these passages. Bearing this in mind, I begin
with the somewhat shorter second proof in order to see whether we might
bring to light what is at work in the case of this exposition before turning to
the rest.
The second proof seemingly both begins and ends with a statement of its
conclusion, albeit formulated in slightly diferent ways: 
Space  is  a  necessary  representation,  a  priori,  that  is  the  ground  of  all  outer
intuitions. […] It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of
appearances,  not  as  a  determination  dependent  on  them,  and  is  an  a  priori
representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.
(A24/B38)
The  marks  to  which  Kant  appeals  thus  must  be  found  somewhere
between the two. Here we fnd a contrast drawn between what Kant claims
we can represent and what he claims we cannot: 
One can never represent that there is no space, though one can very well
think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. 
(A24/B39)
It  is  worth clarifying at  the outset  that  Kant’s  statement here  is  very
plausibly abbreviated. In the corresponding proof for time, the symmetry
of the contrast is made explicit: 
In regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though one
can very well take the appearances away from time. 
(A31/B46)
I thus take the contrast implicit in the case of space to be as follows: One
can never  represent  objects  without  space,  but  one  can  represent  space
without  any  objects  in  it.  In  the  case  of  the  second  proof  then,  Kant
seemingly compares the representation of space with the representation of
an object as such. What he puts forward is that the representation of an
object is not to be found in the representation of space (we can represent
space  without  representing  any  objects),  but  that  the  representation  of
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space is to be found in the representation of an object (we cannot represent
an object without representing space). 
Thus, as we might expect in the case of an exposition with a very specifc
aim, the relevant marks or representations distinguished in the analysis are
not those that we might naturally expect, nor are they only the marks that
are  found in the representation under analysis.  In the case of the second
proof, Kant compares the relations between the representation of space and
the  representation  of  an  object  in  general.  The  relevant  marks  or
representations here are ‘space’ and ‘an object in general’. And indeed, in
this analysis, no mark or representation is put forward as a characteristic
mark of space. Instead, we are given a mark or representation that is  not
found  in  the  representation  of  space,  but  instead  in  which  the
representation of space is to be found. Thus, Kant’s concern here is not all
and only the marks found in the concept in question. What is instead of
interest is the relation between the representation in question and certain
other carefully chosen marks or representations such that the relation of the
representation  to  these marks  or  representations  is  of  signifcance  to  its
ground.  (If  we recall,  in Parts  III  and IV,  we saw that  the procedure of
analysis of a concept involved establishing the relations between various
proposed marks and the indistinct concept. In the case of a straightforward
analysis, many of these relations are set aside in the fnal analysis insofar as
we  are  concerned with  only  those  marks  found  in  the  concept.  In  this
special  case of  a metaphysical  exposition,  however,  it  is  the relations to
various  other  signifcant  or  relevant  marks  or  representations  that  are
singled  out  while  the  others  are  set  aside.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  a
metaphysical exposition is an ‘exposition’ of the concept or representation
in a relatively loose sense.) Further, as we can see, it is not only a partial
analysis of the representation in question that might be found. Given the
nature of the expositions as proofs, if the analysis of another representation
contrasts in a signifcant way with that of space, we might expect a partial
analysis of this other representation. This is the case with the representation
of an ‘object in general’ above. Our proof puts forward a partial analysis of
the  representation  of  space  (the  mark  or  representation  of  an  object  in
general is not found in the concept of space) and a partial analysis of the
representation of an object in general (the representation of space is  not
found in the representation of an object in general) as the contrast between
the two turns out, for yet-to-be-specifed reasons, to be signifcant.
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Further, as we will see, the expositional premises of some of these proofs
are  in  fact  complex.  Kant  does  not  in  every  case  put  forward  as  the
exposition a single relation between the representation of space and some
other single  mark.  Instead,  the relation to  the crucial  mark is  identifed
mediately by means of the immediate relation it bears to some other mark
and the immediate relation this mark bears to the representation of space.
These two connecting steps are put forward as distinct steps below to yield
the relation in question. Thus, in these proofs, we fnd the manifestation of
the  Critical  method’s  distinction  between  ‘immediately  certain’  and
‘mediately  certain’  characteristic  marks  –  a  distinction that,  as  we have
seen, Kant has already made in the  Inquiry. The intermediate steps in the
frst  proof  below  will  come  to  light  more  clearly  in  our  subsequent
discussion.
Having these clarifcations in hand, I return to the four proofs and the
task of distinguishing the relevant marks or representations to which Kant,
in  each  case,  appeals  (that  in  the  proof  which  constitutes  the  ‘possible
objective marks’ as discussed above) along with the relations put forward
between these and the representation of space. These form the exposition of
the representation of space from which the proofs proceed and constitute
the ‘objective level’ claims of the proofs. 
(i) In the frst proof, the representation of space is compared with
the marks or representations, ‘object in a diferent place to another
object’ and ‘object in a diferent place to myself’. The expositional
claims  are:  (1)  The  representation  ‘object  in  a  diferent  place  to
myself’  requires  or  includes  the  representation of  space.  (2)  The
representation ‘object in a diferent place to another object’ requires
or includes the representation ‘object in a diferent place to myself’.
(3) (Thus) the representation ‘object in a diferent place to another
object’ requires or includes the representation of space.
(ii) In the second proof,  the representation of space is compared
with the representation ‘object in general’. The expositional claims
are: (1) The representation ‘object in general’ requires or includes
the representation of space.  (2) The representation of space does
not require or include the representation ‘object in general’.
(iii) In the third proof, the representation ‘space’, ‘multitude’, ‘part
of  space’  are  compared.  The  expositional  claims  are:  (1)  The
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representation  of  space  rules  out  or  excludes  the  representation
‘multitude’. (2) The representation ‘part of space’ does not rule out
or  exclude ‘multitude’.  (3)  The representation of  space  does  not
require  or  include  the  representation  ‘part  of  space’.  (4)  The
representation  ‘part  of  space’  requires  or  includes  the
representation of space.
(iv) In the fourth proof,  the representation of space is  compared
with  the  mark  or  representation  ‘having  an  infnite  number  of
simultaneous  parts’.  The  expositional  claims  are:  (1)  The
representation of space requires or includes the mark ‘having an
infnite number of simultaneous parts’. 
The above, I take it, constitutes the exposition of or “distinct (even if not
complete) representation of that which belongs to” (B38) the representation
of space, as it is put forward in the Metaphysical Exposition. We have not
thus far examined any of the conclusions that are meant to follow from this
analysis, nor have we examined or evaluated the analysis itself. My aim in
the above has been simply to try to isolate the expositional claims in each of
the proofs. 
Now, as we have noted, the exposition presented in the Transcendental
Aesthetic is not simply a statement of the marks of the representation in
question. These expositional claims are put forward in the service of the
exposition  as  ‘Metaphysical’.  That  is,  these  expositional  claims  play  the
further  role  of  showing that  the  representation of  space  is  one ‘given a
priori’, and indeed, that it is one given by the nature of sensibility rather
than the understanding. Having then in hand these expositional claims, let
us turn to an examination of the frst proof, as a proof that proceeds from
its respective expositional claims to a conclusion that concerns the ground
of the representation of space. 
As is familiar, the frst of the proofs is concerned with showing that the
representation of space is not an empirical concept. This is the conclusion of
the frst proof. As Kant puts it forward in the frst line: “Space is not an
empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences.” (A23/B38)
The proof proceeds from the exposition outlined above to this conclusion. 
Thus, as we can see, the frst of these proofs, like the rest, proceeds to a
conclusion that denies of the representation of space one of the possible
grounds outlined in Part III and IV and above. In the case of this frst proof,
the  ground  in  question  is  that  of  empirical  objects  –  that  is,  that  the
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combination of marks constituting the representation of space is grounded
on the combinations of marks of empirical objects. By the end of the frst
proof, Kant has, if the proof succeeds, ruled out such ‘empirical givenness’
as the ground of the representation of space.
Now, as is the case in the other proofs as well, this frst proof seems to
proceed from  a  statement  of  its  conclusion  (”Space  is  not  an  empirical
concept that has been drawn from outer experiences” at  A23/B38)  to its
exposition (“in order for certain sensations, etc.…” at A23/B38) to end again
with  its  conclusion,  albeit  slightly  reformulated  (“the  representation  of
space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through
experience, but this outer experience is itself frst possible only through this
representation” again at A23/B38). Thus, considering what is explicitly put
forward  in  the  proof,  it  would  seem  that  it  proceeds  straight  from  its
expositional  claim  to  the  conclusion  concerning  the  ground  of  the
representation of space. However, as in the case of the other proofs, this
appearance is misleading. The proof is certainly not rendered its strongest
by supposing that Kant proceeds straightforwardly from this exposition to
the conclusion concerning the ground. Rather, I take it that this proof, along
with the rest,  is  best understood if  we suppose it  to take the form of a
reductio.  The proof begins by implicitly positing a claim concerning the
ground of the representation that is ultimately to be denied (viz. the claim
that the representation of space is a concept given empirically), draws out
the implications of this claim, and then shows these to conflict with what
we fnd to be the case. Finally, on the basis of these, Kant concludes that the
representation of space is not an empirical concept, ruling out one of the
grounds in question. What is then explicitly put forward in the proof is
then only the later part of this line of reasoning, viz. the claim about what
we fnd to be the case that conflicts with the original supposition and the
denial of this supposition as the conclusion of the proof. 
Now, if the argument is indeed to be understood as a reductio, then it
would  seem  that  the  claim  that  is  doing  the  work  in  showing  the
implications of the original supposition to be false is the expositional claim,
that is, the claim that puts forward the relations that the representation of
space bears to the representation(s) or marks with which it is compared, as
set out above. Thus, the proof does indeed proceed from the exposition it
puts  forward  to  the  relevant  conclusion  concerning  the  ground  of  the
representation of space. However, it does so by means of a reductio: The
reductio draws out the implications that supposing the representation of
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space to have a certain ground has for the exposition of the representation
of space. And its intermediate premise(s) of the proof is then that which
puts forward these implications. This might be schematised in more detail
as follows:
(1)  Supposition  for  reductio  stating  the  ground:  The  ground  of  the
representation of space is X.
(2) Intermediate premise stating the implications of (1) for the exposition
of  space:  If  the  ground  of  the  representation  of  space  is  X,  then  the
representation of space bears relation R to representation(s) T (that is, our
analysis should yield such an exposition).
(3) Expositional premise: Upon analysis, we fnd that the representation of
space does not bear relation R to representation(s) T (our analysis does
not yield such an exposition).
Thus, the ground of the representation of space is not X. 
Each  of  the  other  proofs  proceeds  in  the  same  manner.  We  have  a
supposition concerning the ground for the reductio, a drawing out of the
implications of the supposition, and the exposition that is put forward as
refuting the initial assumption. 
Having now in hand a more systematic statement of the proof, we can
see that it turns crucially on two claims: The implications of the supposed
ground of  the representation for  the exposition we ought  to uncover in
analysis as put forward in premise (2) (this is the claim that connects the
exposition with the ground of the representation as mentioned earlier), and
the exposition that  we do in fact  uncover in analysis  as put forward in
premise  (3)  (this  is  the expositional  or  ‘objective level’  claim mentioned
earlier). Let us begin then with the frst of these claims, focussing on this
frst proof, in order to arrive at a beter understanding of the workings of
these proofs.
The appeal to the ground of the representation of space in premise (2) is,
I have claimed, an appeal to the distinction between possible grounds for
the combination of marks found in the concept.  As noted in Part  IV, an
empirical  concept  is  the  frst  of  the  concepts  found  under  the  fourfold
distinction of concepts of the Doctrine of Method: In his discussion of the
dogmatic method of defnition, Kant begins by examining (and ruling out)
the possibility of  defnition for empirical  concepts.  With regard to these
concepts, Kant claims, we have “only some marks of a certain kind of object
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of the senses” (A727/B755). Now, as the Doctrine indicates, such concepts
are formed by separating out, from the multitude of marks combined in
some empirical object or objects, some fnite number of these, which are
then  unifed  or  combined  by  the  understanding  so  as  to  constitute  the
newly formed concept in question. The marks so combined or ‘thought’ in
the  concept  might  vary  across  cases  of  using  the  concept  –  a  variation
dependent  on the  distinctions  that  are  relevant  or  useful  in  the  context
(A727-8/B755-6).73
With regard to the representation of space then, the supposition of the
frst premise is this. The concept of space is formed by separating out some
marks  of  some  empirical  object  or  objects  and  combining  these  into  a
concept. More specifcally, the concept of space is formed by separating out
the mark of being in a certain place (this is separated out from diferent
objects being found in diferent places) and abstracting from all extraneous
marks. Now, prima facie, this supposition has implications for our analysis
in the following way: If a concept, as a combination of marks, is formed by
separating out and combining some of the marks found combined in an
empirical  object,  then  the  representation  of  an  empirical  object  and  its
marks must be possible independently of and prior to the representation of
the concept, but not vice versa. The representation of the empirical object or
objects  whose  marks  we  separate  out  must  be  possible  without  the
representation of space while the representation of space is  not possible
with the representation of these objects. Thus, if the representation of space
is  an empirical  concept,  the empirical  representation of  diferent objects
spatially related to one another is  possible prior to the representation of
space. (But, as the proof continues, when we analyse the representation of
space,  comparing  it  with  or  diferentiating  it  from  our  other  given
representations, specifcally that of the representation of diferent empirical
objects located in space, we fnd, frst, that the empirical representation of
an  object  in  a  diferent  place  to  myself  requires  or  includes  the
representation of space and, second, that the empirical representation of an
object in a diferent place to another empirical object requires or includes
the  empirical  representation  of  an  object  in  a  diferent  place  to  myself.
Hence,  any empirical  representation of  an  object  in  a  diferent  place  to
73 Such concepts are thus non-arbitrary insofar as the combination of marks is not simply
any combination of marks chosen by the understanding. Even though the marks thought
in the concept might vary across use, and indeed, even though the understanding might
never think all the marks of the object(s)  in question in the concept,  it  is nonetheless
constrained to the combination found in the object(s).
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another object requires or includes the representation of space. Thus, we
arrive  at  the  inference  needed  for  the  conclusion  of  the  reductio:  The
supposition  that  space  is  an  empirical  concept  conflicts  with  what  our
analysis  of  the  representation  of  space  and  these  other  representations
reveals, and thus is false.)
Filling in the details of the schema with those of the frst proof, we might
thus formalise it as follows: 
(1)  Supposition for reductio:  The ground of (the combination of marks
found in) the representation of space is the combinations of marks found
in empirical objects in diferent places to one another. (I.e.  Space is  an
empirical concept.) 
(2)  If  the ground of the representation of space  is  the combinations of
marks  found  in  objects  in  diferent  places  to  one  another,  then  the
representation  of  objects  in  diferent  places  to  one  another  does  not
require or include the representation of space. 
(3) Upon analysis, we fnd that (i) the representation ‘object in a diferent
place to myself’ requires or includes the representation of space, (ii) the
representation ‘object  in a diferent  place to another object’  requires or
includes the representation ‘object in a diferent place to myself’, and thus
(iii) that the representation ‘object in a diferent place to another object’
requires or includes the representation of space.
Thus, the ground of the representation of space are not the combinations
of marks found in objects in diferent places to one another. (I.e. Space is
not an empirical concept.)
Thus, in this frst proof, we can see that the ground of the combination of
marks  in  a  representation  has  implications  for  the  relations  that  the
representation bears to certain of our other representations. 
In the above, we have examined a prima facie connection between the
ground and exposition in the case of the frst proof in particular. What is
needed, however, if we are to understand the workings of the proofs as
such, is a general formulation of this connection. Why is it that a diference
in the ground of the combination of marks of a representation should have
implications  for  its  analysis?  That  is,  what  is  the  general,  systematic
account  that  underlies  premise  (2)  in  the  proof  above  and  the
corresponding premises in the other proofs? 
It  seems to me that such an account can indeed be given. What is  in
question is the connection between the supposed ground of a concept (that
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is,  whether its  combination of marks is  arbitrary,  or is  a combination of
marks found in an empirical object, or is a combination of marks that is due
to the nature of the faculties) and its exposition (that is, the relation of the
marks to the concept or of the marks of the concept to the marks of certain
other concepts). The key to this connection is to recognise that the division
of concepts according to their ground concerns, in part, what determines the
combination  of  marks of  the  concept  in  question.74 In  the  case  of  an
empirically given concept, the combination of marks found in the concept
is partially determined by the marks found in the empirical object or objects
in  question.  (This  determination  is  only  partial  since  the  understanding
plays a role in choosing to consider certain marks rather than others, which
choice, as noted, may vary according to the occasion of use of the concept.
Nonetheless,  the  marks  available  for  this  choice  are  determined  by  the
marks of the empirical object itself.) In the case of an arbitrarily constructed
concept, by contrast,  the combination of marks is determined arbitrarily.
That is, the combination is simply a mater of the stipulative choice of the
subject.  Finally, in the case of concept given a priori,  the combination of
marks  is  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  faculty  to  which  the
representation is due. 
Now, this diference in what determines the combinations of marks in a
concept  does  not  have  implications  for  every claim  that  might  be  put
forward as part of an exposition (of the concept). That the combination of
marks  in  the  arbitrary  concept  ‘centaur’  is  determined by  the  arbitrary
choice of the subject, for example, does not have implications for whether
the concept will include the combination of marks that constitutes some
other  empirically  given  concept,  for  example,  the  concept  ‘feathered
animal’. However, this diference in what determines the combination of
marks in a concept does have implications for certain of its expositional
claims.  That is, it does have implications for the relation of certain marks to
the concept or of certain marks of the concept to marks of certain other
concepts. Consider frst empirically given concepts. Given that the marks of
the concept are partially determined by the marks found in some empirical
object or objects, this will have implications for the relation of the concept
to  the  representation(s)  of  the  empirical  object(s).  The  combination  that
74 This is only a partial characterisation of this division of concepts since the division also
concerns  the  relation  of  the  concept  to  an  object.  This  is  clearest  in  the  case  of  the
distinction between an arbitrary concept and an arbitrary concept whose object can be
constructed.  For the purposes of  our discussion here,  however,  this  dimension of  the
division of concepts can be set aside.
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constitutes  the  empirically  given  concept  will  presuppose  the
representation(s) of the objects. The empirically given concept will not be
possible  without  these  other  representations,  but  these  other
representations  will  be  possible  without  the  empirically  given  concept.
Given that a concept’s being empirically given is partly defned in terms of
its combination of marks being determined in this way, this turns out to be
part of what an empirically given concept is. 
Secondly,  consider the case of arbitrary concepts.  The combination of
marks found in such concepts are determined entirely arbitrarily, simply
by the choice of the subject. Such a combination is not determined by the
combinations of marks of any objects  whatsoever. So, what determines the
combination of marks in this second case has implications for the relation
of the concept to the representation of any and all objects (whatever these
may turn out to be). The concept will not presuppose any representation of
any object and it will be possible without any such representation (and any
representation of any object will be possible without the arbitrary concept).
Again, this turns out to be part of what an arbitrary concept is.
And fnally,  we can consider the case of concepts given a priori.  The
implications  of  this  sort  of  concept  for  any  expositional  claims  stands
somewhat in contrast to the two concepts above. Concepts given a priori
are concepts whose combinations of marks are determined by the nature of
the faculty to which the concept is due. We noted earlier that this fourth
division in the Doctrine is best read as including both concepts that are due
to the nature of the understanding and intuitions that are due to the nature
of sensibility. So that is, in the case of representations (either concepts or
intuitions) given a priori, the combination of marks of the representation is
determined by the nature of the faculty to which the representation is due,
whether  the  understanding or  sensibility.  Now,  this  determination  of  a
combination of marks by the nature of a faculty potentially has a number of
complex  implications  for  an  exposition  of  the  representation.75 The
75 Prima facie, with regard to the categories, for example, the representation of any object
presupposes these representations of the understanding. We might thus suppose that a
representation being given a priori has the converse implication to that of concept being
empirically given: In the later case, the representation of the object is possible without
the concept,  but not vice versa, whereas in the former case,  the representation of any
object  is  not  possible  without  the  concept,  but  not  vice  versa.  However,  at  least  two
considerations can here show this to be false. First, the categories are only shown to be
necessary  for  the  representation  of  any  object  at  the  point  of  the  transcendental
deduction. The premises that we are considering (premises that connect the ground of a
concept  to  its  implications  for  the  exposition  of  the  concept)  are  prior  to  the
transcendental  deduction  in the  establishment  of  our  a  priori  cognition  and  so  these
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implications that are of interest to us here, however, are the implications
that  such  a  ground  of  a  representation  has  for  the  content  of  the
representation. A faculty is in part distinguished from other faculties by,
what  I  have termed,  the  subjective determinations of  its  representations
(concepts  stand  us  in  a  mediate  relation  to  an  object,  intuitions  in
immediate relation)76 and in another part by the objective determinations of
its  representations  (the  marks  combined  in  a  concept  are  objective
determinations that are universal or general, while the marks combined in
an intuition are objective determinations that are particular).77 Given this,
that the combination of marks is determined by the nature of the faculty to
which  it  is  due  implies  that  the  representation  will  have  the  content
relevant to that, and only that, faculty. That is, this third and fnal ground, a
concept’s being a priori, has implications for the marks that will be found
to be part of the representation itself.
And these implications are indeed precisely those that we fnd in the
expositional claims across the proofs. The frst and second proofs can be
notably  distinguished  from  the  third  and  fourth  in  terms  of  the
representations  with  that  of  space  is  compared.  In  the  frst  proof,  the
expositional claims concern the relation of the representation of space to
that of empirical objects in diferent spatial locations. In the second, we fnd
the representation of space compared with that of the representation of any
object as such. By contrast, the third and fourth proofs appeal, as we have
premises  should  not  be  taken  to  involve  an  implicit  appeal  to  the  deduction  of  the
categories. Second, and more telling, it simply is not the case that the a priori givenness of
a concept is correlated with a concept’s being presupposed in any representation of an
object.  One set  of  counterexamples  here is  the  ideas  of  reason as  treated in the  later
Dialectic of the Critique. These concepts are indeed given a priori, but Kant goes to great
lengths  to  show  that  the  concepts  do  not  stand  us  in  relation  to  the  objects  of  our
cognition and are not necessary in the representation of the objects of our cognition.
This supposed implication is seemingly further complicated in the case of representations
of sensibility given a priori. Given that sensibility is the faculty by means of which we
stand in immediate relation to objects, it seems that the corresponding case of  intuitions
given  a  priori,  but  where  the  representation  of  any  object  is  possible  without  such
representations, is less clearly a possibility. Indeed, this might point to the disagreement
over whether  establishing  the  representations  of  space and time  as pure  intuitions  is
distinct from establishing them as formal intuitions.
76 See  A19/B33  and  A320/B377.  Although  also  epistemic  determinations  of  the
representations,  these determinations are subjective insofar as they are not part of the
objective content  of  the representations  – that  is,  the mark ‘mediate relation’  is  not  a
possible mark of the object represented by the representation.
77 I do not here mean to provide an exhaustive characterisation of what Kant understands
by ‘faculty’, but mean only to appeal to certain uncontroversial necessary features that
distinguish faculties from one another.
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noted earlier, to representations that can be taken to be those found in the
representation  of  space  –  the  representation  of  ‘multitude’  and  ‘part  of
space’ in the third, and the representation ‘infnite given magnitude’ in the
fourth. These later expositions involve an appeal to marks found in the
representation  of  space  that  could  the  content  of  sensibility  and  only
sensibility.78 
We have gone some way in understanding the claimed implications of the
ground of a representation for its  relations to other representations.  But
there is yet a question that lurks in the background of this discussion. It is
one which concerns the second component to the proof and which crucially
requires answering if we are to understand the force behind the proofs: On
what  basis  does  Kant  claim  the  profered  analysis  in  the  expositional
premise  to  be  the  correct  one?  Do  we,  in  some  way,  simply  ‘see’  the
relevant  relations  among  our  representations?  Or  is  there  some  further
ground for these premises? To answer these questions, I turn to the second
proof, for the point I mean to make can be made most clearly in the case of
this proof. 
As is  familiar,  the second proof aims to show that the representation of
space is a priori. That is, it concludes that the representation of space is “an
a  priori  representation  that  necessarily  grounds  outer  appearances.”
(A24/B39)  The  sparsity  of  Kant’s  explicit  claims  is  most  evident  in  this
proof, and Kant again simply puts forward this conclusion along with the
relevant exposition, viz. “[o]ne can never represent that there is no space,
though one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered
in it.” (ibid.) Again, however, the proof is best understood as a reductio:
Although the representation of space has been shown, in the frst proof, not
to be an empirical concept (its ground is not that of empirical objects), this
does not yet establish it as given a priori – as a representation that has its
ground in the subject’s faculties. It remains possible that the representation
78 As noted,  the  standard view of the Metaphysical  Exposition also typically  includes  a
division  between  the  frst  and  second  proofs  and  the  third  and  fourth.  Under  these
accounts, the distinction is typically underlain by the background distinctions at work in
the proofs. The frst and second are typically taken to turn on the distinction between
empirical  and a  priori  concepts,  while  the  third and fourth  are taken to  turn on the
background distinction between concepts and intuitions. The account presented here has
the virtue of unifying the four proofs as concerned with the difering possible grounds of
the representation of space, which grounds themselves then yield a distinction between
proofs one/two and three/four due to their difering implications for the exposition of
space.
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of  space  is  an arbitrarily  thought  concept  –  a  representation that  might
seem  to  have  a  ground  other  than  the  understanding’s  arbitrary
construction, but which in fact does not. The relevant proposal here then,
the proposal asserted for the reductio, is that space is an arbitrarily thought
concept. 
The  proof  continues  by  puting  forward  the  implications  of  this
assumption  for  the  analysis  of  the  representation  of  space.  If  the
representation of space was an arbitrarily thought concept, then it has the
following implications  for  the  relation of  the  representation of  space  to
certain other representations: Insofar as any concept is merely arbitrarily
thought,  it  would  seem  that  the  representation  of  an  object  would  be
independent of the concept. The representation of an object as such cannot
depend on any arbitrarily combined concepts that may or may not happen
to  be  thought.  Thus,  when  we  consider  the  representation  of  space  in
relation   to  the  representation  of  an  object  in  general,  it  is  possible  to
represent  an  object  without  this  arbitrarily  thought  concept.  Indeed,  as
Kant emphasises in the  Inquiry, if an arbitrarily combined concept should
stand  us  in  relation  to  an  object,  this  would  be  “a  happy  coincidence
indeed”  (2:277).  The  representation  of  an  object,  then,  is  prior  to  and
possible without the arbitrarily thought concept of space. Thus, again, we
see the way in which a concept’s having a certain ground has implications
for the relations uncoverable in analysis.
Now, this implication is then shown, in the third premise,  to conflict
with what is to be found when we do analyse the representation of space.
Upon analysis, so Kant tells us, we fnd that the representation of an object
requires the representation of space. The representation of an object is not
possible without the representation of space.) Thus, the representation of
space is not an arbitrarily thought concept, and, since the frst proof has
shown the concept not to be empirical, it must be a representation that has
its ground in the faculties of the subject.) We might formalise this according
to our schema above as follows:
(1)  Supposition for reductio:  The ground of (the combination of marks
found in) the representation of space is arbitrary combination. (I.e. Space
is an arbitrarily combined concept.)
(2) If the ground of the representation of space is arbitrary combination,
then  the  representation  of  an  object  does  not  require  or  include  the
representation of space. 
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(3)  Upon  analysis,  we  fnd  that  the  representation  of  an  object  does
require or include the representation of space.
Thus,  the  ground  of  the  representation  of  space  is  not  arbitrary
combination. (I.e. Space is not an arbitrarily combined concept.)
Now it seems to me that the workings of this expositional premise, and
indeed of the expositional claims in all four proofs, cannot be understood
without  recourse  to  the  changes  to  analysis  made  under  the  Critical
philosophy that we examined in Part IV – the changes underlain by the
case  in  the  appendix.  Recalling  Part  IV,  according  to  the  case  in  the
appendix,  the  correct  diferentiation  of  our  representations  from  one
another in analysis has a further requirement. We are to take into account
the faculty of the representations in question, or alternatively, to precede
our  comparisons  of  these  representations  with transcendental  reflection.
Representations of  sensibility are not  to be diferentiated as  concepts  or
representations  of  the  understanding,  nor  vice  versa.  As  we  saw,  this
directive was to hold quite generally with regard to the indistinctly given
representations  that  are  ultimately  to  feature  in  our  philosophical
cognition. It holds specifcally then as well with regard to the comparisons
of the representation of space with other representations as found in the
expositions  of  the  proofs.  If  these  expositions  are  to  diferentiate  our
representations  correctly,  we  must  take  account  of  the  faculty  of  the
representations appealed to in them. This is a frst point to be noted. 
Secondly, as we have seen above, part of the  aim of the Metaphysical
Exposition  is  to  show  that  the  representation  of  space  is  correctly
diferentiated as a representation of sensibility, not as a concept. Thus, in
the case of the comparisons contained in the third premise, the faculty to
which the representation of space is due is still in question. We cannot at this
point  then,  with  regard  to  the  representation  of  space,  take  it  to  be  a
representation of one or another faculty. Nonetheless, the directive of the
appendix does still hold with regard to any other representations involved
in these comparisons.
Thirdly, and importantly, we must remind ourselves of the directive that
we are given just prior to embarking on the Metaphysical Exposition. Recall
that  at  A22/B36,  Kant  directs  us  to  isolate  sensibility.  In  the  subsequent
passages,  including the proofs of the Exposition, we are concerned only
with  the  representations  of  sensibility.  All  representations  of  the
understanding have been for the moment set aside.
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The  crucial  consequence  of  these  considerations  then  is  this.  In  the
comparisons  put  forward  in  the  proofs  of  the  Exposition,  the
representations  being  compared  are,  with  the  exception  of  the
representation  of  space,  one  and  all  to  be  taken to  be  representations  of
sensibility. At this frst stage on the route to philosophical cognition, Kant is
concerned with sensibility in isolation and with the diferentiation of its
representations.  And the  correct  diferentiation  of  these  will  rely  on  us
taking this into account. 
Thus,  the  proofs  are  to  be  understood  as  follows.  As  we  have
emphasised, the ground of the representation of space is in question across
the Exposition. Similarly, as we have seen, the representations with which
we  are  at  present  concerned  are  solely  those  of  sensibility.  The
representations  with which the  representation of  space  is  compared are
representations of sensibility. What Kant then does, across the proofs, is to
‘test’  the  possible  grounds  of  the  representation  of  space  against  this
background of other representations whose faculty is, as it were, known or
‘fxed’. The proposed ground is varied across the proofs and, in each case, a
conflict results between the exposition implied under the proposed ground
and the correct exposition revealed by analysis. To relate this to our schema
for the proofs: 
(1) Supposition for reductio: The ground of the representation of space is
X.
(2)  If  the  ground  of  the  representation  of  space  is  X,  then  the
representation of space bears relation R to representation(s) T.
(3) (Upon analysis, we fnd that) the representation of space does not bear
relation R to representation(s) T.
Thus, the ground of the representation of space is not X. 
We have, as noted, two analyses in question – the implied analysis in (2)
and the profered analysis in (3). In (2), the ground of every representation
mentioned in the analysis is determinate. The ground of the representation
of space is made determinate by the assumption in (1). In (3), by contrast,
the  ground  of  the  representation  of  space  is  indeterminate.  This  is  our
analysis in which the ground of the representation of space is in question.
Crucially, however, the ground of the representation(s) T in (2) and (3) is
determinate. The representation(s) T are representations of sensibility. Thus,
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the proof  turns on,  one,  the  faculty of  representation(s)  T being determinate
and, two, their ground being the nature of the faculty of sensibility.
Let us add this qualifcation to the schema for the second proof, which I
reproduce below for ease of reference:
(1)  Supposition for reductio:  The ground of (the combination of marks
found  in)  the  representation  of  space  is  arbitrary  combination  by  the
understanding. (I.e. Space is an arbitrarily combined concept.)
(2) If the ground of the representation of space is arbitrary combination,
then  the  representation  (of  sensibility)  of  an  object  does  not  require  or
include  the  representation  of  space  (as  arbitrarily  combined  by  the
understanding). 
(3)  Upon analysis,  we fnd that the representation  (of  sensibility)  of an
object  does  require  or  include  the  representation  of  space  (where  the
ground of combination is in question).
Thus,  the  ground  of  the  representation  of  space  is  not  arbitrary
combination. (I.e. Space is not an arbitrarily combined concept.)
Recall  that  Kant’s  concern  was  to  rule  out  the  second  of  the  three
possible grounds of the representation (arbitrary combination) and show it
to  be  a  priori.  The  representation  of  space  was  compared  with  the
representation of an object in general. Now, according to the reductio, if the
representation  of  space  is  an  arbitrarily  thought  concept,  then  the
representation  of  an  object  in  general  does  not  require  or  include  the
representation of space. This is the implied frst analysis as in (2). However,
as the proof puts forward, when we analyse our representations, we fnd
that this is  not the case.  The representation of an object does require or
include the representation of space. This is the correct analysis, as in (3).
Introducing the newly-mentioned qualifcations,  these analyses are to be
understood  as  follows:  In  the  implied  frst  analysis,  all  grounds  of  the
mentioned  representations  are  determinate.  Thus,  the  ground  of  the
representation  of  an  object  is  determinate  and  the  ground  of  the
representation of space is determinate. In the second analysis, the ground
of the representation of space is in question, while the ground of any other
mentioned representations remains determinate. Thus, even if the ground
of  the  representation  of  space  has  not  yet  been  established,  the
representations with which it is compared do have a determinate ground. 
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Crucially,  however,  the ground of the representations with which the
representation of space is  compared – the representation of an object as
such – is not to be confused. Recall that, for the purposes of the Aesthetic,
Kant requires that we frst “isolate sensibility by separating of everything
that the understanding thinks through its concepts [and] detach from the
later everything that belongs to sensation.” (A22/B36, emphasis my own) It
is  important  that  we  keep in  mind,  then,  that  the  representations  with
which  space  is  compared  in  the  two  analyses  are  representations  of
sensibility. That is, crucially, the representation of an object in general found
in (2) and (3) is not to be understood as the concept of an object in general. It
is the representation of an object  by means of sensibility – it is the intuitive
representation of an object. 
Thus,  when  Kant  puts  forward  the  analysis  in  premise  (3)  that  the
‘representation  of  an  object  requires  or  includes  the  representation  of
space’, he is not comparing the representation of space with the concept of
an object.  He is comparing the representation of space with the  intuitive
representation of  an object  –  the representation of  an object  by means of
sensibility. Thus, Kant is not claiming that an object as represented by the
understanding requires or includes the representation of space – that it is
impossible to entertain the thought of an object without the representation
of space. Rather, he is claiming that the intuitive representation of an object is
impossible without the representation of space. It is impossible to represent
an object by means of sensibility without the representation of space. 
Now in order to see how this helps our understanding of the profered
analysis, let us briefly set aside the frst proof and return to the preceding
tradition.  How  would  the  corresponding  analysis  look  under  German
Rationalism? Recall the crucial distinction between the German Rationalist
method and the Critical method brought to light in Part IV. In contrast to
the  Critical  method,  German Rationalist  analysis  does not  recognise  the
distinction  between  representations  of  the  understanding  and
representations of sensibility. In its analyses, German Rationalism treats all
representations  as  if  they  were  ultimately  representations  of  the
understanding. The only relations recognised between a representation and
some  proposed  mark  are  those  that  can  be  recognised  in  thought or
diferentiated by means of the understanding alone. Thus, in comparing the
representation  of  space  with  that  of  an  object  as  such,  we  are  to  test
whether the  concept of an object in general cannot be  thought without the
concept of space or whether it cannot be thought with it. We test whether it
153
is contradictory to think the concept of an object without that of the concept
of space. 
Our  result  here  in  the  case  of  the  German  Rationalist  comparison
between the representation of  space and that  of  an object,  then,  will  be
diferent to the Critical one above: There is no contradiction in thinking an
object without also thereby thinking the concept of space.79 Indeed, we can,
according to both German Rationalism and the Critical philosophy, form
the  concept  of  an  independent  substance  in  the  absence  of  any
representation of  spatial  properties  or  of  space.80 Admitedly,  under  the
German Rationalist account, once we think of two or more such substances,
the representation of space is included as a certain set of relations between
these  substances.81 However,  the  prior  concept  of  a  single  independent
substance is certainly not contradictory under the Leibnizian account. Thus,
in  contrast  to  the  Critical  analysis  of  these  representations,  the
representation of an object does not,  under German Rationalist  analysis,
require or include that of space. 
Similarly,  we might  ask  whether,  under  this  preceding tradition,  the
concept of space can be thought without the concept of an object in general.
Now, as noted above, the concept of space is the concept of a certain set of
relations that hold between individual substances or objects. Thus, under
the German Rationalist account, the concept of these individual substances
must precede the concept of any relations between them. And so, under
this account, it is not possible to represent space without the representation
of an object – the former requires or presupposes the later. Again then, we
have a contrasting result under German Rationalist analysis.
Thus,  an  entirely  diferent  analysis  is  yielded  under  German
Rationalism: The representation (concept) of an object does not require or
include  the  representation  (concept)  of  space,  while  the  representation
79 It  might  be  objected here that  this  does  not  hold unqualifedly.  Perhaps  under some
contemporary accounts, and certainly under Kant’s critical account, there is a sense in
which it  is contradictory to think an object  without  thinking thereby also thinking of
space. Under Kant’s account, there is a sense in which such a thought is ‘empty’, because
the only thoughts that we can have of actual or existing objects are sensible objects. It is
debatable whether this amounts to the thought being contradictory, however. 
Nevertheless, these considerations are not strictly relevant to our discussion here. What is
in question here is the German rationalist analysis. And since, under German rationalism,
the pure understanding can stand us in direct relation to an object, the worry does not
arise.
80 See, for example, B429, and Baumgarten (1739, §191).
81 See Baumgarten (1739, §§238-239).
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(concept) of space includes the representation (concept) of an object. Thus,
any atempted proof for the non-arbitrariness of the representation of space
on the basis of the impossibility of representing an object without it will not
go through, and the analysis must serve a quite diferent proof (viz. the
opposing claim that  the representation is  an empirically given concept).
Now this is noteworthy in the frst instance as it illustrates the diference in
relations and in analyses yielded under German Rationalism and under the
Critical  philosophy as  discussed in  Part  IV.  I  will  return  to  this  below.
Secondly, however, and what is of present interest, this contrast gives us
insight into the basis for the profered analyses: 
Under German Rationalist analysis, we arrive at the expositional claim
that the representation of an object does not require the representation of
space,  where  both  of  these  are  taken  to  be  representations  of  the
understanding or concepts. Put in another way, the concept of an object
does not presuppose the representation of space, or, we can think – that is,
represent  by  means  of  the  understanding  –  an  object  without  the
representation of space.  Now, in the case of this comparison, no special
problem seems to arise in admiting the claimed relations. The ground of
the  relations  is  not  especially  mysterious:  We examine our  concepts  for
what we already indistinctly think in them and simply ‘see’ that they bear
this  or  that  relation.  We  ‘see’  that  a  logical  contradiction  is  or  is  not
involved,  where  this  logical  contradiction  is  ultimately  a  mater  of
immediately  apprehending  that  the  two  must  or  cannot  be  thought
together. Put another way, as in Part IV, it is a mater of representability –
we simply apprehend that it is possible or impossible for us to represent
something. We apprehend that we cannot, by means of the understanding,
represent the two together (or must represent the two together). There is no
further inference or line of reasoning here that gives us the basis for the
claimed relations between the concepts, either under Kant’s view or under
the German Rationalist account. 
Evidence for this can be found in Kant’s discussions of philosophical
method and his distinction between immediate and mediate marks: In our
discussion in Parts III and IV, we saw that Kant distinguished those marks
whose relation to a concept was mediate and needed to be apprehended by
means  of  some  intermediate  mark  or  marks  from  those  marks  whose
relation  to  a  concept  was  immediate  and  could  be  apprehended  as
immediately found in a concept (and indeed, this held true for each of the
intermediate connections in the case of  mediate marks).  To reiterate the
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discussion of the concept of appetite in the Inquiry, Kant tells us that we are
“able  to  say  with  certainty  that  every  appetite  presupposed the
representation of the object of the appetite;i that this representation was an
anticipation of what was to come in the future;i that the feeling of pleasure
was connected with it;i and so forth. [We are]  constantly aware of all this in
the immediate consciousness of appetite.” (2:284, emphasis my own) In the case
of immediately certain marks then, the relation of mark to concept is  self-
evident.
The  crucial  rub  of  this  then  is  that,  if  the  ground  of  the  profered
relations in the case of concepts is not mysterious, then we need not fnd
them mysterious in the Critical case. In the case of concepts, we ‘see’ that
one concept requires another concept by apprehending that it is impossible
to represent, by means of the understanding, the one without the other (we
immediately apprehend conceptual presupposition or contradiction). And
so it is in the case of intuitions. So too we might ‘see’ that one intuition or
representation of  sensibility  requires  another  by apprehending that  it  is
impossible to represent, by means of sensibility, the one without the other. 
Returning to  the  second proof  then,  the  proposal  here  is  this.  In  the
expositional premise, Kant claims that it is impossible to represent an object
without space (but possible to represent space without any objects). Now,
as we have seen, this expositional claim does not seem to hold when we
take the claim to be conceptual. It is possible to think the concept of an
object without the representation of space. However, this is less plausible
when we take the representations to be intuitions: Suppose we consider the
(any) representation of a sensible object. Further, suppose that we consider
any such representation in abstraction from the representation of space. It
seems  that  we  have,  at  the  same  time,  removed  any  possibility  of
representing  the  sensible  object.  Once  we cease  representing  space  as  a
whole, we cease representing any external objects of the senses. And this
apprehension  is  immediate.  Just  as  we  apprehend  that  is  conceptually
impossible  to  represent  space  as  a  set  of  relations  between  individual
substances without representing substance, so too we apprehend that it is
intuitively  impossible  to  represent  an  object  of  the  senses  without  the
representation of space.
In the above, we have been examining the expositional claims found in
the  proofs  of  the  Metaphysical  Exposition,  claims  upon  which  the
Exposition crucially turns. We have seen that they are to be understood as
the uncovering of intuitive, rather than intellectual or conceptual, relations
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between our representations. And we have seen that such relations need
not  be  taken  to  be  any  more  mysterious  than  the  relations  between
concepts, when these are uncovered in analysis. 
It would seem, however, that more needs to be said. Our aim was to
uncover the ground for Kant’s profered expositions, or analyses, and the
basis on which he puts them forward as correct. Thus far, we have made
only a negative claim, viz. that, even though the relations are less familiar,
there is no further mystery that is added in the case of representations of
sensibility. Yet we have not put forward any positive claims in explanation
of the  analyses. We have not yet made out how it is that we are to tell that
some profered analysis is the correct one. (And indeed, for all we have
said, this question extends to the analysis of conceptual representations as
well  as  intuitive.)  We  might  then  reiterate:  What  is  the  basis  for  the
analyses? What justifes the claim that the ‘(sensible) representation of an
object requires or include the representation of space’, and the others like
it? 
These questions seem to lead to a search for some sort of further basis:
What are the criteria that we are to employ in order to tell whether certain
representations  bear  the  claimed relation  to  one another  or  no?  If  such
criteria could be uncovered in Kant’s account, then we would have some
basis for accepting one analysis of our representations rather than another.
Another way of formulating this point can be given by returning to our
claims in Part IV. As we saw there, the case in the appendix introduces a
further requirement into our analysis, viz. the requirement to recognise the
faculty  to  which  the  representations  under  comparison  belong,  or,  the
requirement of transcendental reflection. Such recognition allows for the
correct analysis of our representations by allowing us to employ the correct
terms of diferentiation, viz. those of the faculty of the representations in
question. If we recall, we are to employ explicitly those terms that are yet
only employed implicitly  in  the  case  of  the  still  obscure  representation.
However, the discussion in Part IV left the mater there. No more was said
as to what precisely these terms were. If we could give a specifcation of these
terms – the terms of diferentiation of the understanding and by contrast
those of sensibility – we would be able, by employing the correct terms, to
tell whether the analyses put forward were indeed correct, as Kant claims.
It would seem then that, in order to understand the basis of the analyses
put forward in the Metaphysical Exposition, we must turn to the faculties
of understanding and sensibility themselves. We must uncover the terms
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according to which the understanding diferentiates the relations between
marks in its representations and the terms according to which sensibility
diferentiates the relations between marks in its representations. 
The above line has some appeal. Yet I believe that, as an account of the
ground  of  the  profered  analyses  in  the  Metaphysical  Exposition,  it  is
incorrect. I do not think that such an account will tell us why Kant thinks
that we should accept the analyses as correct. There are at least two lines of
consideration  that  might  lead  us  to  this  conclusion.  The  frst  of  these
concerns the role that the expositional claims play within the proofs. Recall
our reconstruction of the proof as a reductio. The initial premises of the
argument explicitly suppose the representation of space to have a certain
ground  and  draw  out  the  implications  of  this  for  our  analysis  of  the
representation.  Following  these  premises,  the  expositional  premise  (or
premises) puts forward an analysis that conflicts with these implications.
Now, the expositional  premise (or premises) is  introduced ultimately  as
evidence for the ground of space (that is, as evidence that it has a ground other
than the one assumed). So, if we are looking for what it is that justifes the
expositional premise – for the appeal that is made in puting forward the
premise  –  this  cannot  be  an  implicit  appeal  to  the  ground  of  the
representation. It cannot be that, in examining the premise, we must make
sense of it or fnd its justifcation by an appeal to a certain faculty and its
terms of diferentiation, as suggested above. This would render the appeal
circular. Because the premise is ultimately meant to show that the faculty is
not the one in question, it  must introduce some sort of evidence that is
independent of any assumptions about the faculty of the representation of
space. The evidential force that the premise has must be other than this and
the premise(s) must, as it were, ‘hold itself up’ by some other means. The
line of reasoning moves from the expositional claims to a conclusion about
the ground of the representation. It thus cannot be that an implicit appeal
to the ground of the representation of space and its terms of diferentiation
is what grounds the expositional claim.
The second line of consideration concerns what the evidential force of
the premise does consist in. And it seems to me that our contrast with the
German  Rationalist  analysis  above,  along  with  Kant’s  remarks  in  the
Inquiry,  do  in  fact  already  give  us  all  that  we  need:  In  the  Inquiry’s
discussion of analysis, Kant draws the distinction between propositions of
which  we  can  be  mediately  certain  and those  that  admit  of  immediate
certainty. In some propositions connecting a proposed mark of an object to
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the representation of that object, the connection is established by means of
some further mark that  is  found in both the proposed mark and in the
representation of the object (thus by establishing propositions that connect
the original proposed mark and representation to this further mark). In the
case  of  propositions  related  in  this  way,  the  certainty  of  the  original
proposition is mediate – it is derived by inference from the propositions
that  mention  the  intermediate  mark.  In  the  case  of  other  propositions,
however,  and indeed in  the  case  of  each of  the  individual  propositions
forming  such  an  inference,  the  connection  between  mark  and
representation of the object is  established with certainty  immediately  and
without appeal to any intermediate marks. 
Now I take part of what Kant to mean here is that such propositions are
not established by appeal to any implicit  line of inference.  Rather,  these
propositions are  self-evident,  on the basis of the self-evidence of the relation
between the marks or representations in question. In considering or comparing
the  mark  and  representation  in  question,  we  simply  become  aware  of
relations that are already involved in our obscure awareness of them. As
Kant puts it  in the  Inquiry,  the marks involved in such propositions are
marks  of  which  “everyone  is  constantly  aware  […]  in  the  immediate
consciousness of [the object in question].” (2:284)
It is my view that the expositional claims of the Metaphysical Exposition
are such claims. As we have seen, Kant has not rejected this element of the
analysis  of  our  obscurely  given  representations  for  some  of  their
immediately certain marks at the time of the Critical method. He reiterates
in the Doctrine that we are to give expositions, as non-exhaustive analyses,
and does not  repeal  his  distinction between mediately  and immediately
certain propositions of such analyses. In the frst proof, we have a case of
the later. The expositional premise connects the representation of an object
with  the  representation  of  space  immediately.  The  premise  is  an
immediately certain proposition. It is self-evident on the basis of the self-
evidence  of  the  relations  between  the  representations  involved,  albeit
representations  of  sensibility.  And  I  believe  that  this  is  precisely  the
evidence that they provide for the proof’s further claims about the ground
of the representation.82 
82 Thus,  instead  of  a  prior  appeal  to  certain  terms  of  diferentiation  to  support  our
expositional claims, the immediate apprehension of our expositional claims results in an
understanding of the terms of diferentiation of the faculty in question. This is evident in
the conclusion that rests on the Metaphysical Exposition, viz. that spatial representation
is the form of sensibility. This conclusion about the most basic form of representation of
the faculty rests, in part, on the expositional claims themselves.
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What is  then needed is not an identifcation of some further claim or
criteria as the basis for these expositional claims. They are self-evident in
the way that the concept of an efect is presupposed in the concept of a
cause. To ask after further evidence for these claims is misdirected. What
we can ask for, however, is an explanation or account of how it is that we
might apprehend these immediately. And this, I think, can be given. 
The clue to this explanation again lies in considering the more familiar
case  of  concepts.   As  noted,  in  the  case  of  concepts,  we  immediately
apprehend  either  that  the  concept  without  the  mark  involves  a
contradiction (in the case of ‘identity’) or that the concept with the mark
involves a contradiction. Now why is it that we should able to immediately
apprehend such a contradiction?  A natural explanation here, and one that
indeed coheres with the picture that we have put forward so far, is that
such a contradiction just is a manifestation of the capacity for conceptual
representation.  The  capacity  for  conceptual  representation  precisely  is  a
capacity for certain forms or kinds of representation and not others. That a
certain  representation  is  impossible  (the  concept  with  the  mark  is
contradictory for example) is the manifestation of this. The representable
and  unrepresentable  relations  between  mark  and  indistinctly  given
representation precisely are what characterise the representative capacities
of the faculty in question. It is thus unsurprising that we should be able to
immediately apprehend these relations – what we apprehend precisely is
that our capacity for representation either does or does not allow for the
representation in question.
In the above, we have progressively examined the proofs in order to come
to an understanding of their workings, in light of our fndings in Parts III
and IV. Let us review our examination from the innermost structure of the
Metaphysical Exposition to its outermost. The Metaphysical Exposition is
indeed an exposition insofar as it puts forward a number of marks of the
representation of space that serve, in part, to bring it to distinctness as a
representation distinguished from other representations. As an exposition,
it puts forward the relation of various marks (themselves representations)
to the representation in question. As we have seen, however, in the case of
the  Metaphysical  Exposition,  these  various  marks or  representations  are
not always those that we would straightforwardly expect as those found in
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the  representation,  but  are  a  number  of  other  carefully  chosen
representations.
This surface-level exposition involves a number of further complicated
dimensions.  Focussing still  only on the expositions themselves,  we have
seen that the Critical account involves an intricate picture of how these are
to be established. In Part IV, we saw that the line of reasoning put forward
in  the  appendix  applied  to  the  frst  step  in  arriving  at  philosophical
cognition – to the analysis of our given representations. There we saw that,
in  order  to  determine  the  relations  between  proposed  marks  and  an
indistinctly given representation in question, it was necessary that we take
into account the faculty to which the representations in question belong
and  employ  its  terms  of  diferentiation.  We  have  now  seen  that  the
relations put forward in the expositional claims are the culmination of this
directive. As emphasised, at the start of the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant
directs us to isolate sensibility by seting aside all  representations of the
understanding  and  all  sensations,  in  order  to  focus  solely  on  the
representations of sensibility. Thus, the representations under comparison
in the expositional claims are to be taken as those of sensibility – they are to
be compared as representations of sensibility. And it is on the basis of this
recognition of faculty that the relations in the expositional claims are put
forward.  (A  qualifcation  to  this  was,  as  we  saw,  found  in  the
representation of space. Given that the Metaphysical Exposition is special
insofar as it  is  intended to establish the ground of the representation of
space, the faculty of the representation of space was, in the case of each
expositional premise, indeterminate.) 
Recognising this further dimension to the exposition gave us insight into
the ground and plausibility of the expositional claims themselves. As we
saw, if the proposed marks in each case were taken to be representations of
the understanding, or concepts, the expositional claims did not seem to be
true. The profered relations did not seem to hold. If, instead, we took the
proposed representations  to  be  those  of  sensibility,  and  allowed for  an
apprehension  of  intuitive  relations  analogous  to  the  logical,  then  the
expositional claims emerged looking no more mysterious or implausible
than the corresponding claims in the case of the relations between concepts.
Such  were  the  further  dimensions  to  the  surface-level  expositional
claims put forward in the Metaphysical Exposition. We have now seen how
these further dimensions are underlain by the changes to the method under
the Critical philosophy (in particular, by the changes implied by the line of
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reasoning of the appendix). But these claims do not, as we know, exhaust
the  Exposition.  Indeed,  the  exposition  is  ‘metaphysical’  insofar  as  it
“contains that which exhibits the concept as a priori given.” (B38) That is,
the Exposition further serves to show the ground of the representation of
space.  As we have seen, it  does so by including each expositional claim
within an argument that moves from the expositional claim to a conclusion
concerning the ground of the representation of space. Let us review these
arguments, or ‘proofs’, and their workings. 
In each proof, a frst,  implicit premise stipulates the representation of
space to have a certain ground. This premise serves as the assumption for a
reductio argument. The second premise then puts forward the implications
of this assumption of ground for the relations between the representation of
space  and the  proposed mark  in  question.  The  third  premise  (and any
subsequent  premises)  contrasts  these  implications  with  the  relations
established  between  the  representation  and  mark  in  analysis  (the
expositional premise). Together, these premises then serve to rule out the
initially  posited  ground.  Now,  what  was  of  interest  to  us  in  our
examination of the workings of the proofs individually were the later two
premises. These two premises involved claims (i) about the ground of the
representations under comparison and its implications for the analysis of
space, and (ii) the relations established by such analysis. 
The  later  of  these  we  have  discussed  as  the  ‘expositional’  premise
above, and we saw that its ground consisted in a self-evidence analogous to
that of  the logical.  Turning to the former,  we saw that the assumptions
concerning  ground  across  the  proofs  were  assumptions  concerning  the
ground of  the combination of  marks  found in the representation as  put
forward  in  the  fourfold  distinction  among  concepts  in  the  Doctrine  of
Method. We saw that supposing the combination of marks that constitutes
a representation to have one or the other of the four possible grounds put
forward in the Doctrine yields implications for the relations between the
representation in question and our other possible representations.
Having now covered the  workings  of  the  proofs  individually,  let  us
move  fnally  to  the  overall  complex  argument  that  constitutes  the
Metaphysical Exposition. In the case of each proof, we have only a negative
conclusion.  In  order  to  arrive  at  the  positive  conclusion  of  source,  the
argument follows a process of eliminating a fnite number of grounds. In
order to determine these grounds, we saw that we needed to consider the
changes to the Critical method uncovered both in the Doctrine of Method
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and in the line of reasoning to the appendix. In the Doctrine of Method,
Kant gives us a fourfold division of concepts in terms of ground into (i)
arbitrarily combined, (ii)  arbitrarily combined such that an object can be
given, (iii) empirically given, and (iv) given a priori.  The frst conclusion
serves to rule out the representation as empirically given (iii),  while the
second  serves  to  rule  out  the  representation  as  arbitrarily  combined
(thereby ruling out (i) and (ii)). As we saw, taking into account only the
discussion  in  the  Doctrine  of  Method,  the  Exposition  would have  been
concluded at this point. However, once we again took the line of reasoning
of  the  appendix  into  account,  recalling  that  the  obscurely  given
representations  in  need  of  analysis  for  the  propositions  of  philosophy
might come from one of  two distinct  faculties  – the understanding and
sensibility – it became clear that a further ground for the representation of
space needed to be ruled out, viz. space as given a priori by means of the
understanding. This was the task of the third and fourth proofs.
Such is the structure of the various sub-proofs and the overall complex
argument of the Metaphysical Exposition. As we have seen, our renewed
understanding of the Exposition is underlain at a number of places by the
Critical changes to philosophical method, as examined in Parts III and IV.83
83 Having  now  put  forward  the  above  account  of  the  Metaphysical  Exposition,  it  is
necessary to return to the accounts that were to be distinguished from what I termed the
‘standard’  account  of  the  Exposition.  The  following  three  accounts  are  to  be  so
distinguished  insofar  as  they  recognise  and  treat  the  expositional  nature  of  the
Metaphysical Exposition. These discussions, then, variously agree on many points with
the account presented here, but in no case does the discussion of the Exposition line up
entirely with it. I consider these in turn, highlighting those points that I take to constitute
their problematic points of departure from the account presented here:
(i) McGoldrick (1985, p. 257f.) explicitly recognises the arguments of the Metaphysical
Exposition as analyses of the concept of space. However, McGoldrick’s discussion still
fails to recognise the various corrections to analysis that Kant has made by the time of the
critical philosophy. Under McGoldrick’s account, the expositional claims put forward in
the proofs are one and all analytic claims that constitute an analysis of the concept of space,
which account thus overlooks Kant’s introduction of the analysis of representations of
sensibility and the further terms of diferentiation relevant to such analysis, which terms,
as  we  will  see,  yield  expositional  claims  that  are  intuitively  necessary,  though  not
conceptually necessary or, as McGoldrick has it, analytic.
(ii)  Leirfall’s  2004 discussion  of  the  Metaphysical  Exposition  focuses  explicitly  on  the
passages as expositions of the concept of space and on how the exposition of a given a
priori concept of philosophy contrasts with that of the defnition of a concept (as found in
mathematics). In many respects, Leirfall's insightful account of an exposition (that is, as
an incomplete analysis of what is contained in a given concept) coincides with what we
have presented here. As is the case with McGoldrick, however, our accounts crucially
part ways insofar as Leirfall emphasises the expositional claims as analytic judgements.
This  is  so,  according  to  Leirfall,  precisely  because  expositions  are  the  results  of  the
analysis of what is contained in a concept, which analysis must yield judgements that are
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And  what  then  is  the  outcome  of  this  new  exposition  of  the
representation  of  space,  as  complicated  in  these  various  ways  by  the
changes to the Critical method? The outcome is the following complex one:
First, and as noted in Part IV, by engaging in transcendental reflection in
the analysis of our obscurely given representations, we arrive at diferent
and corrected expositions. As we saw, the exposition of space contained in
the Metaphysical Exposition difers from that which would be given under
German Rationalism. Secondly, and crucially, the exposition allows for the
analytic. By contrast, under our account here, the critical correction to the analysis of our
given  representations  recognises  the  possible  analysis  of  intuitions,  which  analysis
involves  terms  of  diferentiation  that  diferentiate,  not  the  marks  as  predicates  of  a
concept by means of identity or contradiction yielding an analytic  judgement,  but the
marks of an intuition or representation of sensibility yielding, as we will see, a synthetic
judgement.
(iii) Messina’s account in  Conceptual Analysis and the Essence of Space (2015) is by far the
most intricate treatment of the Metaphysical Exposition as an exposition of the concept of
space.  In  it,  Messina  gives  a  detailed  treatment  of  the  nature  and  ground  of  the
expositional claims, as well as a reconstruction of the frst proof in light of his fndings. In
agreement  with  the  account  presented  here,  Messina  recognises  (i)  the  expositional
nature of  the key premises of  the proofs,  (ii)  these  key premises  as containing claims
about  the  objective  marks  involved  in  the  concept  in  question,  (iii)  the  proofs  as
proceeding from these expositional claims to their respective conclusions. 
Messina parts ways from what is presented here, however, in his account (i) of the nature
of the representations under analysis, (ii) of the justifcation or ground of the expositional
claims, and in his account (iii) of the ontological import of the claims. Each of these points
of diference is underlain by an account of Kant’s Critical view of analysis that is more
continuous with his pre-Critical account than our discussion in Parts II – IV reveal: (i) As
with  McGoldrick  and  Leirfall’s  accounts,  Messina  views  the  representation  under
analysis  as  being  the  concept  of  space.  Thus,  as  with  the  other  accounts,  Messina’s
discussion does not recognise any critical introduction of the possibility of the analysis of
representations of sensibility, and its concomitant additional terms of diferentiation. (ii)
Under Messina’s account, the expositional claims are grounded in an examination of our
“modal  intuitions  (in  the  contemporary  philosophical  sense  of  the  term,  not  Kant’s)
whose evidential status is constrained by the results and method of pure mathematics”
(2015, p. 418). That is, analysis of the concept of space involves a modal consideration of
what would or would not constitute a case of space. As we will see in more detail below,
the account presented here difers from this insofar as the expositional claims are self-
evident  claims  about  the  nature  of  the  representation  of  space  that  are  ultimately
grounded in the constraints presented by the nature of our faculties.  (iii)  Finally,  and
relatedly,  Messina’s  account  claims  that  the  expositional  claims  presented  in  the
Exposition have ontological import insofar as the analysis is fundamentally one of space
as the object, and not merely of the representation. This, Messina claims, is justifed by a
continuity in Kant’s view of analysis from the time of the Inquiry to the Critique. Analysis,
according to Messina, still can yield truths about the essence of the object in question,
though these results are defeasible by the results of the established sciences of geometry
and mathematics. By contrast, the account we have presented here and in Part II – IV
puts forward a diferent picture of the ontological import of any expositional claims. As
discussed  in these  earlier  parts,  the  fourfold division  of  concepts  put  forward in the
Doctrine  now  involves  a  recognition  of  the  question  of  the  relation  between  a
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identifcation of  a  representation that  is  given by the  nature  of  sensibility.
Prior to the Critical recognition of the distinctness of the understanding and
sensibility, and the ensuing demand for transcendental reflection, there was
no possibility of identifying such a representation because there was no
possibility  of  such  representations  at  all.  Under  the  German Rationalist
account, all representations featuring in our philosophical cognition were
concepts. Under the Critical account, however, cognition requires both the
understanding  and  sensibility,  and  the  failure  to  identify  any  such
representation or representations will  result  in a failure of  philosophical
cognition tout court. Thus, the outcome of the identifcation of space as a
representation given a priori, ultimately allows for the possibility of a priori
or philosophical cognition, a possibility deeply in question at the start of
the Critique.
V. Bringing to distinctness: The Critique as culmination of Critical method
In the  above,  we have examined in  detail  a  part  of  the  Transcendental
Aesthetic,  the  Metaphysical  Exposition  of  Space,  in  light  of  the  various
fndings put forward in Parts III and IV. In what follows, I turn to a fnal
brief broader discussion of analysis as it has come to light under the Critical
account, to examine its relation to the German Rationalist tradition and to
understand more clearly the place and signifcance of the Aesthetic within
the Critique.  
philosophical  representation  and  its  object.  Analysis  of  a  philosophical  concept  now
serves  only  to  bring  the  representation to  distinctness,  and  the  relation  of  the
representation  to  the  object  is  a  further  question.  In  the  case  of  philosophical
representations of the understanding, as we saw, Kant insists on a transcendental proof
in order to establish this relation. (Indeed, we might, under Messina’s account, wonder
why the concept of space, being a concept, needs no such proof.) By contrast, in the case
of representations  of  sensibility,  we stand in immediate  relation to an object by their
means, and thus once they have been shown to be representations given a priori (that is,
to be representations due to the nature of our faculties), philosophical representations of
sensibility  can be  taken to  stand us  in  relation  to  an object.  The account  here of  the
ontological import of the representation of space is thus quite diferent from Messina’s
and is one that can be given only under the supposition that the representations under
analysis in the Metaphysical Exposition are not concepts. 
A fnal point of contrast between our account and Messina’s concerns their respective
understandings of the overall series of proofs and their respective conclusions. Messina
does not recognise the series of proofs as constituting an argument by elimination of the
three possible grounds of a concept, as underlain by Kant’s discussion in the Doctrine,
and thus neither recognises the conclusions of the proofs as concerning these grounds nor
their unity as a series of proofs. 
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As noted in Part IV, Kant remains commited to the same basic picture
of the frst stage of philosophical cognition as that of the preceding pre-
Critical tradition. The representations of philosophy are “given […] though
perhaps only still  confused…” (A730/B758),  and we are to  arrive  at  the
“distinct  representation”  (A728/756)  of  such  (still  confused)  given
representations by means of analysis. The early parts of the  Critique  put
forward the results of this analysis. Indeed, in the early parts of the Critique,
we  fnd,  as  we  would  in  a  German  Rationalist  taxonomy  like  the
Metaphysica, a list of the most elemental representations that will go on to
feature in our philosophical cognition. In this, the need for and legitimacy
of analysis, the Critique is thus continuous with its preceding tradition.
Beneath  this  continuity,  however,  the  Critique diverges  dramatically
from its German Rationalist counterparts. In the frst instance, the analyses
put  forward  under  the  Critical  philosophy  involve  the  further  task  of
showing the representations to be representations of philosophy. That is,
the  analyses  found  on  the  pages  of  the  Critique must  establish  the
representations as due to the nature of our faculties, rather than due to the
nature of empirical objects or arbitrary combination. As we can now see,
this task is carried out diferently for representations of the understanding
and  for  those  of  sensibility.  In  the  case  of  the  understanding,  the
identifcation of any philosophical representations proceeds directly from
an  examination  of  the  faculty  of  understanding  itself  and  its  forms  of
representation  (the  forms  of  judgement).  In  the  case  of  sensibility,  by
contrast, an additional proof is needed to establish the representations as
due to the nature of the faculty. Thus, the Critique involves the addition of
the Metaphysical Deduction and Metaphysical Exposition. 
Establishing the representations as  due to the nature of our faculties,
however, is not the only signifcant change to the taxonomy of elemental
representations  found  in  the  Critique.  Kant’s  Critical  claim  of  the
distinctness  of  the  understanding  and  sensibility  results  in  a  further
change. Given this claim of distinctness, it is additionally necessary, when
identifying  a  representation  as  due  to  the  nature  of  our  faculties,  to
distinguish  which  of  these  faculties  is  at  work.  An  exposition  of  our
philosophical representations as due to the nature of faculties must specify
whether a representation in question is due to the understanding or due to
sensibility.   Again,  the  Metaphysical  Deduction  and  Metaphysical
Exposition carry out this further task. 
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Further,  again given the claim of distinctness,  the Critical  philosophy
diverges  from  its  predecessors  in  the  introduction  of  further  terms  of
diferentiation in the very analysis of these representations. Under German
Rationalism,  the  marks  of  our  obscurely  given  representations  were
diferentiated  as  marks  of  representations  of  the  understanding  or  as
predicates of concepts. Under the Critical account, however, further terms
of diferentiation are introduced – terms that diferentiate representations
of  sensibility  rather  than the  understanding.  Thus,  the  relation between
mark and indistinctly given representation, put forward in the analyses of
the taxonomy, are diferentiated, under the Critical account, according to
the terms of diferentiation of sensibility.
The culmination of these divergences from German Rationalism is the
addition  of  precisely  the  section  that  we  have  been  examining  –  the
Transcendental Aesthetic. This section constitutes a hitherto unrecognised
distinct part of any such taxonomy and a part that is, under the Critical
account, absolutely necessary if we are to arrive at philosophical cognition.
We can thus recognise its place as a distinct and prior section, added at the
frst stage of the account of our philosophical cognition. 
A fnal point of discontinuity that we might emphasise before turning to
some brief discussion of the Aesthetic itself is the diference across the two
accounts  in  the  objectivity  of  these  representations.  Under  German
Rationalism, as we saw, an analysis of our obscurely given representations
is itself sufcient to yield the marks of the objects of the representations.
This  was  grounded  in  an  assumed  relation  of  cognition  between  the
understanding and the objects of philosophy. In the Critique, however, the
analyses put forward in the expositions of our given representations is not
itself sufcient to establish anything about any objects. The relation of these
representations  to  any  objects  is  a  further  step  required  in  securing
philosophical cognition. Thus, the Critique involves the sections succeeding
the Metaphysical Exposition, in which Kant addresses the question of the
relation of the philosophical representations of sensibility to objects (and
the nature of these objects),  and the Transcendental Deduction, in which
Kant  establishes  the  relation  of  the  philosophical  representations  of  the
understanding to  objects  (and indeed which involves,  in  its  course,  the
crucial qualifcation that there are no representations of the understanding
alone that stand us in relation to objects). Thus, analysis is, under both the
German  Rationalist  account  and  under  the  Critical  philosophy,  both
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necessary and legitimate. The reasons underlying this legitimacy, however,
are, as we have seen, radically diferent.
Having seen the ways in which the taxonomy put forward in the pages
of  the  Critique  is  continuous  with  preceding  German  Rationalist
taxonomies, and the ways in which it more crucially difers, we can turn
fnally to a brief re-examination of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Having
charted our fndings in the above, we can now read the Transcendental
Aesthetic with a renewed understanding. In the frst instance, we can see
that the Transcendental Aesthetic is indeed a part of the carrying out of the
very  frst  task  required  for  philosophical  cognition  –  the  bringing  to
distinctness of our elemental representations. The Transcendental Aesthetic
is the distinct exposition of certain of those elemental representations that
are due to sensibility. As such, we might indeed expect to fnd it, as we do,
in the very early parts of the Doctrine of Elements. 
Secondly,  insofar  as  the  Aesthetic  deals  with  our  elemental  intuitive
representations,  it  constitutes  a  previously  unrecognised  addition  to  any
such  taxonomy.  Carrying  out  the  task  of  distinguishing  the  various
elemental  representations  of  philosophy  under  any  prior  German
Rationalist  account,  or  indeed under  Kant’s  pre-Critical  account,  would
involve puting forward the various elemental concepts that feature in our
philosophical  cognition.  However,  the  Aesthetic  identifes  and  puts
forward elemental representations that are not concepts, but intuitions.
Thirdly,  we can now understand more  clearly  how the  addition and
successful  carrying  out  of  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic  is  absolutely
necessary  for  the  overall  project  of  philosophical  cognition.  The Critical
account demands that any conceptual representations (elemental or indeed
propositions) be applicable to the sensible. Thus, philosophical cognition
requires that there are some intuitive representations that are given a priori.
Without  the  addition  of  the  Aesthetic,  or  indeed  if  the  Aesthetic  went
astray  in  its  expositions  or  failed  to  yield  any such representations,  the
Critique subsequent to it could not be writen. 
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Part VI
Revisiting the appendix
At the outset of this study, we began with an examination of the case in the
appendix (Part  I).  There we saw that  Kant  introduces and treats  a new
subject  mater,  the  concepts  of  reflection,  which  concepts  subsume  the
relations of representations ‘among themselves’. We also saw that, in the
brief introduction to the appendix, Kant puts forward a complex argument
regarding  the  correct  employment  of  these  concepts.  He  claimed
transcendental reflection to be necessary for their correct employment, and
their correct employment to be necessary for a priori cognition.
In this sixth and fnal Part, I wish to return to this case and the various
questions and puzzles that it raised, to examine it in light of the fndings
that we have uncovered in the preceding part and to have it fnally before
us with beter clarity. I begin, in Section I, with a brief reiteration of the case
in the appendix before turning to a re-examination of it, now in light of the
various fndings that we have uncovered in Parts II to V. In Section II, I
address  some  of  the  more  specifc  questions,  puzzles,  and  speculations
presented in Part I and show their resolution according to these fndings.
Finally, in Section III, I return to the formulation of the case in the appendix
that is familiar in the literature – the formulation with which we began our
study.  I  will  bring  to  light  the  various  ways  in  which  this  formulation
uncovers  only  a  part  of  the  far  more  complex  and systematic  case  put
forward by Kant in the appendix.
I. Revisiting the introduction’s line of reasoning
As is  familiar,  the  case  in  the  appendix  concerns  the  newly introduced
concepts of reflection. In contrast to preceding concepts treated in the main
part of the Transcendental Logic, these concepts subsume, not objects, but
the relations between the representations of the subject. The introduction to the
appendix,  as  we saw, puts  forward an argument concerning the correct
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employment  of  these  concepts.  This  argument  proceeded  in  two  broad
steps:
In the frst of these steps, Kant put forward a condition for the correct
employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection.  This  condition  is  that  any
employment of these concepts be preceded by an awareness of the faculty
to which the representations are atributable. Put diferently, their correct
employment  requires  transcendental  reflection:  Supposing  some
representations to be in question, the relations that we are to take to hold
between them, Kant tells us, will difer depending on the faculty that we
take them to be atributable to. That is,  if  the representations are due to
some given faculty, the concepts of reflection will subsume certain relations
between them, and if due to some other faculty, the concepts of reflection
will subsume diferent relations between them. Thus, the employment of
the concepts of reflection will  difer across a diference in the faculty to
which we take the representations to be atributable, and thus their correct
employment will depend on correctly apprehending the faculty to which
the representations are in fact due. Such is the frst step of the argument of
the introduction.
In the second step of the argument, we are reminded that it is not merely
the relations of representations among themselves that is of concern. Our
concern is to arrive at a priori cognition, and our interest in the concepts of
reflection  is  ultimately  an  interest  in  their  role  in  such  cognition.  In
subsuming the relevant relations under the concepts of reflection, we want
not only to subsume the relations between certain representations simply
as  representations.  Rather,  we  want  such  subsumption  to  be  at  once  a
subsumption  of  the  relations  that  hold  between  the  objects  of  those
representations.  What  is  necessary  for  such  objective  comparison,
according to the argument, is that the relations among our representations
themselves be established correctly. That is, the correct employment of the
concepts  of  reflection  is  necessary  for  the  objective  comparison  of  the
representations  in  question.  Thus,  since  a  condition  for  the  correct
employment of the concepts of reflection is the correct apprehension of the
faculty to which the representations belong – transcendental reflection –
and since their correct employment is necessary for objective comparison,
so  too  is  transcendental  reflection  necessary  for  objective  comparison.
Finally, since objective comparison is necessary for a priori cognition, we
see  that  such  reflection  and the  correct  employment  of  the  concepts  of
reflection is necessary for such cognition. 
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Such is the picture put forward in the introduction to the appendix. The
concepts of reflection play a crucial role in a priori cognition: Their correct
employment is necessary for the possibility of such cognition. And, so too,
the condition for their correct employment – transcendental reflection – is
shown to be essential in arriving at such cognition.
Thus, the argument yielded a distinction between two ways in which the
relations of our representations to one another might be determined, or,
equivalently,  two  ways  in  which  the  concepts  of  reflection  might  be
employed. They might be employed such that we are aware of the faculty
to  which  the  representations  belong.  That  is,  their  employment  might
involve transcendental reflection. Or they might be employed such that we
are not so aware.  The former allows for the objective comparison of the
representations, and thus for philosophical cognition, while the later rules
out  such  objective  comparison,  and  thereby  rules  out  the  possibility  of
philosophical cognition.
More formally, the line of reasoning was rendered as follows:
(1) For any given representations, a diference in the faculty to which they
are atributable implies a diference in the relations we are to take to hold
between them (a diference in the way in which the concepts of reflection
are to be employed). 
(2) In our case, our representations are atributable to either one of two
distinct  and mutually dependent cognitive faculties,  the understanding
and sensibility. 
(3) Thus, the correct determination of the relations of our representations
among themselves requires the taking into account of the faculty to which
the representations belong (transcendental reflection).
(4) The objective comparison of representations, i.e. comparison such that
not only the relations among our representations are determined, but the
relations  among  the  objects  of  those  representations  are  also  thereby
determined, requires the correct determination of the relations among our
representations.
(5)  Thus,  transcendental  reflection  is  necessary  for  the  possibility  of
objective comparison.
(6)  Objective  comparison  is  necessary  for  the  possibility  of  a  priori
cognition. 
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(7)  Thus,  transcendental  reflection  is  necessary  for  the  possibility  of  a
priori cognition.
Such is  the now-familiar line of  reasoning with which we began our
study.  Let  us  then,  in  the  rest  of  this  section,  turn  to  what  has  been
uncovered over  the  course  of  this  study and to  re-examine  this  line  of
reasoning in light of it. 
Over the course of this study, we have uncovered a rich account of the
frst stage of arriving at philosophical cognition, a stage shared by both the
Critical  philosophy  and  its  German  Rationalist  predecessors:  Prior  to
philosophical cognition proper, we are, by means of a multitude of various
representations, aware of the various objects of our cognition, albeit often
only haphazardly and indistinctly.  Now, certain of these representations
stand us in relation to the objects with which philosophy is concerned, and
the aim of philosophy is to establish the propositions that hold of these
objects.84 Thus, the frst step in arriving at such propositions is to separate
out and make distinct those representations that will be relevant to such
cognition, from this multitude of haphazard and indistinct representations.
These  are  the  representations  that  will  go  on  to  feature  in  these
propositions  and  the  gradual  bringing  to  distinctness  of  these
representations is a mater of the procedure of analysis. 
What came to light in our study was that such analysis was not merely a
mater  of  giving  atention  to  indistinct  representations  of  which  we  are
usually haphazardly or indiferently aware. The marks of the objects of the
representations  in  question  could  not  be  brought  to  distinctness  in  this
way.  What  we  found  was  that  the  diferentiation  of  these  marks,  both
under  the  pre-Critical  and  the  Critical  accounts,  involved  an  implicit
subjective dimension. In order ultimately to diferentiate the marks of the
object in such analysis, an awareness (implicit or explicit) of the cognitive
faculty by means of which we stand in relation to the object in the case of
the representation was necessary. The way in which we were then to set
about diferentiating the marks of the object was according to the way in
which that faculty diferentiates the marks of objects in its representing the
object. It was only by means of these terms that we secure the possibility of
philosophical cognition by means of the representation in question. 
84 There  is,  of  course,  crucial  divergence  between  German  Rationalism  and  the  critical
account both as to which objects these are and as to how and why certain of our initially
indistinct representations stand us in relation to these objects.
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It was here, in the above frst step in arriving at philosophical cognition,
that the line of reasoning of the appendix had its application – and indeed
here  that  we  can  locate  the  relevant  employment  of  its  crucial  subject
mater,  the  concepts  of  reflection.  As  noted  in  Part  I,  the  concepts  of
reflection have a standard employment.  Most familiarly,  the concepts of
reflection are employed in comparing concepts with one another for their
relations, which comparison yields the logical form of the judgements that
connect the concepts so related. This standard employment is ‘logical’ or
‘mere’ comparison, and is to be found in  all cases in which concepts are
employed or compared, whether these concepts are empirical or a priori (or
indeed  even  arbitrarily  combined).  And  we  can  locate  this  standard
employment in the above frst step in arriving at philosophical cognition.
Where our indistinctly given representations in need of analysis are those
of the understanding, that is, concepts, we fnd a species of this standard
employment of the concepts of reflection. In bringing the indistinctly given
concepts  of  our  philosophical  cognition  to  distinctness,  the  concepts  of
reflection are employed, now explicitly, in order to diferentiate the marks
of these philosophical concepts.85 
Now,  as  we  have  seen,  German  Rationalist  analysis  consists  in  this.
Under the German Rationalist account, this standard employment of the
concepts  of  reflection,  now  applied  to  the  case  of  the  concepts  of
philosophy, serves to bring the marks of (the objects of) these indistinctly
given representations to distinctness.  However,  this  does not,  under the
Critical  account,  sufce  in  order  to  render  distinct  the  representations
needed for our philosophical cognition. Under the Critical account, among
85 It  might  here  be  objected  that  the  ‘standard’  employment  of  the  concepts  is  an
employment  found  in  the  case  of  empirical  judgements,  and  thus  that  their  being
employed  in  this  way,  this  time  explicitly,  in  order  to  diferentiate  a  priori  or
philosophical concepts is problematic. 
In response to this worry, we need only note that the concepts of philosophy ultimately
distinguished under the critical account, the schematised concepts, are nonetheless still
concepts,  despite their being non-empirical, and their featuring in any propositions or
judgements,  albeit  the  a priori  judgements  of  philosophy,  will  thus  still  involve their
being distinguished as concepts. Insofar as both involve (at least) a relating of concepts to
one another, this employment of the concepts of reflection is found in every empirical
judgement as well as every philosophical judgement.
In fact, this standard employment of the concepts of reflection has a dual nature, both in
the  empirical  case  and  in  the  case  of  the  a  priori  given  schematised  concepts:  The
concepts of reflection are employed in the very initial  (unconscious)  formation of our
concepts, and they are also employed in every case in which these concepts are applied in
a judgement. Longuenesse (1998) treats this dual nature in her discussion of the concepts
of reflection. I discuss this treatment in the objections and replies of Part VII.
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the  haphazard  and  indistinctly  given  representations  relevant  to  our
philosophical cognition are also representations of sensibility. In the case of
these representations,  this standard employment is  inadequate.  Diferent
and further terms of  diferentiation were required for representations of
sensibility – viz. the terms of diferentiation of sensibility itself. 
Now  it  might  be  that,  even  given  the  Critical  recognition  of  both
representations of sensibility and the understanding in our philosophical
cognition, the role of the concepts of reflection in such cognition ends at the
point put forward above. From further terms of diferentiation, it need not
follow that the concepts of reflection subsume anything but the relations
between concepts. Referring back to the line of reasoning of the appendix,
however, we fnd that these concepts in fact have a further employment.
They are employed in the case of sensibility as well, in order to bring its
representations to distinctness: As they are characterised at the start of the
appendix, the concepts of reflection do not merely subsume the relations
between  concepts,  but  “the  relations  of  [given  representations]  among
themselves” (A260/B316). Thus, the concepts of reflection diferentiate  our
representations in general, both those of the understanding and sensibility. Of
this diferentiation of our representations in general, the line of reasoning
tells  us  the  “correct  determination  of  [these]  relation[s]  [viz.  those
subsumed  under  the  concepts  of  reflection]  depends  on  the  cognitive
power  in  which  they  subjectively  belong  to  each  other,  whether  in
sensibility  or  in  understanding.  For  the  diference  in  the  later makes  a
great diference in the way in which one ought to think of the former.”
(A261/B317) Thus, the line of reasoning of the appendix tells us that these
concepts  are employed both with regard to diferentiating representations
of the understanding and representations of sensibility, but that they will
be  employed  diferently  across  the  two  cases  –  representations  of  the
understanding  and  sensibility  are  to  be  diferentiated  diferently.  Thus,
their  more  familiar  standard  employment  in  the  case  of  concepts  in
yielding the logical form of judgement is  one species  of  a more general
employment, viz. the diferentiation of our representations in general. The
diferentiation of representations of sensibility is equally an employment of
the concepts of reflection. And in analysis then, we fnd an employment of
the  concepts  of  reflection  that  is  additional  to  their  standard,  familiar
employment in distinguishing concepts. The concepts of reflection equally
diferentiate the representations of sensibility.
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Thus, in analysis, the concepts of reflection are employed with regard to
diferentiating  both  the  representations  of  the  understanding  and  the
representations of sensibility. We can locate their employment, and indeed
identify an additional such employment, in this frst stage in arriving at
philosophical cognition. Let us turn then to the line of reasoning found in
the introduction to the appendix that concerns the correct employment of
these concepts and their role in a priori cognition. We are now in a position
to see that this line of reasoning applies to the employment of the concepts
of reflection in analysis, as we have located it above. 
Beginning with the later, second, step in this line of reasoning, we recall
that Kant’s concern was with the role of the concepts of reflection in a priori
cognition, and claimed their correct employment to be necessary for such
cognition. Now, the relevant employment of the concepts of reflection is
located  in  the  diferentiation  of  our  various  obscure  and  indistinct
representations that will go on to feature in our philosophical cognition –
the  concepts  subsume the  relations  of  these  to  one  another.  What  their
correct employment consists in, then, is the correct diferentiation of these
indistinct  representations.  Employed correctly,  the  concepts  of  reflection
will allow us to bring a representation to distinctness such that we correctly
diferentiate  its  marks.  Now,  this  is  signifcant  insofar  as  these  are  the
concepts  that,  in the distinct  step of  transcendental  proof,  are shown to
stand us in relation to objects. In order for these to be representations of
which this can so be shown, and thus to be representations that allow for
philosophical  cognition,  their  correct  diferentiation is  necessary to  start
with.  Thus,  in  diferentiating  these  representations,  we  ultimately
diferentiate the marks of the objects to which we will be shown to stand in
relation, the objects of philosophy. 
Thus, in the above, we can see both why the correct employment of the
concepts  of  reflection  is,  as  the  appendix  claims,  necessary  for  a  priori
cognition, and we can understand the distinctness and possibility of the
‘objective  comparison’  of  representations,  which  previously  seemed  to
elude us.  This  later,  objective comparison,  was mysterious  insofar  as  it
seemed to involve the claim that, in establishing the relations between our
representations as representations, we could at once thereby establish the
relations between the objects of those representations. However, it seemed
that the line of reasoning of the appendix was commited to the possibility
and necessity of such comparison in our philosophical cognition, and this
comparison  was  not  dismissed  as  part  of  the  failings  of  the  German
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Rationalist  tradition.  Here  we can see  how such comparison is  possible
under the Critical account, and indeed, necessary. Establishing the relations
between our representations among themselves is the aim of analysis and
requires the employment of the concepts of reflection. However, once the
transcendental  proofs  have  been  carried  out,  it  turns  out  that  this
diferentiation was at once the diferentiation of the marks of the objects of
the  representations.  Here  then,  we  have  an  understanding  of  objective
comparison  that  is  legitimate  under  the  Critical  account.  Further,  this
comparison is distinct from philosophical cognition itself. It is the bringing
to distinctness of the marks of the representations that will go on to feature
in the synthetic  a priori  judgements of  our philosophical  cognition,  and
thereby  a  bringing  to  distinctness  of  the  marks  of  the  objects  of  the
representations,  but  it  is  not  the  establishing  of  these  judgements
themselves.
Having  now  in  hand  an  understanding  of  the  second  step  of  the
appendix’s argument, we might turn to its frst step. In this frst step, Kant
was,  I  claimed,  concerned  with  the  employment  of  the  concepts  of
reflection in isolation from cognition, and put forward a condition for their
correct employment in the activity of transcendental reflection. Again, we
are now in a position to understand the line of reasoning – to see what the
correct employment of these concepts consists in, and why such reflection
is  necessary  for  this  correct  employment.  In  the  above,  we  located  the
employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection  in  the  diferentiation  of  our
indistinctly  given  representations.  The  concepts  of  reflection,  we  noted,
subsume the relations of these representations to one another. Their correct
employment thus consists  in correctly diferentiating the marks of  these
representations in bringing them to distinctness.  Now, in the above,  we
have seen the condition for this. These representations are representations
of the marks of objects as diferentiated by a certain faculty. Thus, in order
to  diferentiate  these  marks  correctly,  we  need  to  employ  the  terms  of
diferentiation of the faculty to which the representation is due. We thus
need to compare the representation “with the cognitive power in which [it
is] situated” (A261/B317) or, in a word, engage in transcendental reflection.
We can thus fnally bring to light the role of transcendental reflection in
philosophical  cognition.  Such  cognition  must  begin  by  a  bringing  to
distinctness  of  certain  indistinct  representations  found  in  empirical
experience.  In doing so,  however, we must begin by being aware of the
faculty of the representation or representations in question. This awareness
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allows us correctly to diferentiate the representation by adopting the very
terms of diferentiation of the faculty to which the representation is due.
And this  correct  diferentiation,  in  turn,  allows us,  albeit  in  conjunction
with the further task of transcendental proof, to diferentiate the marks of
the  objects  to  which  we  will  ultimately  stand  in  relation  when  the
representation appears in our philosophical propositions. 
And thus, we can read the introductory passages to the appendix in a
new light: 
Reflection (refexio) does not have to do with objects themselves, in order
to acquire concepts directly from them, but is rather the state of mind in
which we frst prepare ourselves to fnd out the subjective conditions
under which we can arrive at  concepts.  It  is  the consciousness  of  the
relation of  given  representations  to  our  various  sources  of  cognition,
through which alone their relation among themselves can be correctly
determined.  The  frst  question  prior  to  all  further  treatment  of  our
representation  is  this:  In  which  cognitive  faculty  do  they  belong
together? Is it the understanding or is it the senses before which they are
connected or compared?
All  judgements,  indeed  all  comparisons,  require  a  reflection,  i.e.,  a
distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong.
The action through which I make the comparison of representations in
general  with  the  cognitive  power  in  which  they  are  situated,  and
through which I  distinguish whether they are to  be compared to one
another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition, I
call  transcendental  reflection.  The  relation,  however,  in  which  the
concepts in a state of mind can belong to each other are those of identity
and diference, of agreement and opposition, of the inner and the outer,
and fnally of the determinable and the determination (mater and form).
The  correct  determination  of  this  relation  depends  on  the  cognitive
power  in  which  they  subjectively  belong  to  each  other,  whether  in
sensibility or in understanding. For the diference in the later makes a
great diference in the way in which one ought to think of the former.
Prior to all objective judgements we compare the concepts, with regard
to identity (of many representations under one concept) for the sake of
universal judgements, or their diference, for the generation of particular
ones,  with  regard  to  agreement,  for  afrmative  judgements,  or
opposition,' for negative ones, etc. On this ground it would seem that we
ought  to  call  these  concepts  concepts  of  comparison  (conceptus
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comparationis). But since, if it is not the logical form but the content of
concepts  that  is  concerned,  i.e.,  whether  the  things  themselves  are
identical or diferent, in agreement or in opposition, etc., the things can
have a twofold relation to our power of cognition, namely to sensibility
and  to  understanding,  yet  it  is  this  place  in  which  they  belong  that
concerns  how  they  ought  to  belong  to  each  other,  then  it  is
transcendental reflection, i.e., the relation of given representations to one
or the other kind of cognition, that can alone determine their relation
among themselves, and whether the things are identical or diferent, in
agreement or in opposition, etc., cannot immediately be made out from
the  concepts  themselves  through  mere  comparison  (comparatio),  but
rather only through the distinction of the kind of cognition to which they
belong, by means of a transcendental reflection (refexio).
[T]ranscendental reflection, […] (which goes to the objects themselves)
contains the ground of the possibility of the objective comparison of the
representations to each other, and is therefore very diferent from the
other, since the cognitive power to which the representations belong is
not  precisely  the  same.  This  transcendental  reflection  is  a  duty  from
which  no one can escape if  he  would judge anything about  things a
priori.
(A260-3/B316-9, emphasis omited)
II. The puzzles revisited
Having now in hand a beter understanding of the concepts of reflection
and their role in a priori cognition, we are now in a position to set aside the
remaining questions and puzzles that arose in our initial discussion of the
case in the appendix. I turn now to an examination of these as they arose in
Part I. 
Our  initial  questions  concerned  the  concepts  of  reflection  and  their
employment. According to the line of reasoning, the concepts are employed
in the comparison of representations for their relations among themselves
and they subsume these relations. Yet we had not established what such
comparison  and  the  relations  in  question  amounted  to,  nor  had  we
established how we were to understand the representations ‘themselves’. 
To  begin  with  the  later,  recall  that  our  initial  atempt  to  clarify  the
appeal  to  ‘representations  as  representations’  introduced  a  threefold
distinction: We distinguished between (i) the (subjective) determinations of
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representations themselves, (ii) the represented (objective) determinations
of the object, and (iii) the (objective) determinations of objects themselves.
We  can  now  see  that  Kant  is  indeed  commited  to  such  subjective
determinations – and indeed to the trifold distinction. The representations
in analysis (and indeed in our cognition) are to be characterised in certain
ways ‘as representations’– that is, they have features beyond the features
represented as part of the objective content and the features of the object
itself.  This  point  is  not  entirely  unfamiliar.  Indeed,  such  features  are
invoked in Kant’s distinction between concepts and intuitions. What is less
familiar, however, is the subjective character of these representations as this
comes to light in the case in the appendix. Our familiar understanding of
the  determinations  of  concepts  themselves  is  their  mediacy,  and  of
intuitions  their  immediacy.86 The  picture  presented  in  the  appendix,
however,  concerns  the  relations  or  connections  between  the  marks
combined  in  a  representation  (or  indeed  between  this  combination  of
marks  and  other  representations  as  combinations  of  marks).  We  were
presented with a picture under which these connections varied according
to the faculty of the representation in question. In the frst instance then, the
appendix  revealed  a  distinction  between  concepts  as  combinations  of
marks that bear certain logical or conceptual relations to one another and
intuitions  as  combinations  of  marks  bearing  intuitive  relations  to  one
another – as combinations of marks that are intuitively connected.
Secondly,  the  argument  of  the  appendix  revealed  an  interesting
dependence within our initial trifold distinction: The determinations of the
representations  themselves  have  implications  for  both  the  represented
determinations of the object and, given Kant’s transcendental idealism, the
determinations  of  the  objects  themselves.  As  we  saw,  an  indistinct
representation is to be diferentiated diferently depending on whether it is
a concept or an intuition. This diference in diferentiation at the subjective
level yielded (i) a diference in diferentiation of the objective content of the
86 It seems to me that a concept’s universality and an intuition’s singularity, despite their
frequently  being  equally  involved  in  the  characterisation  of  these  two  types  of
representations, are part of the represented (objective) determinations of the object. That
some mark found in a concept thereby also involves universality seems to me to be a
feature of the represented determination of the object, rather than a feature of the concept
itself. This point applies mutatis mutandis to the case of intuitions.
By contrast,  the  mediacy or  immediacy of  a representation  does  seem to  me to  be  a
(subjective)  determination  of  the  representation  itself.  The  representation  as  a
representation stands one in such a relation to the object.
179
representation,  which  in  turn  ultimately  yielded  (ii)  a  diference  in  the
object to which we might stand in relation by means of the representation. 
Further,  with  regard  to  these  representations,  we  can  now  allay  the
worry of ontological commitment. Recall that the appeal to the comparison
of representations for their relations led us naturally to suppose what was
under comparison were some mental entities, of one or another sort. We
noted,  however,  that  any  account  of  the  representations  to  which  the
appendix refers must minimally avoid any such ontological commitment.
We now have a beter understanding of the nature of the representations
mentioned in the appendix,  an understanding that  does not involve the
appendix  in  the  introduction  of  further  ontological  commitment  with
regard to these representations. Recalling the discussion of the Doctrine of
Method, the representations in general  available for analysis could have
one  of  three  grounds;i  arbitrary  combination  by  the  understanding,  the
combinations of marks found in empirical objects, or the combination as
due  to  the  nature  of  our  faculties.  The  representations  relevant  to
philosophy are of the later ground. Now, it  is only the second of these
(empirical  representations)  that,  according  to  the  Critical  account,
necessarily brings along with it an ontological commitment – and indeed
only an ontological commitment regarding the existence of the empirical
objects.  For  none  of  the  representations  captured  under  this  trifold
commitment is there an ontological commitment as to the existence of the
representations as  mental  entities.  With regard to  the  representations in
question  in  comparison  then,  the  representations  of  philosophy,  these
representations are combinations of (represented) marks of possible objects
such that the combination is due to the nature of our faculties, and thus need
not be taken to introduce an ontologically problematic commitment. 
Turning  now  to  the  former  questions,  let  us  re-examine  briefly  and
explicitly the nature of these relations and the nature of the comparison of
representations that is engaged in. We have now seen that these relations
are the connections between the marks (ultimately of objects) combined in a
representation,  which  combination  constitutes  the  representation.  The
relations in question are those of an indistinctly given representation to its
more  elemental  representations.  What  was  implicitly  at  work  was  the
further dimension of being a connection within the representation of a certain
faculty.  (The connections within a combination of  the understanding are
logical;i the connections within a representation of sensibility are intuitive.)
To compare our representations for their relations among themselves is to
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compare them for  these  connections –  either  the  connections within the
representation  or  the  connections  that  hold  between  it  and  other
representations. Put another way, to compare our representations for these
relations  was  to  distinguish  the  marks  of  our  indistinctly  given
representations (to determine the connections holding between mark and
representation according to the sort of representation it is) – and at once to
distinguish the marks of the object to which we stand in relation by means
of  the  representation.  We  now  see  that  this  amounts  to  bringing  to
distinctness whatever relations between marks (combinations of marks) are
already indistinctly represented by the faculty in question. 
Further,  we now have a clearer  understanding of  the nature  of  such
comparison. This comparison is a conscious, reflected, willed activity. We
compare separated marks with an indistinctly given representation in order
to  bring  the  representation  to  distinctness.  This  is  distinct  from  our
ordinary  awareness  of  the  representation.  It  is  an  activity  involved  in
carrying out philosophical investigation. However, it is important to note
that the relations uncovered, that is, the representations thereby brought to
distinctness,  are  relations  and  representations  of  which  we  are  already
implicitly aware in the multitude of haphazard and indistinct representations  of
our empirical experience.  Such comparison happens implicitly in the case
of ordinary empirical judgement, but must be carried out explicitly in the
case  of  puting  forward  a  philosophy.  The  two  involve  the  same
representations  and  relations  or  connections.  The  later  is  a  mater  of
actively bringing to  distinctness what  is  already always  involved in  the
former.
III. Revisiting the familiar formulation
In Part I, we examined what I termed the ‘familiar formulation’ of the case
in the appendix – the account that is predominantly found in discussions
on the appendix in the extant literature. In what follows, I return to this
account,  in  order  to  examine it  in  light  of  our fndings.  Before  I  do so,
however, let us briefly review this formulation.
The familiar formulation in the literature focusses on the appendix as
containing  a  charge  put  forward  by  Kant  against  the  Leibnizian
philosophy. The charge is variously emphasised in these discussions: The
Leibnizian  philosophy  is  charged  with  confusing  two  sorts  of  object  –
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phenomena with noumena, with confusing the comparison of concepts for
the comparison of objects, with failing to recognise the distinct contribution
of sensibility to our cognition, with commiting a fallacious transcendental
amphiboly,  and,  in  its  most  developed  formulation,  with  an  erroneous
ontological employment of the concepts of reflection.
Under  this  later,  most  developed,  formulation,  the  Leibnizian
philosophy, insofar as it engages in the comparison of concepts, employs
the concepts of reflection in order to establish their relations. However, the
philosophy involves a further complexity. It engages in such comparison,
not merely for the sake of examining these concepts, but ultimately for the
sake of establishing the relations among the objects of the concepts. It takes
such comparison to be sufcient for the later as well as the former. This is
the frst part of the underlying account of the charge as it is put forward in
these  discussions:  The  Leibnizian  philosophy  involves  an  ontological
employment of the concepts of reflection. 
In  its  second part,  the  standard account  identifes  Kant’s  reasons  for
rejecting this employment of the concepts of reflection. The reasons here
turn on the consideration that the objects in question, the objects whose
relations  are  sought  by  comparing  their  concepts  under  the  Leibnizian
philosophy, are objects given or presented by sensibility. And crucially, it is
further noted, these objects bear further relations to each other that are not
captured in the concepts of these objects that are had and compared by
means  of  the  understanding.  Sensibility  “brings  with[it  its]  own
distinctions”  (A270/B326).  Thus,  the  account  concludes,  the  ontological
employment of the concepts of reflection by the Leibnizian philosophy is
illegitimate and yields false conclusions and principles, which do hold of
the objects of our cognition that are objects of sensibility or appearances.
Finally, these discussions highlight the solution that Kant puts forward
in  the  appendix  to  this  complex  error  contained  in  the  Leibnizian
philosophy. This solution is to precede any such comparison of concepts
with transcendental reflection – that is, with an awareness of the faculty to
which the objects of our cognition belong. Such an awareness will reveal, as
we have seen above, that the objects in question are objects of sensibility.
And  thus,  such  reflection  will  reveal  the  erroneous  nature  of  any
ontological  employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection,  as  well  as  any
conclusions or principles based on such an employment.
Such is the bare outline of the main features of the case contained in the
appendix,  as  they  are  put  forward  in  many  extant  discussions  in  the
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literature. Having concluded our study, we are now in a position to see that
these  accounts  are,  as  far  as  they  go,  correct  in  many  of  their  claims.
However,  we  are  now  equally  in  a  position  to  see  that  these  familiar
formulations involve crucial omissions in their picture of the appendix and
the signifcance of its implications, and are, in the case of certain claims,
even  in  error.  Let  us  turn  then  to  a  re-examination  of  these  familiar
formulations of the case, for their points of accuracy, their omissions, and
their  errors.  I  begin  with  some  brief  discussion  of  the  frst  three
formulations of the case, before turning to a more detailed discussion of the
ffth and more developed formulation of the case. Thereafter, I will address
the fourth formulation.
Under the frst formulation, the error of German Rationalism is to take
certain objects, phenomena, to be that which they are not, viz. noumena.
The error, under these accounts, was made at the level of objects. Given our
discussion  of  the  complex  commitment  found  in  German  Rationalist
analysis, and Kant’s corresponding complex rejection of the commitment,
we  can  now  see  that  this  formulation  of  the  error  put  forward  in  the
appendix is not inaccurate, but is not the fundamental error with which Kant
is concerned in the appendix. The German Rationalist account does indeed
involve a conflation of two sorts of objects. The criteria employed by this
tradition  in  bringing  our  philosophical  representations  to  distinctness
involved the commitment that the objects of the representations in question
were objects cognisable by the understanding alone. However, as we have
now also seen, this is not the fundamental error with which the appendix is
concerned.  The  charge  of  taking  phenomena  to  be  noumena  by  the
Leibnizian philosophy can be found in a number of places in the Critique, in
ways that have nothing to do with the claims of the appendix. (Indeed, the
frst  main  section  of  the  Critique,  the  analytic,  is,  in  part,  concerned  to
establish  the  former  rather  than  the  later  as  the  proper  objects  of  our
philosophical cognition (A238-9/B297-8)). The true point of concern of the
appendix,  as  we  have seen,  is  with an error  in  the  employment  of  the
concepts  of  reflection,  which  subsume  the  diferentiation  between  our
representations among themselves. The German Rationalist account fails to
diferentiate  our  representations  correctly  as  representations.  This  error,
along with the  ultimate  claim that  these  representations  do stand us  in
relation to objects, then yields an erroneous assumption about the nature of
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those objects.87 However, the fundamental error with which the appendix is
concerned is thus not a confusion of objects, but a confusion that occurs at
the level of representations as representations. 
In  its  second  familiar  formulation,  the  error  is  put  forward  as  the
confusion  of  the  comparison  of  concepts  for  the  comparison  of  objects.
Under this account, German Rationalism is legitimately only engaged in
uncovering  the  distinctions  between certain  concepts,  but  at  once  takes
itself to be legitimately uncovering the distinctions between the objects of
the concepts.  Put in another way, the error of German Rationalism is to
conflate logical distinctions with real distinctions.  Again,  our study here
shows  this  familiar  formulation  of  the  error  to  be  accurate,  but  not
fundamental.  As  we  have  seen,  the  German  Rationalist  account  does
indeed  involve  the  move  from  diferentiating  our  indistinctly  given
representations  as  concepts  to  the  diferentiation of  the  objects  of  those
representations. It assumes that the terms employed in the diferentiation
of concepts are sufcient to diferentiate the objects of those concepts. And
this indeed is a crucial step in the overall complex commitment that Kant
wishes  to  reject.  Contrary  to  the  formulation  above,  these  accounts
correctly  pinpoint  the  trouble  as  involving  the  diferentiation  of
representations as representations. As we have also seen, however, these
accounts are not quite yet nuanced enough. First, they do not recognise the
distinctness  of  the  two  levels  of  concern  that  come  to  light  in  Kant’s
argument for transcendental reflection in the introduction. The concepts of
reflection,  properly  speaking,  subsume  the  diferentiation  of  our
representations  as representations. At this level, an erroneous and a correct
employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection  can  be  distinguished.  These
employments then have implications for the diferentiation between objects,
if they are so taken to diferentiate objects. Nonetheless, the fundamental
point of concern of the appendix is the correctness of their employment at
the  level  of  representations  as  representations.  Secondly,  and  relatedly,
these accounts do not recognise the mentioned corrected employment of
the concepts at this level. Only an erroneous employment of the concepts is
recognised. I will address this point in relation to the ffth formulation in
more detail below. 
87 As we have seen,  German Rationalism  assumes that  our  philosophical  representation
stand us in relation to objects, thereby assuming these objects to be phenomena, while in
fact  the  objects  to  which our philosophical  representations  do  stand us  in  relation,  as
purportedly proven under the critical account, are phenomena.
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The third formulation of the error discussed in Part I characterised it as a
failure, in one or another way, to recognise the distinctness of sensibility
and the signifcance of its contribution to our cognition. It is now clear that
these accounts are correct insofar as they identify the fundamental error as
located at the level of the subject of cognition. Under these accounts, the
fundamental error of German Rationalism is not a confusion of the objects
of our cognition with any other thing (either objects of a diferent sort or
with concepts), but is an error prior to this and which concerns the subject –
its faculties and representations. This is indeed in line with the account that
we  have  presented  in  the  above  study.  However,  discussions  that
characterise  the  error  of  the  appendix  in  this  third  way  err  in  the
exhaustiveness of the account.  The error is  fundamentally located at the
point of the diferentiation of representations as representations (that is, at
the subjective level), but this is an error relevant to philosophical cognition
only  insofar  as  it  has  implications  for  the  objects  of  our  philosophical
cognition. Discussions that emphasise this third formulation run the risk of
overlooking the whole of Kant’s case.
The most  developed and complete  accounts,  however,  are  those  that
formulate the case in the appendix in the ffth way above. These accounts
frst identify the standard employment of the concepts of reflection in the
diferentiation  of  concepts  from  one  another  in  logical  reflection.  This
employment  is  then  contrasted  with  the  problematic  ontological
employment  of  the  concepts  under  German  Rationalism,  in  which  the
concepts  are  used  logically,  but  taken  to  yield  ontological  conclusions.
Kant’s reason for rejecting this ontological employment is then cited as the
recognition of sensibility in the cognition of the objects in question and the
fact  that  sensibility  introduces  diferentiation  among  the  objects  of  its
representations that are not captured in logical reflection on the concepts of
the  objects.  Having  concluded  our  study,  we  are  now  in  a  position  to
examine the ways in which this developed familiar formulation of the case
in  the  appendix  is  both  correct  and  the  ways  in  which  it  remains
problematic. I will begin with a discussion of the former. 
In  our  account,  we  saw  that  the  case  in  the  appendix  is  centrally
concerned with the employment of the concepts of reflection, as concepts
that subsume, not objects, but representations. This ffth formulation of the
error is indeed correct in its recognition of these concepts as the concern of
the appendix and as constituting a new subject mater within the Critique.
This change of subject is not lost to these discussions. 
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Further,  we saw that the case in the appendix does indeed identify a
certain employment of these concepts under German Rationalism, which it
claims  to  be  erroneous:  Under  German  Rationalism,  these  concepts  are
employed in the ‘mere comparison’ of representations, which comparison
is a mater of treating all representations as those of the understanding or
as concepts, which it then takes to establish the relations between, not only
the  representations  in  question,  but  also  between  the  objects  of  those
representations. Equally, in our account, we saw that this is precisely what
Kant  claims  such  comparison  cannot  do.  The  German Rationalist  move
here from the relations between representations to the relations between
the  objects  of  those  representations  is  illegitimate.  Contrasting  this
illegitimate  employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection,  we  saw  that  the
Critical method indeed demands that transcendental reflection be adopted
in  place  of  such  comparison.  Thus,  in  all  of  these  claims,  these  extant
discussions are in line with what we have uncovered here.
Our close examination of the case has, however, revealed a number of
crucial  details  that  have gone unnoticed in extant literature,  and indeed
even in its most developed formulations. The appendix in fact contains a
far more complex and systematic account than is  typically recognised.  I
turn now to examine the ways in which this formulation can now be seen
to be inadequate as an account of what is going on in the appendix. 
In the frst instance, our understanding of the underlying workings of the
error and its correction on these accounts is, at best, vague and, at worst,
non-existent.  Consider  frst  our  understanding  of  the  error  itself  under
these  accounts.  The  error  lies  in  the  illegitimacy of  the  move  from  the
relations found between the concepts of objects to the relations between the
objects themselves. This move is illegitimate because the objects in question
are objects of sensibility and, as such, are related in ways that cannot be
captured  by  the  relations  between  the  understanding’s  concepts.
Admitedly,  insofar  as  the  later  holds,  it  does  yield  the  illegitimacy in
question: If the objects in question are those of sensibility and if this means
that they bear relations to one another beyond those that can be captured
by the understanding’s concepts, then German Rationalist does indeed err
if it takes the relations between the concepts of the objects to be sufcient to
yield the relations between the objects. But what we lack here is a deeper
understanding of how and why the introduction of a second faculty in the
cognition  of  these  objects  brings  with  it  further  relations  between  the
objects. Here, the familiar formulation simply takes it to be self-evident that
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an appeal  to  sensibility  will  bring  with  it  further  relations  between the
objects – relations that cannot be captured by means of the understanding.
A crucial, related worry concerns the appeal to transcendental reflection
under these accounts. Transcendental reflection is posited as the solution to
the error, and also as the means by which we are to tell that the German
Rationalist employment of the concepts, and the principles arising from it,
are  incorrect.  Now  such  reflection,  under  these  accounts,  consists  in
becoming aware of the faculty of the objects in question. We become aware
that the objects whose relations are proposed in the principles are objects of
sensibility.  Such  reflection  then  purportedly  allows  us  to  see  that  the
relations put forward in the principles do not hold of these objects, and that
there are further relations between these objects that are not captured in the
proposed  principles.  Yet,  it  is  unclear  how  precisely  transcendental
reflection allows us these claims. Whence the evidence that is aforded by
transcendental reflection under these accounts?
This  evidence,  I  believe,  is  standardly taken to be something like the
following:88 German Rationalism carries  out the comparison of  concepts,
which  comparison  it  happily  takes  to  be  sufcient  for  establishing  the
relations  between  the  objects  of  those  concepts.  This  later  assumption
results in the four central ontological principles identifed in the appendix.
However,  German  Rationalism  fails  to  precede  its  comparisons  with
transcendental reflection – with the awareness of the faculty of the objects
in question. If it were to involve such an awareness, it would recognise that
the objects whose relations it purports to establish are in fact objects given
or presented to us by sensibility – and sensibility allows us to apprehend
relations  between  these  objects  beyond  those  that  hold  between  their
concepts.  In  sensibility,  we look to  the  objects  themselves and apprehend
further  real relations  between  these  objects,  beyond  any  conceptual
relations captured by the understanding. Further, this allows us to see that
the ontological principles put forward do not hold, as they do not hold of
the  objects  of  sensibility  and  these are  the  objects  in  question.  Thus,
transcendental  reflection,  on  this  account,  allows  us  to  identify  this
employment of the concepts of reflection as erroneous by allowing us to see
that the supposed relations do not hold between the real objects presented
in sensibility. In this, the appeal to transcendental reflection, under these
accounts,  signals  Kant’s  ‘empirical  turn’  in  relation  to  his  German
88 See, for example, Kerslake (2004), Marques (2008) pp. 218 and 219, and Sedgwick (1991).
For a more extreme statement of this appeal, see Zinkin (2008) p. 846.
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Rationalist  predecessors.  Recognising  the  objects  as  those  of  sensibility
allows  us  to  turn  to  our  empirical  experience  to  fnd  out  the  relations
between these real, empirical objects.
However,  even  given  this  more  qualifed  picture  of  the  appeal  to
transcendental  reflection,  the  familiar  formulation  falters  in  at  least  two
crucial  ways.  First,  and  least  worryingly,  the  account  is  yet  vague  and
indeterminate.  Exactly  how  is  it  that  we  apprehend  these  further  real
relations? How is it that we see that the principles in question do not hold?
Standardly, these accounts leave these questions answered only implicitly:
The  introduction  of  sensibility  as  the  faculty  by  means  of  which  these
objects are given or presented directly is meant to signal a general turning
of our atention to empirical experience, for which these claims are then
taken to be in some way self-evident.
Secondly, and more worryingly, this account is erroneous as an account
of transcendental reflection in at least two ways. First, as we have it above,
to precede any comparison of concepts with transcendental reflection is to
become  aware  of  the  faculty  of  the  objects of  the  concepts  in  question.
Becoming aware of the faculty by means of which we cognise these objects
allows  us  to  see  that  such  comparison  is  inadequate.  However,
transcendental  reflection  does  not  involve  turning  to  the  objects  of  our
cognition to relate them to their relevant faculty. Transcendental reflection
is the apprehension of the faculty to which our  representations belong, not
straightforwardly the objects. Kant says this in a number of places. Such
reflection is “the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our
various  sources  of  cognition,  through  which  alone  their  relation  among
themselves can  be  correctly  determined.”  (A260/B316)  It  is  “the  action
through which I make the comparison of representations in general with the
cognitive power in which they are situated” (A261/B317). In its formulation
of  the  case,  the  familiar  account  ends  up  dismissing  these  explicit
characterisations  by  construing  transcendental  reflection  solely  as  the
awareness  of  the  faculty  to  which  the  objects  in  question  belong.  The
familiar  formulation  thus  involves  a  subtle,  but  crucial,  misconstrual  of
transcendental reflection.
There  is  a  second way in  which the  account  involves  an error  in  its
understanding  of  the  appeal  to  transcendental  reflection.  As  we  have
presented  it  here,  the  appeal  to  transcendental  reflection  afords  us  an
appeal to the real relations between the objects of our cognition (and thus is,
according to this account, a case of Kant’s recognition of and insistence on
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the  real-conceptual  distinction).  Now,  the apprehension of  real  relations
between particular objects will indeed allow us to fnd any principles that
deny those relations to be false. (A single instance against a principle is
sufcient to show the general principle false.)89 Thus, the appeal to the real
relations between objects will allow a rejection of the Leibnizian principles.
However, the apprehension of real relations between particular objects will
not, either under the Critical account or under German Rationalism, allow
us to arrive at any correct general principles. The principles in question are
strictly  universal  principles  –  they  hold  of  all  possible  objects  of  the
relevant  sort  –  and so it  cannot  be  that  an appeal  to  any real  relations
between  particular  objects  in  our  empirical  experience  can  show  the
superseding  principles  to  be  true.  Thus,  the  appeal  to  transcendental
reflection fails, under the familiar formulation, to play a role in our arriving
at (Critical) philosophical cognition. 
Thus  far  we  have  seen  how  the  familiar  formulation  leaves  our
understanding of  the error  and its  correction vague and,  in some parts,
even  erroneous.  However,  our  understanding  of  Kant’s  case  in  the
appendix is yet worse of under this formulation. These formulations in fact
almost entirely fail to capture the positive account of the correction to the
error: First, as noted, the appeal to transcendental reflection in arriving at
corrected  principles  is,  under  these  accounts,  indeterminate  and
inadequate. It is unclear how transcendental reflection, if understood as the
recognition of the real relations between the objects of sensibility,  is  the
solution  that  corrects  the  error  and  allows  us  to  arrive  at  corrected
principles. More signifcantly, these formulations fail to give any account of
the  corrected  employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection.  Under  these
accounts, Kant shows the concepts of reflection to be erroneously employed
by German Rationalism insofar as this employment is taken to yield the
relevant  relations  between  objects.  However,  we  are  left  without  any
indication of what the corrected employment of these concepts consists in.
We have no idea how their correct employment is involved in arriving at
philosophical cognition under the Critical account, or indeed, whether it is
at all – or whether, in fact, their employment simply reverts to their role in
producing the logical forms of judgement.90 
89 Precisely this appeal is found in Warren’s discussion of the principle of the identity of
indiscernibles (2013, p. 34.)
90 It  might  here be objected that  these accounts  do at  least  involve an  implicit corrected
employment of the concepts of reflection: The accounts recognise that the distinctions
captured in the  concepts  apply to  the  objects  of  sensibility,  but that  they do so  in  a
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This lack of any account of the corrected employment of the concepts of
reflection  is,  I  think,  the  most  crucial  and  far-reaching  worry  in  these
discussions  –  and one which  is  brought  to  light  when we  contrast  this
formulation with the fndings of our study here:
In applying the line of reasoning of the appendix, we uncovered, not
only an underlying account of the error found in the German Rationalist
employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection,  but  also  an  account  of  their
correct, Critical, employment: In line with the familiar formulation, the line
of reasoning put forward transcendental reflection as the needed solution
to  the  error.  What  this  demand  pointed  us  to,  however,  was  not  an
examination of the objects of our cognition for their real relations as the
familiar formulation has it, but an employment of the concepts of reflection
in accordance with the faculty of the representations in question. The line
of  reasoning brought  to light  that  such analysis  proceeds by employing
implicitly  those  terms  of  diferentiation  that  are  already  employed
implicitly by the relevant faculty in our having the representation. Thus, if
we relate, as transcendental reflection properly demands, the representations
in question to their relevant faculty,  we fnd that,  for representations of
sensibility, we are to employ terms of diferentiation that are diferent to
those of the understanding. This is a demand for a difering employment of
the concepts of reflection. In the case of representations of sensibility, the
concepts of reflection are to be employed in a diferent way – but they are
still to be employed. 
Thus, we might contrast the error as it has emerged here in our study
with  the  error  as  it  is  found  in  this  ffth  formulation.  Under  this
formulation,  German  Rationalism  errs  in  its  move  from  the  logical
employment of the concepts of reflection to their ontological employment
because  the  objects  in  question are  objects  of  sensibility,  and sensibility
‘introduces its own distinctions’. Under our account, we are able to see that
what  is  in  question  is  the  diferentiation  of  our  representations  as
representations. Their correct diferentiation requires the correct terms of
diferentiation  (employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection)  and  that  this
involves  employment  of  the  relevant  faculty’s  own  implicit  terms  of
diferent  way  to  objects  of  the  pure  understanding.  Here  then,  we  have  an  implicit
corrected employment of these concepts.
In response,  we might note that this is not,  in fact, an employment of the concepts of
reflection. The concepts of reflection subsume representations,  and this  account of the
corrected employment  of the concepts of reflection needs to be developed so that the
distinctions can accurately be understood as an employment of the concepts of reflection.
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diferentiation.  The  error  of  German  Rationalism,  then,  consists  in  its
employing  the  concepts  of  reflection  erroneously (diferentiating  our
representations  incorrectly),  due  to  an  incorrect  apprehension  of  the
faculties in question. Under German Rationalism, all such representations
are taken to belong to the understanding and diferentiated accordingly.
However, this is erroneous, according to the Critical account, because our
cognition involves both understanding and sensibility as distinct faculties.
Thus,  not  all  representations  can  be  treated  in  the  way  of  German
Rationalism.  Sensibility  ‘introduces  its  own  distinctions’  insofar  as
sensibility introduces a further employment of the concepts of reflection in
diferentiating  our  representations.  In  order  to  move  from  this
diferentiation  of  representations  to  the  diferentiation  of  objects,  the
correctness of the former is required as these are the representations due to
our faculties that will ultimately be shown to stand us in relation to the
objects of philosophy. Thus, the move from the logical employment of the
concepts of reflection to their ontological employment is illegitimate, as it
yields  erroneous  results  for  the  diferentiation of  our  representations  as
representations.
Secondly, we can now see how transcendental reflection allows for the
apprehension of further relations between the objects of sensibility. Under
familiar  formulations,  what  transcendental  reflection  afords  us  is  the
apprehension of the objects of our cognition as objects of sensibility, and
thus, in some way or another, we are able to apprehend these objects as
having certain relations not captured in German Rationalism’s comparison
of  the  concepts  of  these  objects.  However,  we  now  have  a  more
perspicuous  understanding  of  the  role  played  here  by  transcendental
reflection.  The  reason  why  we  are  able  to  apprehend  further  relations
between  the  objects  of  our  cognition  is  because  we  have  apprehended
further  relations  between  the  representations  of  those  objects.
Transcendental  reflection  allows  us  to  apprehend  the  faculty  of  the
representations in question, and thereby to diferentiate them by means of
the  concepts  of  reflection  correctly.  This  correctness  then,  once  the
transcendental proofs have been carried out, then yields a diferentiation of
the  marks  of  the  objects  of  the  representations,  and  thus  yields  further
relations  between  these  objects  that  are  unrecognised  under  German
Rationalism.91
91 One  discussion  in  which  the  difering  relations  between  concepts  and  intuitions is
recognised, albeit in passing, is in Perrejin (1997, p. 113).
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Finally, we have seen that the concepts of reflection do indeed have a
determinate and crucial positive role in securing philosophical cognition.
The concepts  of  reflection are still  required in order to diferentiate  our
representations from one another under the Critical account, though in a
now-corrected way. The concepts are employed in a way that diferentiates
these representations in accordance with the faculty to which they belong.
In this, their corrected Critical employment, the concepts of reflection play
the  same  role  as  under  their  German  Rationalist  predecessors.  In  its
account, the familiar formulation fails to recognise this.
The root  cause of  these failures in extant discussions is  that,  in their
haste to examine the Leibnizian principles themselves, they overstep the
line of reasoning presented in the introduction. This line of reasoning, as
we have seen in the course of our study, is crucial in understanding the
case that Kant puts forward in the appendix. Once it is taken into account,
we fnd a complex, systematic, and unifed account of the employment of
the  concepts  of  reflection  –  both  of  their  erroneous  employment  in  the
tradition  promulgated  by  Leibniz’s  hand  and,  indeed,  of  a  corrected
Critical employment, which is at once continuous with this tradition as well
as a correction of it.
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Part VII.
Alternative accounts
In  Parts  I  and  VI,  I  contrasted  my interpretation  of  Kant’s  case  in  the
appendix with what I termed its ‘familiar’ formulation as it is standardly
found  in  literature  on  the  section.  Not  all  extant  interpretations  of  the
section, however, align with this familiar formulation. In this seventh and
fnal part, I turn to three interpretations of Kant’s case in the appendix that
diverge, in fundamental ways, with either the interpretation presented in
this  study  or  with  the  familiar  formulation.  I  begin  with  de  Boer’s
interpretation in ‘Pure Reason’s Enlightenment: Transcendental Reflection
in Kant’s  frst  Critique’  (2010).  I  turn then to Longuenesse’s  well-known
treatment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection  in  Kant  and  the  Capacity  to  Judge
(1998), before discussing an account given by McBay Merrit in ‘Varieties of
Reflection in Kant’s Logic’ (2015). In each case, I will put forward what I
hope to be an accurate outline of the account insofar as it is relevant to the
account presented here, followed by an assessment of its relative strengths
and weakness in relation to the fndings of our account.
I. De Boer in ‘Pure Reason’s Enlightenment’ (2010)
In ‘Pure Reason’s Enlightenment’, de Boer discusses the amphiboly chapter
and  transcendental  reflection  within  the  context  of  tracing  “Kant’s
transformation of rationalist metaphysics into a science” (2010. p. 53). De
Boer’s overarching aim is to show that the Critical philosophy is crucially
distinguished  from  rationalist  metaphysics  in  its  restriction,  in  various
ways,  of  ‘things  in  themselves’  to  ‘objects  of  experience’.  Within  this
overarching  argument,  one  of  de  Boer’s  central  claims  is  that
transcendental  reflection  underlies  both  rationalist  metaphysics  and  the
Critical philosophy, but what distinguishes the later from the former is its
correct  Critical  mode  of  this  reflection.  While  transcendental  reflection
under rationalist  metaphysics involved taking the objects of our a priori
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judgements  to  be  things  in  themselves,  corrected  reflection  under  the
Critical  account  involves  recognising  that  these  objects  must  be  the
empirical objects of our senses. In treating de Boer’s interpretation, I will
trace out  the main claims of  her account  of  the amphiboly chapter and
transcendental  reflection,  and  then  turn  to  some  remarks  on  how  the
account  I  have  presented  here  coincides  with  and  diverges  from  her
account.
De Boer distinguishes three types of reflection relevant to her purposes.
The  frst  of  these  is  ‘preliminary  reflection’,  which  (normally  implicit)
reflection involves  considering  the  faculties  of  the  representations  being
connected  in  a  judgement.  Empirical  judgements  that  connect
representations of diferent faculties (for example, ‘the cause is red’) cannot
be  objectively  valid.  The  second  type  of  reflection  is  that  of  logical
reflection.  Such  reflection  involves  the  employment  of  the  concepts  of
reflection and is carried out both in every case of empirical judgement and
also  in  the  initial  formation  of  concepts.  Such  reflection  is  a  mater  of
comparing concepts with one another for the sake of their diferentiation.
The  third  and  last  type  of  reflection  is  transcendental  reflection.  Like
preliminary reflection, transcendental reflection involves an awareness of
the faculty of the representations connected in a judgement. It is seemingly
distinct  from such reflection,  however,  insofar  as  the  representations  in
question  are  the  a  priori  elements  of  our  philosophical  cognition.
Transcendental  reflection  is  the  “act  by  means  of  which  I  determine
whether the representations to be connected in a judgement belong to pure
understanding or sensible intuition” (2010, p. 67).
According to de Boer, the amphiboly chapter distinguishes for us two
diferent modes of the later. One mode of transcendental reflection leads to
rationalist metaphysics’ application of its a priori judgements to things in
themselves, while the correct Critical mode restricts the application of our a
priori judgements to the objects of our experience. De Boer’s account of the
contrast is as follows. Under rationalist metaphysics, the concepts in an a
priori  judgement  are,  as  in  any  judgement,  logically  reflected  upon  by
means of the concepts of reflection. However, such reflection is used by
rationalist  metaphysics  for  “ontological  purposes”  (2010,  p.  64).  Logical
reflection is carried out in order to defne the a priori concepts that feature
in  our  a  priori  judgements,  which  concepts  are  then  taken to  apply  to
objects  or  things  in  general.  In  this,  rationalist  metaphysics  takes  the
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concepts of these objects to be “[assigned] to pure thought alone” (2010, p.
68) and so engages in a certain mode of transcendental reflection.
The key to the contrasting form of transcendental reflection, and indeed
to the error present in the above mode of such reflection, de Boer takes to
be  Kant’s  reference  at  A263/B319  to  ‘objective  comparison’.  What  is
required,  according  to  de  Boer,  for  metaphysics  to  become a  science  is
objective comparison or, what de Boer seemingly takes to be equivalent,
empirical judgement. That is, what is required for science are judgements
about  the  sensible  objects  of  our  empirical  experience.  And  what  the
Critical  mode  of  transcendental  reflection  consists  in  is  the  correct
apprehension  of  the  complex  cognitive  set  up  found  in  this form  of
judgement:
Empirical  judgements  connect  representations  of  sensibility.  But,  de
Boer reminds us, such judgements are “made possible by synthetic a priori
principles” (2010,  p.  69),  which principles  are only valid if  they connect
representations  that  belong to  diferent faculties  (that  is,  they  “predicate
pure  concepts  of  possible  objects  of  experience.” (2010,  p.  69)  Thus,  the
Critical  mode  of  transcendental  reflection  allows  us  to  recognise  this
cognitive  complexity  to  our  a  priori  judgements  and,  contrary  to  the
rationalist  mode  of  reflection,  to  “determine[s]  which  representations
belong  to  pure  thought  and  which  to  sensibility  in  an  appropriate  way.”
(2010, p. 68) Thus, the Critical mode of transcendental reflection allows for
the application of our a priori judgements to be restricted to the correct
objects – viz. the sensible objects of our empirical experience.
Finally,  this  Critical  mode  of  transcendental  reflection  involves,
according to de Boer, a Critical employment of the concepts of reflection.
Kant does not “[abandon] the concepts of reflection he held undergirded
Leibniz’  unCritical  mode  of  transcendental  reflection”  (2010,  p.  69),  but
rather employs them correctly.  According to de Boer,  Kant employs the
concepts of reflection in order to distinguish phenomena from noumena,
prior to establishing the a priori principles:
Although Kant does not really put it this way, he seems to regard the
opposites of  the  concepts  of  reflection  employed  by  Leibniz  to  serve
precisely  this  purpose.  On  this  view,  the  concepts  of  distinctness,
conflict, and the outer allow thought to conceive of phenomena as distinct
from one another, as marked by conflicting forces, and as determined by
extrinsic, relational properties. The distinction between mater and form,
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lastly,  allows  thought  to  conceive  of  phenomena as  sensible  contents
preceded by the forms of intuition.
(2010, p. 70)
Empirical judgement thus requires transcendental reflection insofar as
transcendental reflection yields this Critical employment of the concepts of
reflection, which employment delineates  the relevant realm of objects of
such judgements prior to establishing the a priori principles.
Having seen de Boer’s account in broad outline above, I turn now to
some remarks on it in light of the account presented here. 
De Boer’s account can be singled out from standard discussions in the
literature  in  an  important  way.  Contrary  to  these  discussions,  de  Boer
recognises and emphasises a further legitimate employment of the concepts
of reflection. As noted in our discussion of the familiar formulation in Part
VI, any further legitimate employment of these concepts, as concepts that
distinguish  concepts  or  representations  from  one  another,  is  either
generally  overlooked  or  fails  to  show  how  the  corrected  employment
applies the concepts to representations rather than objects.
In  contrast  to  these  formulations,  de  Boer’s  account  does  indeed
recognise a further legitimate employment of the concepts that correctly
characterises them as applying to representations. Under de Boer’s account,
the legitimate employment of the concepts of reflection in the a priori case
is still to be found in distinguishing concepts from one another – the pure
concepts that are found in our synthetic a priori judgements. The concepts
of  reflection still  serve  to  individuate  the  pure  concepts  found in  these
judgements,  in  the  same  way  in  which  they  individuate  the  empirical
concepts  found  in  empirical  judgements  or  the  pure  concepts  found  in
rationalist metaphysics. However, they are employed Critically insofar as
transcendental reflection allows us to apprehend that the things to which
they  apply  are  objects  of  sensibility  and  not  objects  of  the  pure
understanding. This later recognition allows for a valid employment of the
synthetic  a  priori  judgements:  It  allows  for  the  recognition  that  the
synthetic  a  priori  judgements  in  question are  only  valid when they are
applied to the objects of sensibility, thus allowing us to recognise the two
necessary  faculties  of  understanding and sensibility  in  cognition  and to
employ the synthetic a priori judgements in a valid way. Thus, as de Boer
puts it, “The objective comparison of representations occurring within the
sciences […] ultimately rests on transcendental reflection. This is the case […]
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because  valid  synthetic  a  priori  judgments  must  connect  representations
that  belong  to  diferent  faculties.  The  act  of  reflection  that  precedes  these
judgments  must  ensure,  in  other  words,  that  the  representations  to  be
connected stem from diferent sources.” (2010, p. 69)
The  merits  of  this  account  are  notable:  It  involves  a  substantive
characterisation of a further legitimate and corrected employment of the
concepts  of  reflection,  and  does  not  merely  distinguish  their  erroneous
employment  under  rationalist  metaphysics.  Secondly,  prima  facie,  the
account  does  not  extend  the  employment  of  the  concepts  in  any
controversial  way  –  the  concepts  of  reflection  still  distinguish  concepts
from  one  another  only,  as  they  do  under  their  standard  employment.
Thirdly, the account does not fall into the trap of rendering transcendental
reflection  a  mater  of  the  awareness  of  the  faculty  of  the  objects  of  our
cognition.  As  we  can  see  above,  transcendental  reflection  involves  an
awareness of the faculties in a priori cognition as constituted in the above
complex way. Finally, we have a rich account of transcendental reflection
as necessary for synthetic a priori cognition: The validity of the synthetic a
priori judgements depends on their being applied to objects of sensibility,
and  their  being  so  applied  depends  on  transcendental  reflection  as  the
awareness of the diferent faculties in this application. 
There are, however, a number of ways in which the account diverges
from the account presented here – and thus a number of ways in which I
take the account to involve an error of one form or another. To begin, it is
not clear that the account in fact manages to retain the applicability of the
concepts  of  reflection  to  representations,  rather  than  to  objects.  In
characterising the erroneous employment of the concepts under rationalist
metaphysics,  this erroneous employment is  distinguished from a correct
employment in terms of a lack of correct awareness of the objects (and their
faculties) to which the pure concepts apply.  Under both their erroneous
and their correct employment, however, the concepts of reflection seem to
be employed in order to distinguish our pure concepts from one another.
She writes: 
[The] concepts of reflection can also be used for ontological purposes.
Just as I can compare my representations of ‘ball’ and ‘round’ and defne
the later as an intrinsic determination of the former, so I can compare
my representations of ‘all things’ and ‘substance’ and defne the later as
an intrinsic determination of the former. […] In such cases, Kant notes, I
“apply  these  concepts  to  an  object  in  general  (in  the  transcendental
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sense), without further determining whether this is an object of sensible
or intellectual intuition” (CPR A 279/B 335). […] Kant denounces not this
employment itself, but merely the particular way in which Leibniz relied
on the concepts of reflection.
(2010, p. 64)
At this point, the account still seems to retain the claim that the concepts
subsume  representations  (viz.  the  pure  concepts).  However,  in  its
discussion of the corrected principles, the principles seem to emerge from
an application of the concepts to objects directly. According to de Boer’s
account  at  this  point,  the  concepts  of  reflection  are  correctly  employed
under the Critical account in order to distinguish the realm of phenomena
from the realm of noumena, prior to the application of the synthetic a priori
judgements.  This  prior  diferentiation  of  these  two realms  of  object,  by
means  of  the  concepts  of  reflection,  results  in  the  corrected,  Critical
principles.  “On  this  view”,  she  claims,  “the  concepts  of  distinctness,
conflict, and the outer allow thought to conceive of phenomena as distinct
from one another, as marked by conflicting forces, and as determined by
extrinsic, relational properties.” (2010, p. 70) Now, this application of the
concepts  of  reflection  seems  not  at  all  to  be  a  mater  of  applying  the
concepts to pure concepts for their distinction – nor indeed of applying the
concepts  to  any  representations  as  representations.  Here,  the  concepts  of
reflection are being applied to the objects of cognition, albeit it at a point
prior to the application of the pure concepts. By the end of the discussion,
the concepts of reflection are no longer higher-order concepts, subsuming
our  representations,  but,  like  the  pure  concepts,  subsume  what  will
ultimately be the objects of our cognition. And this is problematic insofar as
it conflicts with Kant’s explicit and repeated construal of the concepts as
subsuming  the  relations  of  our  representations  “among  themselves”
(A260/B316). 
A further worry concerns, in fact, the lack of any controversial extension
of the concepts of reflection under the account. As noted, the account, at
least in the frst instance, puts forward the corrected employment of the
concepts of reflection as a mater of the diferentiation of the pure concepts
appearing in the synthetic a priori judgements of philosophy. Our worry
here, however, is that any such account fails to make sense of the line of
reasoning that  Kant puts  forward explicitly  at  the start  of  the appendix
concerning  these  concepts.  As  we  have  seen,  there  Kant  explicitly  puts
forward a distinction between diferent ways of employing the concepts of
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reflection, which diferent employments depend on whether the relations
subsumed  are  those  of  representations  of  the  understanding  or  are
representations  of  sensibility.  That  is,  the  concepts  are  to  employed
diferently  for  representations  of  sensibility,  in  contrast  to  those  of  the
understanding.  But  then  this  implies  that  the  concepts  do  have  an
employment in the  case  of  representations of  sensibility –  an employment
that, seemingly, is unrecognised under the account in question (or, if it is
taken to be recognised in the corrected principles as above, it renders the
concepts applicable to sensible objects and not representations of sensibility). 
Related  to  this  worry,  is  a  concern  over  the  characterisation  of
transcendental reflection and the representations relevant to it. Recall that
transcendental  reflection  involves  an  awareness  of  the  faculty  of  the
representations involved in a priori  cognition in the following way: Our
synthetic  a  priori  judgements  involve  certain  pure  concepts.  These,  as
under  rationalist  metaphysics,  are  representations  that  “originat[e]  in
thought” (2010, p. 69). However, these judgements must ultimately apply
to the objects of sensibility. The pure concepts must thus ultimately relate
to  “representation[s]  originating  in  sensibility”  (ibid.).  Transcendental
reflection allows us to recognise this distinction of faculties with regard to
our a priori cognition. 
Now,  under  the  account  presented  here,  we  need  not  deny  that
transcendental  reflection  is  needed  for  the  correct  recognition  of  the
faculties of the pure concepts and of the representations of the objects to
which these concepts ultimately apply. This is the role of transcendental
reflection with regard to the some of the largest elements in our cognition
(the concepts in our a priori judgements and the intuitions to which they
apply). However, if our account of the role of the concepts of reflection in
the  proofs  of  the  Aesthetic  is  correct,  then  transcendental  reflection  is
required at a point prior to this – indeed at the point of distinguishing our
various representations in isolation from one another at the most elemental
level.
A fnal worry with this account concerns its treatment of the corrected,
Critical principles – a concern that it shares with the familiar formulation.
As discussed in our re-examination of the familiar formulation in Part VI,
the corrected, Critical principles put forward in the appendix are, indeed,
perfectly general or universal. They are established of all possible objects of
our cognition, and not merely of some particular such objects of which we
have  had  experience.  If  we  take  this  to  be  so,  then  an  account  of  the
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corrected employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection must  show how we
arrive at this universality. Under the account in question, the concepts of
reflection  are  employed  prior  to  the  pure  concepts  in  distinguishing
phenomena from noumena in a general way. However, it is unclear how
we might arrive at such universality under this account. All universality
that  derives  from  the  application  of  concepts  is  dealt  with  in  the
transcendental deduction and the proofs of the synthetic principles.  It is
uterly unclear how or why Kant might put forward further, unannounced,
unproven concept-derived universality subsequent to the arguments of the
Transcendental  Analytic.  And  the  account  in  question  seems  to  be
commited  to  this.  The  concepts of  reflection  serve  to  distinguish
phenomena from noumena in a general way prior to the synthetic a priori
judgements. By contrast, the account put forward in this study does allow
for such generality by introducing the possibility of intuitive, in addition to
logical, representability, both of which are a mater of the employment of
the concepts of reflection.
II. Longuenesse in Kant and the Capacity to Judge (1998)
By far, the most intricate discussion of the concepts of reflection is to be
found in Longuenesse’s 1998 work, Kant and the Capacity to Judge. The work
is devoted to an account of how discursive thought ultimately comes to be
related to the sensible, and the appendix and its account of the concepts of
reflection are appealed to in the service of this overall aim. In what follows,
I will focus primarily on the account of the appendix that is given in the
course of this broader aim, though, towards the end, I will turn briefly to
some discussion of Longuenesse’s own appeal to the concepts of reflection.
Again, the discussion here can be divided into two: I begin with an outline
of the relevant points of Longuenesse’s account and turn thereafter to a
discussion of this account in relation to that which has been put forward in
our study above.  
One of the primary claims in Longuenesse’s account of how discursive
thought  relates  to  the  sensible  concerns  the  corresponding  syntheses
involved  in  the  generation  of  the  a  priori  concepts  of  thought  and the
syntheses  that  must  take  place  prior  to  these  in  the  sensible  given.  As
Longuenesse  puts  it,  “Elucidate  the  forms  of  discursive  analysis  –  the
logical forms of judgement – and you will have the key to the universal
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forms of the sensible synthesis that is prior to analysis, and therefore also
prior to the categories in their proper role as full-fledged concepts.” (1998,
p.  12) Her  argument  proceeds  by  intricately  tracing  out  the  activities
according  to  which  a  priori  concepts  are  generated,  and  the  forms  of
synthesis  involved  in  this  generation,  in  order  then  to  uncover  the
corresponding forms of sensible  synthesis to which these concepts  must
ultimately  apply.  The  discussion  of  the  appendix  and  the  concepts  of
reflection is located in the carrying out of the frst of these tasks.
In  order  to  understand  how  the  concepts  of  reflection  feature  in
Longuenesse’s account of the generation of a priori concepts, and indeed in
her  account  of  the  argument  of  the  appendix,  it  is  helpful  to  begin  by
seting out the four types of comparison distinguished under her account,
as I understand them. I begin with logical comparison in its general form.
Logical  comparison,  under Longuenesse’s  account,  is  the  comparison of
already formed concepts. Once we have concepts in our possession, these
can  be  compared with  one  another  for  their  identity,  diference,  etc.  in
terms of  the concepts  of  reflection.  Such comparison is,  as  Longuenesse
puts it, “comparison of concepts in the understanding” (1998, p. 114). Prior
to any such comparison being possible, however, the concepts require an
initial  generation.  This  generation  proceeds  by  a  trifold  activity  of
comparison of the singular representations of intuition. This is the activity
of  analysis  and  it  is  a  trifold  activity  of,  at  once,  comparing  singular
representations, abstracting from some, while recognising others as falling
under  a  universal  rule,  the  concept.  This  recognition  is  efectively  a
generation of the concept.  Now, although, at frst glance,  this activity of
comparison seems to have nothing to do with the concepts of reflection,
Longuenesse argues that the concepts of reflection in fact guide this type of
comparison as well. This, it would seem, is ultimately because the concepts
of reflection are the concepts that realise the logical form of a judgement,
and  because  concepts  ultimately  obtain  their  universal  form  only  in
judgement  as  the  fundamental  form  of  universal  representation.  Thus,
claims Longuenesse, in this activity of the generation of concepts from the
singular representations of sensibility, the rules employed are the concepts
of  reflection.  A  third  and prior  type  of  comparison  is  identifed  in  the
aesthetic comparison of the singular representations with one another in
intuition. This is a prior and necessary form of comparison according to
Longuenesse:  “[I]t  seems  plausible  to  assume  that  this  transcendental
reflection […] presupposes a comparison one may call aesthetic, by means
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of which appearances are recognized as identical or diferent in sensible
perception and externally related to one another.” (1998, p. 114)
Finally, transcendental reflection is a reflection on “the relation of our
representations  in  general  to  their  sources  in  our  mind”  (1998,  p.  123),
which reflection allows us to recognise the distinction between the frst and
third types of comparison above, that is, to recognise a distinction between
the  comparison  of  concepts  and  the  comparison  of  sensible  objects  in
intuition.  As  Longuenesse  puts  it,  “[t]he  distinction  between  (logical)
comparison of concepts and comparison of objects in sensibility is efected
by transcendental reflection” (1998, p. 113).
Having  these  distinctions  before  us,  we  might  now  turn  to
Longuenesse’s account of the argument of the appendix, and of the error
with  which  the  Leibnizian  philosophy  is  charged.  Now,  although
Longuenesse explicitly characterises the error of the Leibnizian philosophy
as  a  mater  of  the  confusion  of  the  comparison  of  concepts  with  the
comparison of objects, it seems to me that, in her detailed treatment of the
concepts of reflection, a slightly diferent reading of the charge comes to
light. In this discussion, Longuenesse distinguishes two subtypes of logical
comparison, ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ logical comparison, and it seems to me
that the error that the Leibnizian falls into, under her account, is ultimately
construed as  carrying out  the former type of  comparison instead of  the
later. 
As we have seen above, logical comparison is an activity of comparing
already possessed concepts with one another.  This is done, according to
Longuenesse, by employing the concepts of reflection. However, a ‘narrow’
form of such comparison is distinguished by Longuenesse from a ‘broad’
form. Narrow logical comparison involves the comparison of concepts, by
means of the concepts of reflection, in abstraction from the referents of the
concepts (whether or not they have any). It is a “comparison of  concepts
alone” (1998,  p.  126).  By contrast,  broad logical  comparison involves the
comparison of concepts, by means of the concepts of reflection, as concepts
compared “under  sensible  conditions.”  (1998,  p.  127)  Given the  various
Critical details and intricacies, this comparison is ultimately now a mater
of the comparison of concepts as schemata, or universal rules under which
the singular marks in sensible intuition fall, rather than simply as logical
combinations  of  universal  marks.  And,  this  is  what,  according  to
Longuenesse,  any  comparison  of  concepts  must  be  under  the  Critical
philosophy. Thus, under Longuenesse’s account, the contrast between the
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erroneous comparison of the Leibnizian philosophy and a corrected form of
such comparison is the contrast between narrow logical comparison and
broad logical comparison (and thus with confusing one way of comparing
concepts with another way of comparing concepts).
In relation to our study here,  this intricate account of the concepts of
reflection by Longuenesse requires, as I see it, a response on three fronts.
First, and most pertinently, we might examine Longuenesse’s construal of
the case in the appendix itself in relation to the account presented in our
study  here.  Both  accounts  involve  a  contrast  between  the  erroneous
Leibnizian employment  of  the concepts  of  reflection and their  corrected
employment under the Critical philosophy. The accounts diverge, however,
quite  dramatically  with  regard  to  this  later  employment.  Secondly,
Longuenesse’s  account  involves  a  quite  diferent  understanding  of  the
activity  of  analysis  to  that  of  our  study,  and  this  activity  constitutes  a
crucial element under both of these accounts and some discussion of these
contrastive accounts is thus necessary. Finally, a response to Longuenesse’s
account of the employment of the concepts within the generation of a priori
concepts is needed. 
Under Longuenesse’s account, the correct type of comparison that is to
replace the erroneous comparison of concepts of the Leibnizian philosophy
is a comparison of concepts insofar as these refer to objects of sensibility.
More precisely, under the Critical account, such concepts are ultimately to
be understood as schemata and the erroneous comparison of concepts in
abstraction from their referents is thus to be replaced by the comparison of
schemata. Now, it seems to me that we must, under any understanding of
the appendix, recognise this later type of comparison. Indeed, once we are
dealing  with  the  schematised  categories  –  once  we  are  dealing  with
concepts that refer to sensible objects – these concepts will be capable of
comparison with one another, as such concepts, and we will thus fnd such
a  type  of  comparison.  However,  under  the  account  presented here,  the
contrast between erroneous and correct comparison, and thus the point at
which the concern of the appendix is  located, is  prior to the comparison
between  concepts  of  this  sort.  It  is  a  comparison  that  concerns  the
fundamental  elements  involved  in  such  concepts  –  their  elemental
conceptual  and  sensible  representations,  but  yet  in  isolation from  one
another.  According  to  our  account,  the  corrected  employment  of  the
concepts of reflection is to be found in their additionally being employed
with  regard  to  sensible  representations  in  isolation.  Our  account  then
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implies  that,  in relation to Longuenesse’s  four  types of  comparison,  the
correction  of  the  Leibnizian  error  involves  employing  the  concepts  of
reflection in the third of these types, viz. in aesthetic comparison, and is not
a  mater  of  employing  the  concepts  for  the  sake  of  broad  logical
comparison rather than narrow logical comparison.
Now, what is to be said in support of this understanding of the error
and its correction over that of Longuenesse? First, there are formulations in
the appendix that seem to indicate that the concepts of reflection can be
employed  with  regard  to  representations  of  sensibility  considered  in
isolation:  “The  action  through  which  I  make  the  comparison  of
representations  in  general  with  the  cognitive  power  in  which  they  are
situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared
to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition”,
Kant  tells  us,  “I  call  transcendental  reflection.”  (A261/B317)  Thus,  to
suppose that a corrected employment of the concepts involves their role
solely in the comparison of concepts, albeit schemata, does not do justice to
these formulations. Secondly, there is, as we have seen in Part IV, reason to
suppose  that  the  erroneous  employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection is
located in the German Rationalist procedure of bringing already possessed
concepts to distinctness for the sake of philosophical cognition. Now, this
procedure  is  a  mater  of  bringing  to  distinctness  the  representational
elements in our cognition, down to the  most elemental of these. This is the
required starting point of the analytic method according to which German
Rationalism proceeds. And the Critical philosophy is continuous with this.
The frst step in philosophical cognition is to bring our already possessed
representations to distinctness, right down to the most elemental. Thus, if
we are,  under the  Critical  account,  to arrive  at  these most  fundamental
elements, and if the erroneous employment of the concepts of reflection is
indeed to be located in the German Rationalist procedure for arriving at
such  elements,  then  their  corrected  employment  must  be  found  in  the
analysis of the representational elements of our cognition, down to their
most elemental. And, given the separate contributions of the understanding
and sensibility to our cognition under the Critical account, some of these
elements are going to be representations of sensibility in isolation.
Let us turn then to the contrasting accounts of analysis found in the two
discussions. Longuenesse takes analysis to be a bringing about of clarity
insofar  as  it  is  a  mater of  generating  a  concept.   Analysis  is  the  trifold
activity of comparison, reflection, abstraction by means of which a concept
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is  initially  generated.  Under our  account,  analysis  is  equally  a  bringing
about  of  clarity  or  distinctness,  but  with  regard  to  representations  that  we
already have.  Now,  it  is  worth  noting  that  this  does  not  strictly  efect  a
disagreement over the claims of the appendix. A bringing to distinctness of
already possessed representations is one activity. A bringing to distinctness
in generating a concept is another. And Longuenesse and I both agree that
the issue in the appendix concerns two ways of comparing representations
already possessed (with Longuenesse’s independent and ultimate interest
being in the role of the concepts of reflection in the generation of a concept).
Nonetheless, we might note that Kant’s use of the term ‘analysis’, when it is
evidently used in a technical and not ordinary sense, is  primarily found
referring  to  the procedure  outlined in our account,  viz.  of  bringing our
representations to distinctness.92 It is further worth pointing out, however,
that, although this provides evidence for the use of ‘analysis’ to refer to this
procedure,  this does not  rule out Kant’s being commited to the further
trifold procedure as that which is involved in the generation of concepts.
Finally, and turning to Longuenesse’s account within the context of  its
overall  focus,  we  might  examine  her  claims  regarding  the  concepts  of
reflection  in  the  generation  of  a  concept,  in  relation  to  the  account
presented here.  The role  that  Longuenesse  uncovers  for  the  concepts  of
reflection in our a priori cognition might be outlined once more as follows.
As  noted  at  the  start  of  our  discussion,  the  concepts  of  reflection  are
employed in the logical comparison of concepts, that is, in the comparison
of concepts that we already possess. They are equally, however, employed
in the initial generation of any such concepts,  such that the synthesis of
marks in the concept already possessed is paralleled in its generation. Now,
these  two  employments  are  found  in  the  case  of  all  concepts  –  both
empirical  and,  crucially,  a  priori  concepts.  This  later  is  the  focus  of
Longuenesse’s account. Under this account then, the concepts of reflection
can be employed in the logical comparison of our a priori concepts, once
we are in possession of them. Crucially, however, the concepts of reflection
are employed in this initial generation of the a priori concepts as well. By
means of the trifold procedure of comparison, reflection, and abstraction,
the a priori concepts of philosophy are generated by reflection on sensible
intuition (where such intuition is pure in the case of a priori concepts) by
the employment of the concepts of reflection. What then might be said in
92 See, for example,  A7/B11, A14/B28, B23, B130, and A77/B103.
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response to this understanding of the concepts of reflection as employed in
the generation of the a priori concepts of philosophy? 
It is perhaps frst worth noting that it is not this employment that is at
issue in the appendix, either according to Longuenesse or according to our
study here. Longuenesse’s concern in the case of this employment is with
the pre-conscious conditions that make possible our a priori concepts and the
synthetic  judgements  in  which  they  feature.  By  contrast,  under  both
Longuenesse’s and our account, the concern of the appendix is with the
conscious  treatment of  these  concepts  in  the  explicit  establishing of  these
judgements. (Indeed, I take it that Longuenesse does not mean to claim that
the  corrected  Critical  employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection,  the
employment  that  contrasts  with  their  erroneous  employment  under
Leibniz, is  in  their role in the generation of concepts. This cannot be the
case  as  the  contrasting  erroneous  employment  is  a  mater  of  the
comparison  of  concepts  already  had,  and  Longuenesse  distinguishes  a
corrected ‘broad’ form of this, which later employment is distinct from the
“embryonic”  (1998,  p.  124)  employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection  in
generating  a  concept.)  Nevertheless,  this  employment  is  signifcantly
related to the point of interest of the appendix in the following way.
As noted, under both Longuenesse’s and the account put forward in this
study, the concern of the appendix is with the employment of the concepts
of reflection in the conscious treatment of our a priori representations for the
sake  of  explicitly  establishing  the  synthetic  a  priori  judgements  that
constitute  our philosophical  cognition.  It  is  not  concerned with the  pre-
conscious processes  that  initially  serve  to  generate  these  concepts.
Nonetheless, it seems that the later must indeed have implications for the
former  –  and  this  in  the  way  suggested  by  Longuenesse.  If  we  are  to
uncover certain relations between our concepts or representations that we
already possess by means of the former sort of comparison, then the later
pre-conscious processes or conditions we describe must be such that the
relations in question will be found. And this is indeed what Longuenesse
claims: “Elucidate the forms of discursive analysis – the logical forms of
judgment – and you will have the key to the universal forms of the sensible
synthesis that is prior to analysis, and therefore also prior to the categories
in their proper role as full-fledged concepts.” (1998, p. 12)
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III. McBay Merrit in ‘Varieties of Reflection in Kant’s Logic’ (2015)
McBay Merrit’s most developed interpretation of the appendix is found in
her recent paper, ‘Varieties of Reflection’ (2015). The overriding concern of
the  discussion  is  to  systematise  and  clarify  the  various  appeals  to
‘reflection’ across Kant’s writings. These appeals, claims Merrit, are both
technical and non-technical or everyday. With regard to the former, Kant’s
technical  senses  of  ‘reflection’  divide  primarily  into  four  varieties,  with
each variety relevant or proper to a species of logic. The line of argument of
the  paper thus  begins by distinguishing the  four species  of  logic  found
under the Critical account, in order then to identify the correspondent form
of reflection. 
Merrit’s discussion of the appendix appears towards the end of this line
of argument. Pure general logic has been distinguished as the constitutive
rules for thought about objects, where this is independent of the domain of
objects. The reflection proper to this is reflection under the analytic unity of
apperception. Pure applied logic concerns the non-constitutive norms for
the  good  use  of  judgement.  The  reflection  relevant  to  these  norms  is
consideration  of  the  general  entitlement  to  make  a  claim.  Pure  special
(transcendental) logic concerns the constitutive rules for thought about a
particular domain of objects, viz. phenomena. The reflection correspondent
to this logic is reflection under the synthetic unity of apperception. Special
(transcendental) applied logic is the non-constitutive norms for the good
use of judgement with regard to phenomena. The reflection proper to this
logic,  claims  Merrit,  is  transcendental  reflection.  Although  this
systematisation of  the species  of  logic  and their correspondent forms of
reflection is of great interest, I will, for the most part, set it aside in what
follows, focussing on her claims concerning the appendix itself. I will raise
these further distinctions as and when they are relevant to these concerns. 
Merrit’s account of the appendix might be outlined as follows. In the
appendix,  Kant  introduces  and  contrasts  logical  and  transcendental
reflection. Kant’s primary concern thereafter is a polemic against Leibniz
that charges Leibniz’s philosophy with engaging in the former instead of
the later.  The former of these varieties of reflection is an organisational
activity. Logical reflection, according to Merrit, is the activity of organising
and clarifying concepts  that  we possess  into a systematic  structure.  The
concepts of reflection are employed in this organisational activity. They are
the  concepts  that  organise  and  clarify  our  concepts  in  relation  to  one
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another – they are used in “analysing […] these concepts to determine their
points  of  identity  and  diference.”  (2015,  p.  13)  The  error  with  which
Leibniz’s philosophy is charged, according to Merrit, is to engage in this
activity of the organisation of concepts in relation to one another,  while
failing  to  “be  clear  about  the  general  nature  of  the  object  represented
through  the  concepts  in  question:  i.e.,  whether  it  is  phenomenal  or
noumenal.” (2015, p. 18) This later task is transcendental reflection, and
Kant thus charges Leibniz with engaging in logical  reflection instead of
transcendental reflection.  Leibniz’s error,  according to Merrit,  is  that  he
“failed to care about the substantive requirements on thinking relative to a
certain domain, and instead cared only about the systematic coherence of
his thought.” (ibid.)
Although, in the fnal analysis, Merrit’s account and the account that we
have put forward in this  study diverge signifcantly,  and perhaps more
signifcantly than do the other accounts examined, Merrit’s account is also
the  only  account  of  the  appendix  that  equally  locates  logical  reflection
within the procedure of German Rationalist analysis:
Standard accounts of logical reflection, according to Merrit, take it to be
part of a threefold sequence of acts – comparison, reflection, abstraction –
that allow for the production of concepts. Logical reflection is a reflection
on  non-conceptual  material  for  the  sake  of  the  initial  generation  of
concepts. Support for this account, Merrit notes, comes in the form of an
appeal  to  §§5–6 of  the  Jäsche  Logic in  which Kant is  concerned with the
constitution of  concepts,  which discussion cites  the  mentioned threefold
sequence. In contrast to this view, Merrit claims that logical reflection is
not a reflection found in the generation of concepts (and indeed that Kant
gives  no  account  of  such  concept  generation  at  all),  but  is  instead  the
activity of  organising concepts of which we are already in possession. The
appeal to logical reflection in the appendix, according to Merrit, “alludes
to German Rationalist logic […] For [the German Rationalists], reflection is
trained on concepts already at hand, considering their points of identity
and diference in order to clarify their content through their articulation
into a systematic whole.” (2015, p. 17) Thus, at this point, Merrit’s account
is in agreement with the account presented in this study. Logical reflection
is “trained on concepts that are already in hand — and not obviously to
create new ones, but rather to clarify existing concepts and their relation in an
organised  whole.”  (2015,  p.  10,  emphasis  my  own)  According  to  both
Merrit’s account and the account presented here then, logical reflection is
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involved  in  the  German  Rationalist  procedure  for  bringing  concepts  of
which we are in possession to distinctness by their comparison with one
another. 
Our  accounts,  however,  diverge  almost  immediately  in  a  number  of
signifcant ways. This divergence between the accounts is primarily found
on three fronts. First, under the account presented here, Merrit’s account
involves a misunderstanding of the nature and signifcance of such logical
reflection  under  German  Rationalism.  Logical  reflection  is  not  a  merely
organisational afterthought in philosophical cognition. It is both necessary
for,  and  partly  constitutive,  of  such  cognition.  Secondly,  the  account
equally involves a misunderstanding of the nature and signifcance of the
Critical correction of logical reflection. Both German Rationalism and the
Critical  philosophy  are  commited  to  the  necessity  and  legitimacy  in
philosophical  cognition  of  bringing  our  representations  to  distinctness,
albeit  for  diferent  reasons  and  in  quite  diferent  ways.  Finally,  and
relatedly,  due  to  its  misconstrual  of  the  Critical  correction  of  the  error,
Merrit’s  account  involves  a  subtle  misconstrual  of  transcendental
reflection. I will deal with these in turn and thereafter raise a few smaller
points of concern.
Although Merrit’s discussion does not explicitly address the context or
purpose of logical reflection in great detail,  the discussion seems to take
such  reflection  to  be  something  of  an  organisational  afterthought  to
philosophical cognition. The aim or end of such reflection is, according to
Merrit, an “organised whole” (2015, p. 13) or “systematic cognition” (ibid.),
but the emphasis here is on the ordering or organisation of our concepts or
cognition  and  not  on  securing  any  cognition  or  concepts  themselves.
Seemingly,  the  (sole)  purpose  served  by  logical  reflection  is  that  of
organising  and  clarifying  our  concepts,  and  this  purpose  is  not  strictly
necessary  for  a  priori  cognition.  Its  rules  are  “simply rules  for  the
organisation of  thought”  (2015,  p.  17,  emphasis  my  own)  and  there  is
“nothing wrong with [such] reflection;i it simply provides no sufcient basis
for metaphysics” (2015,  p.  18).  (Transcendental  reflection,  by contrast,  is
explicitly recognised as necessary for such cognition under the account.)
From these remarks, Merrit implicitly seems to take logical reflection to be
essentially an activity of ordering already possessed concepts or cognitions,
at a point subsequent to cognition.
Now, under the account presented here, the above does not sufce to
characterise logical reflection, nor does it capture the signifcance of such
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reflection under German Rationalism. German Rationalist logical reflection
is not, under our account, a merely organisational afterthought. It is not an
organisational afterthought insofar as such reflection is a necessary frst step
in securing philosophical cognition. The concepts involved in such logical
reflection  are  not  those  gleaned  from  our  already  secured  cognition
(although  such  reflection  can  be  carried  out  on  these  as  well),  but  are
concepts of which we are indistinctly aware, which stand us in relation to
the objects of our philosophical cognition, but which do so indistinctly, and
which thus require a bringing to distinctness in order that  cognition by
means  of  them  might  be  secured.  Secondly,  and  more  crucially,  such
reflection is not an  organisational afterthought. German Rationalist logical
reflection is  partly  constitutive of  philosophical  cognition.  There  are  two
points here to be noted. First, as we have seen, such reflection is carried out
by employing the concepts of reflection. This is equally noted by Merrit.
However,  only  under  the  account  presented  here  is  it  recognised  that
carrying out such reflection by employing these concepts involves implicit
terms of diferentiation. In such reflection, the concepts of reflection do not
simply diferentiate identity and diference, but the identity and diference
of  concepts.  The  concepts  of  reflection  subsume  diferentiation  among
representations of a certain sort. Secondly, and crucially, given the German
Rationalist assumption that these representations (concepts) are sufcient
for representing the objects of our cognition (and the assumption that the
representations in question do in fact so stand us in relation), this carrying
out of logical reflection by employing the concepts of reflection does not
only succeed in organising the concepts. It sufces for distinguishing the
marks of the objects of the concepts as well. Thus, the concepts of reflection
as employed in logical reflection are not, as Merrit claims, “simply rules
for  the  organisation  of  thought”  (2015,  p.  17).  Logical  reflection  is
constitutive of our philosophical cognition under German Rationalism, as
the  rules  according to  which  the  marks  of  objects  are  diferentiable  are
(taken to be) paralleled in the rules according to which the marks of our
concepts are diferentiable. 
This leads us to a second primary point of divergence between the two
accounts.  Once  we  recognise  the  constitutive  role  played  by  the
employment of the concepts of reflection under German Rationalism, we
are able to uncover a contrasting constitutive role, now corrected, under the
Critical account. Under Merrit’s account of Critical cognition, the concepts
of  reflection  remain  confned  to  their  employment  in  logical  reflection,
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which  reflection  itself  remains  consigned  to  the  post-cognition  merely
organisational tasks. The employment of the concepts of reflection under
German Rationalism, in reflection “trained on concepts already at hand […]
in order to clarify their content through their articulation into a systematic
whole”  (2015,  p.  17),  remains,  for  Merrit,  their  employment  under  the
Critical philosophy. What is introduced and emphasised under the Critical
philosophy, under her account, is the further dimension of consideration of
the nature of the objects to which the concepts are meant to refer. 
By  contrast,  under  our  account,  the  Critical  philosophy  equally
recognises  a  constitutive  role  to  the  employment  of  the  concepts  of
reflection, though the picture that underlies this constitutive role is quite
diferent to that of German Rationalism: Under the Critical philosophy, the
representations involved in our philosophical cognition must be, if there is
to be any such cognition, representations of both the understanding and
sensibility.  The  concepts  of  reflection  have  now  been  recognised  as
concepts  that  subsume,  not  specifcally  the  diferentiation  between
concepts, but the diferentiation between representations generally. These
concepts are thus now employed in the comparison of both representations
of the understanding and sensibility for their clarifcation. This is  a frst
point of diference. As under German Rationalism, this clarifcation is not
merely organisational,  but is  both a necessary frst step to philosophical
cognition and plays a constitutive role in such cognition. Again as under
German  Rationalism,  the  representations  compared  in  terms  of  the
concepts of reflection ultimately stand us in relation to their objects and the
diferentiation  of  the  marks  of  these  representations  by  means  of  the
concepts of reflection at once serves to diferentiate the marks of the objects
of the representations. However, the Critical philosophy does not assume
that the understanding stands us in relation to the objects of philosophy as
does German Rationalism. Sensibility stands us in direct relation to objects,
and its  representations  can  be  assumed to  stand us  in  relation  to  their
objects,  while  the  representations  of  the  understanding  are  given
transcendental proofs to show that  they do stand us in relation to their
objects.  Given  this,  employing  the  concepts  of  reflection  in  order  to
diferentiate the representations will allow for diferentiation of the marks
of  their  objects,  provided  this  is  done  correctly.  Thus,  the  concepts  of
reflection have a further Critical employment that is unrecognised under
Merrit’s account. This employment is equally a necessary frst step in our
philosophical  cognition  and  equally  plays  a  constitutive  role  in  such
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cognition, though this time, under the Critical account, this is because the
rules according to which the marks of our representations are diferentiable
are (shown to be) paralleled in the rules according to which the marks of
their  objects  are  diferentiable.  This  employment  is  distinguished in  the
crucial line of reasoning concerning these concepts in the appendix to the
introduction. 
Finally,  a third point  at which our account presented here must take
issue with that of Merrit’s concerns its characterisation of transcendental
reflection.  According  to  Merrit,  standard  accounts  of  transcendental
reflection take such reflection to be the equivalent of logical reflection in the
case  of  philosophical  or  a  priori  concepts.  That  is,  such  reflection  is
involved  in  the  generation  of  a  priori  concepts  from  non-conceptual
material. By contrast, under Merrit’s account, transcendental reflection is a
reflection that corresponds to normative requirements that guide the good
use of thought, rather than constitutive requirements of that thought.  As
mentioned, the account crucially distinguishes two broad sorts of reflection
—reflection that corresponds to the constitutive requirements of thought
(pure logic) and reflection that corresponds to the normative requirements
on  the  correct  use  of  thought  (applied  logic).  Under  her  account,
transcendental  reflection  is  a  case  of  the  later.  It  is  the  reflection  that
corresponds to the norms guiding the use of our thinking with regard to
the domain of phenomena. It is, in Merrit’s words, “to consider whether
any  given  claim  concerns  objects  in  a  sensible  or  a  merely  intelligible
world.” (2015, p. 18) It is to “be clear about the general nature of the object
represented  through  the  concepts  in  question:  i.e.,  whether  it  is
phenomenal or noumenal” (2015, p. 18) or to “care about the substantive
requirements on thinking relative to [the domain of phenomena]” (2015, p.
18). 
Thus, in contrast to the standard account, claims Merrit, transcendental
reflection  can,  under  her  proposed  account,  be  understood  as  a  ‘duty’.
Under standard accounts, such reflection must be implicitly present insofar
as we have cognition by means of the concepts in question or “something
that we are all already doing anyway, by sheer analytic default” (2015, p.
19).  By  contrast,  under  her  account,  transcendental  reflection,  as  the
consideration of the general nature of the objects represented through our
philosophical concepts, is an activity that we can carry out or fail to carry
out in our atempts at philosophical cognition. 
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However, the account presented here must take issue with this account
of transcendental reflection, and it must do so on the basis of the explicit
defnition of such reflection given by Kant in the appendix. As we have
noted, transcendental reflection is characterised in a number of places by
Kant as an activity of comparing  given representations with the  faculty to
which the representations are due: It is “consciousness of the relation of given
representations to our various sources of  cognition” (A260/B316).  It  is  a
“distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong”,
(A261/B317)  or  the  “action  through  which  I  make  the  comparison  of
representations  in  general  with  the  cognitive  power  in  which  they  are
situated, and through which I distinguish whether they are to be compared
to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure intuition”
(A261/B317). 
The  account  put  forward  by  Merrit wreaks  havoc  with  this  explicit
defnition in three ways. First, under her account, transcendental reflection
seems essentially to involve reference to the  objects  of the representations
under comparison. Under one formulation, we are to “be clear about the
general nature of the object represented through the concepts in question:
i.e., whether it is phenomenal or noumenal” (2015, p. 18). As we have seen,
however, Kant’s explicit defnitions involve no direct mention of the objects
of the representations. In contrast to our account, however, under Merrit’s
account  there  is  no  intelligible  sense  of  transcendental  reflection  in
abstraction from an appeal to the objects of the representations. Secondly,
the  ‘givenness’  of  the  representations  involved  is  not,  under  Merrit’s
account, understood in the technical sense of the Doctrine – as involving a
non-arbitrary  combination  of  marks  –  but  is  instead  understood  in  the
ordinary sense of ‘having in hand’ or ‘in possession of’. As we have seen,
Kant’s  mention  here  of  ‘given’  representations  is  to  be  understood  as
referring to the same representations discussed in the Doctrine of Method.
Finally,  and  perhaps  most  worryingly,  transcendental  reflection,  under
Merrit’s account, is characterised in a number of other ways that are not
equivalent to the explicit defnition of such reflection given in the appendix,
as when, for example, Merrit characterises it as “to consider whether any
given claim concerns objects in a sensible or a merely intelligible world”
(2015, p. 18), to “be clear about the general nature of the object represented
through  the  concepts  in  question:  i.e.,  whether  it  is  phenomenal  or
noumenal”  (ibid.),  or  to  “care  about  the  substantive  requirements  on
thinking relative to [the domain of phenomena]” (ibid.). 
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Finally,  there one further,  lesser concern with Merrit’s account that I
wish here to raise. The worry concerns transcendental reflection, as Merrit
construes it, as the correction to Leibniz’s error. Under Merrit’s account, the
error  is  to  engage  in  logical  reflection  as  the  organisation  of  concepts,
without consideration for the nature of the objects to which the concepts
apply. However, even if  Leibniz does, as Merrit’s account recommends,
consider this nature, he is likely to arrive at the same account. The point
here  is  that  the  correction,  as  it  stands  under  Merrit’s  account,  does
nothing to correct the concepts with which Leibniz is working.
Having thus dealt, in some further detail, with these three accounts that
diverged in signifcant ways from the account presented in this study, and
from the familiar formulation, we might, for the moment, lay this all to rest
and proceed to some brief concluding remarks. 
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Concluding overview
Our aim in this study was to bring to light a complex and systematic case
put forward by Kant in the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, the
‘Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection’. In order to do so, we examined,
in  Part  I,  a  crucial  line  of  reasoning  found  in  the  oft-overlooked
introductory passages of the appendix. This line of reasoning revealed a
prior, though lesser treated, Critical condition of the possibility of a priori,
or  philosophical,  cognition:  The  correct  employment  of  the  concepts  of
reflection.  These  concepts,  we  were  told,  fnd  their  employment  in  the
establishing of our relations among our representations as representations,
and their correct employment was put forward by Kant as requiring an
awareness  of  the  faculty  of  the  representations  in  question,  or
‘transcendental reflection’. 
To arrive at an understanding of this line of reasoning and the crucial
condition it contained, we turned, in Parts II to IV, to Kant’s pre-Critical
tradition of German Rationalism. In particular, we examined the method
adopted  by  this  tradition  for  establishing  philosophical  cognition.  Our
examination culminated, in Part IV, by revealing a crucial feature of the
frst  stage  of  this  method.  In  the  stage  of  bringing  our  various
representations to distinctness, German rationalism adopted the terms of
diferentiation  of  the  faculty  of  the  understanding  and  in  so  doing
employed the concepts of reflection under an erroneous awareness of the
faculties of the representations in question. German rationalism was thus at
once  erroneously  commited  to  the  understanding  as  the  only  faculty
necessary for philosophical cognition and to the objects of philosophical
cognition being diferentiable by the understanding alone.
In Part V, we turned to Kant’s claimed Critical correction of the error
and  the  correct  employment  of  the  concepts  of  reflection.  Under  this
correction,  in  bringing our  various  representations  to  distinctness,  these
representations  were  to  be  recognised  as  stemming  from  both  the
understanding  and  from  sensibility.  This  recognition  allowed  for  their
correct  diferentiation  by  means  of  the  concepts  of  reflection,  which
corrected diferentiation revealed the a priori representations of sensibility,
viz. the representations of space and time. We thus saw that a corrected
employment of the concepts of reflection was to be found from the very
start  of  the  Critique,  in  the  proofs  of  the  a  priori  representations  of
sensibility found in the Metaphysical Exposition, and that this employment
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underlay  the  workings  and  possibility  of  the  proofs,  and  indeed  the
possibility of the philosophical cognition that rested on them.
Finally,  in  Part  VI,  we  returned  to  the  appendix  and  to  the  line  of
reasoning of its introductory passages, having now an understanding of the
crucial Critical changes made by Kant to the German Rationalist method, in
order  to  clarify  and  dispel  the  puzzles  that  it  had  initially  seemed  to
introduce. Woven between this structure,  in Parts I,  VI, and VII, was an
examination of the more and less familiar accounts of the appendix section
—a section which this study has, I hope, shown to contain a case far more
systematic and crucial to the philosophical cognition put forward in the
Critique than preceding accounts have taken it to be.
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